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PATTERNS OF DIFFERENTIAL INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIRST ACTIVITIES: 
EVIDENCE FORM DHKP/C AND TURKISH HEZBOLLAH CASES 
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Major Director: Dr. William W. Newmann, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, L. 
Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs 
 
This study examines the patterns of involvement in terrorist activities for 
the Revolutionary People‘s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) and Turkish 
Hezbollah members. The study is based on the assumption that terrorists differ in 
terms of their involvement in terrorist activities. In this sense, there are full-time 
and part-time terrorists. Full-time terrorists act professionally and do the 
assignments given by their commanders. Part-time terrorists, on the other hand, 
act on a non-professional basis and have their own motivations to participate in 
terrorist activities. For part-timers, there are various factors that may have an 
effect on their degree of involvement in terrorist activities. Their decisions 
regarding whether to participate in a specific terrorist act can be influenced by 
individual factors as well as the instructions and assignments given to them. In 
this study, these factors are categorized under four different headings; 
demographic, relative deprivation, frustration, and social learning.  
ix 
 
 
 
Data regarding the involvement in terrorist activities (as measured by 
arrest records) and demographics (age, gender, marital status, social class), 
relative deprivation (education, work status), frustration (school dropout, loss of a 
loved one in a counter-terrorism operation, family arrest), and social learning 
(family association to a terrorist group and recruitment method) was collected 
from terrorists‘ autobiographies. Research hypotheses were tested using 
bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses. 
The findings indicated that relative deprivation, frustration, and social 
learning models can explain the differences in the degree of involvement in 
terrorism for DHKP/C members, but not for Turkish Hezbollah members 
(controlling for demographic variables). The results showed that these three 
models may account for some of the differences in involvement in terrorist 
activities. 
 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
For the past three decades, studies on terrorism have expended great 
efforts to determine whether or not there are unique background and personality 
traits common to all terrorists; researchers from different parts of the world have 
attempted to draw a general terrorist character in order to understand different 
processes of terrorism such as becoming a terrorist or engaging in terrorist acts 
(Clark, 1983; Handler, 1990; Hassan, 2001; Pedahzur, Perliger, & Weinberg, 2003; 
Russell & Miller, 1977; Sageman, 2004; Strentz, 1988; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). 
Findings from these studies suggested that a typical terrorist is predominantly male, 
well-educated, in his mid-twenties, and middle class. However, current studies are 
not immune to methodological issues.   
In general, the above studies suffer from two shortcomings. First, they did 
not use control groups, which would allow a comparison between the 
characteristics of terrorists and non-terrorists. Second, they focused mostly on ―who 
becomes a terrorist and why‖, whereas other processes such as involvement or 
engaging in terrorist acts and leaving terrorism are usually ignored. Most existing 
studies assumed a homogenous terrorist profile. They tended to ignore the 
possibility that terrorists may have different characteristics, which ultimately may 
determine not only one‘s becoming a terrorist in the first place but also his degree 
of involvement and dedication to terrorism. As a result, the questions of whether 
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terrorists are different from an average person and whether all terrorists are equally 
involved in terrorism have not been answered yet. This study aims to address these 
shortcomings by examining demographics and backgrounds of terrorists from 
several domestic terrorist networks in Turkey.  
Problem Statement 
Terrorism has been one of the major threats to the safety of the Turkish 
people for the past three decades. Since 1984 the number of people killed in 
terrorist attacks has reached up to 36,000 civilians and combatants. In addition to 
personal loss, monetary loss spent for counter-terrorism efforts only approximates 
$400 billion. When the cost of opportunities lost within this time period is added, the 
amount is even higher (Teymur, 2007). 
The Turkish government‘s efforts to combat terrorism have strongly 
emphasized counter-terrorism tactics (Yayla, 2005). In the last three decades of 
combating terrorism, the Turkish Army and National Police have assumed 
significant roles in determining and implementing counter-terrorism policies. On the 
other hand, Turkish legislators have passed several legislations, what were publicly 
known as ―Return to Home‖, to encourage terrorists to leave terrorism and return to 
their homes. In addition, governments started social, economic, and cultural 
initiatives in districts that were most vulnerable to terrorist attacks. 
In Turkey, there is a dearth of scientific studies on terrorism in general and 
the motivations of terrorists in particular. Most existing studies are opinion-based 
(Dilmac, 1997). Few studies have used an appropriate research design to obtain 
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systematic information on terrorism and the motivations of terrorists. This study is 
seeking to fill such a gap. Before stating what is fully expected with this study, a 
brief summary of major terrorist organizations and their background will be 
presented.  
The Current Gap in the Literature 
Understanding the nature of terrorism is the key to identifying the 
motivations of terrorists. However, the nature of terrorism has undergone significant 
changes recently. Modern terrorists have extensive technical skills ranging from 
piloting an aircraft to making the most sophisticated bombs. Moreover, conducting 
deadly attacks went being from being a highly technical issue to a matter of finding 
inexpensive explosives. Today, terrorist organizations have the ability to plot highly 
violent attacks with little cost by using a human body as a bomb.    
Parallel to the changes in world politics, the nature of domestic terrorism has 
changed in Turkey. One of the significant changes has occurred in the structure of 
leftist terrorist organizations. The collapse of the USSR and the demise of 
communism as a promising prospect pushed leftist terrorists to a greater utilization 
of legal activities such as gathering around solidarity associations, student 
confederations, and labor unions. Many potential recruits had lost their belief in a 
communist revolution. This has been the case at least for DHKP/C and other leftist 
terrorist organizations in Turkey for the last two decades.  
The legalization trend had an impact on the recruitment methods of terrorist 
organizations as well. More precisely, to ensure their own survival, DHKP/C and 
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other leftist terrorist groups kept their recruitment criteria very lax by granting many 
sympathizers membership status. As a result, membership has become available 
to many more persons than it was in the past. The purpose of greater legalization is 
to make more propaganda and attract more potential recruits. Sympathizers now 
serve both covertly or publicly. Police witnessed a changing trend in the familiar 
terrorist characteristics, from professional and fully dedicated terrorists to non-
professional and part-time workers. Interestingly and unexpectedly, new terrorists 
have regular occupations during the day, whereas they may go out and plot terrorist 
attacks during the night.  
The terrorism literature, however, has a tendency to see terrorists as full-
time workers. In this view, terrorists are not part-timers, but rather professionals 
who are thoroughly dedicated. The problem with this view is that it tends to ignore 
the differences amongst terrorists, which in turn creates a stereotypical terrorist 
profile in the minds of terrorism scholars. As a result, the degree to which a terrorist 
is involved in terrorist activities, which is the central focus of this study, does not 
draw enough attention from terrorism scholars.  
This study aims to contribute to expanding literature by examining the 
terrorist profile from a different angle. In other words, this study tries to make a 
profile of terrorists in respect to their involvement levels. It takes a sociological 
approach for analysis using sociological profiling, relative deprivation, frustration-
aggression, and social learning as frameworks. Sociological profiling is a method 
of identifying personal characteristics using socio-demographic variables such as 
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age, gender, and education. Relative deprivation theory asserts that terrorism is 
a response to poor market opportunities. Frustration-aggression claims that 
terrorism is a response to some social problems such as injustice and 
government oppression. Finally, social learning theory claims that terrorism is 
learned just like any other human behavior. The chapter two identifies studies 
and evidence relating to each of these frameworks in detail.   
Major Terrorist Organizations in Turkey 
In Turkey, there are over twenty different terrorist organizations of different 
orientations and sizes. These terrorist organizations can be categorized under 
three different groups with respect to their orientations or ideology: (a) Marxist-
Leninist or leftist, such as the Revolutionary People‘s Liberation Party/Front 
(DHKP/C), the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP), and the Turkish 
Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML); (b) Religiously-motivated or radical, 
such as the Turkish Hezbollah, the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front (IBDA-
C), and the Islamic Movement (IH); (c) Ethnic or separatist such as Kurdistan‘s 
Worker Party (PKK).  
This study examines the involvement levels of DHKP/C and Turkish 
Hezbollah members in respect to social backgrounds and motivations. These two 
terrorist organizations were purposely selected because they were responsible 
for almost half of all terrorist incidents that happened during the last fifteen years 
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(Sevinc, 2008). Further, these two organizations have the largest terrorist 
population within their respective categories1.  
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) 
The Revolutionary People‘s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) is a leftist 
terrorist group founded by Dursun Karatas and his friends in 1978 under the name 
―Dev-sol‖. Before 1978 the group was a part of the Turkish People‘s Liberation 
Party/Front (THKP/C). In 1994, delegations from different factions of Dev-Sol 
congregated in Damascus, Syria and decided to change their party‘s name to 
DHKP/C. The group has claimed a widespread atrocity; during the 1980s and the 
first half of 1990s DHKP/C militants killed over 1,000 police, military officials, and 
civilians in Turkey (Yayla, 2001).  
DHKP/C adopts a Marxist-Leninist revolution model and it explicitly states its 
ultimate purpose as destroying the current democratic regime in Turkey and 
founding a communist state instead. The group strongly opposes the U.S. and 
Western culture. In DHKP/C‘s ideology, Western countries in general and the U.S. 
in particular symbolize oligarchy and imperialism; Turkey is a part of the western 
world and the current political system is found to serve to the objectives of 
imperialist powers. Those who hold the power are the collaborators of imperialists 
and they should be removed from power to establish a classless society.    
                                            
1
 Further details are given in the sampling section of the Chapter III. Also, the reason as to why 
any terrorist organization from the separatist camp was not included is also discussed in the 
same chapter.  
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DHKP/C has three main extensions: political, military, and legal (Sevinc, 
2008). The political extension is responsible for the entire organization and the 
recruitment of the new members. The military extension is responsible for carrying 
out armed operations. DHKP/C views armed struggle as a propaganda technique 
and therefore names its military cells as ―Armed Propaganda Units‖ (Yayla, 2005). 
Finally, the legal extension is responsible for forming public opinions in various 
policy issues such as the rights of terrorist inmates in corrections and the rights of 
workers in workplaces. Unlike Turkish Hezbollah, DHKP/C is active in most units of 
social life. It has clandestine cells and legal extensions among labor and office 
workers, university and high school students, inhabitants of slums in big cities, and 
even media workers. The group is not only active in Turkey, but also in some 
European countries such as Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece. 
DHKP/C has the capacity to plot sensational assassinations, suicides and remote-
controlled bombings.  
DHKP/C militants appear in mobs, chant slogans, hang banners, and throw 
Molotov cocktails at police, military officials, government buildings, and bank ATMs. 
Among its major attacks are the assassinations of a former prime minister, a justice 
minister, a couple of military generals, and an attempted assassination of the U.S. 
president George W.H. Bush in 1992 during his official visit to the city of Istanbul 
(Teymur, 2004).   
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Turkish Hezbollah 
Turkish Hezbollah seeks to establish a religious state based on Islamic rules 
on Turkish territory. The foundation of Turkish Hezbollah dates back to late the 
1980s. During that time, religious extremists in the south east part of Turkey formed 
a book club by gathering around Ilim and Menzil bookstores, which were owned by 
major Hezbollah figures Huseyin Velioglu and Fidan Gungor. The names of these 
bookstores were then given to two different factions of Hezbollah when they broke 
their connection over the use of violence. The faction known as Ilim which was led 
by Huseyin Velioglu committed to violence in the early 1990s.  
Hezbollah‘s transition to violence inflicted a hidden turf battle between it and 
the PKK (Kurdistan Worker‘s Party), which then claimed 700 lives from both sides 
between 1992 and 1995. Along with the PKK, Hezbollah became one of the major 
threats during the 1990s in Turkey until the police raided a Hezbollah‘s cell in 
January 2000 and killed Huseyin Velioglu with his two top aides. In this operation, 
police reached the archives of Hezbollah saved in a computer folder. According to 
official records, between 1991 and 2003, police arrested as many as 14,000 
Hezbollah members and supporters (Ozeren & Van De Voorde, 2006). Turkish 
Hezbollah is mostly active in the south-eastern part of Turkey even though it carries 
out its terrorist attacks throughout the country. Unlike DHKP/C, Turkish Hezbollah 
has no legal extensions and operates more clandestinely.  
Even though the Turkish Hezbollah is confused with the Lebanon Hezbollah, 
evidently these two groups are totally different in strategy, if not the ideology. For 
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one thing, the Lebanon Hezbollah is a Shiite group located basically in Lebanon 
and dedicated to the destruction of the Israeli state. The Turkish Hezbollah, on the 
other hand, is a Sunni group and acts only within Turkish territory. The fact that the 
Lebanon Hezbollah was inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution is also true for 
Turkish Hezbollah (Ozeren & Van De Voorde, 2006). 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is two-fold: First, it focuses on DHKP/C and 
Turkish Hezbollah terrorists‘ degree of involvement in terrorist activities (as 
measured by arrest) in relation to their socio-demographic characteristics such as 
education, social class, work status, and school dropout records. Second, this study 
also examines the similarities and differences in socio-demographic characteristics 
between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
This study aims to complement a series of studies conducted by Teymur 
(2004, 2007) and Yayla (2005). In these studies, researchers sought to find out 
general characteristics of Turkish domestic terrorists. Both of these studies used 
descriptive and bivariate statistical analyses and reported backgrounds and 
demographics. However, further analysis is required to find out whether domestic 
terrorism in Turkey is borne out of some social and demographical forces common 
to all terrorists and their families. Such an analysis is a must to develop ―early 
intervention‖ methods to counter terrorism.  
In addition to early intervention methods, a counter-terrorism strategy must 
also consider those terrorists who are already committed to terrorism. Terrorists are 
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not equally committed to and involved in terrorism. Depending on arrest histories, 
statistical findings suggest some differences among terrorists. These results beg 
further statistical analysis which will be conducted in a multivariate setting to see 
what socio-demographic forces drive terrorists to repeat their offenses.  
Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer following research questions: 
1. To what extent are terrorists similar or different in terms of their degree of 
involvement in terrorist activities?  
2. What factors are influential in the degree of involvement in DHKP/C and 
Turkish Hezbollah?  
Definition of Terms 
There is a need for a framework to understand what is counted as terrorism, 
terrorist, terrorist organization, and terrorist act in the Turkish context. Turkish 
judges adjudicate anyone who is charged with being an active member of a terrorist 
organization and/or acting on behalf of a terrorist organization according to Turkish 
Anti-Terror Law. 
Terrorism 
The Turkish Anti-Terror Law of 1991 defines as terrorism any act of violence, 
oppression, intimidation, and threat committed by an individual or a group of 
individuals who act on behalf of an organization which is gathered (a) to change the 
constitutionally determined characteristics of the Turkish Republic; (b) to weaken or 
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to take over state authority; and (c) to abolish fundamental rights and freedoms of 
citizens. This definition implies that an act of terrorism involves not only politically-
motivated violence, but also politically-motivated oppression, intimidation, and 
threat. The definition is operational when the broad and complicated characteristics 
of a terroristic act are considered (Anti-Terror Law, 1991, Article 1). 
Terrorist Organization 
The Anti-Terror Law defines a terrorist organization as a group formed by 
two or more individuals to realize the aforementioned objectives cited in the very 
definition of terrorism in the same law (Anti-Terror Law, 1991, article 1). 
Terrorist 
The Anti-Terror Law‘s definition cites three different types of terrorists or who 
are counted as terrorists, which has also some application for the purpose of this 
research. Accordingly, a person who is a member of a terrorist organization which 
is seeking to realize the aforementioned goals is considered as a terror offender if 
he or she (a) commits a crime with others or alone in accordance with these goals 
or (b) becomes a member of a terrorist organization even though he or she did not 
commit the intended crime. A third category of terrorists is defined as those (c) who 
commit a crime on behalf of a terrorist organization even if he or she is not a 
member of any terrorist organization. At this point, there is a need to examine the 
process of joining in a terrorist organization (Anti-Terror Law, 1991, article 2).  
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Act of Terrorism 
The Turkish Anti-Terror Law does not define any specific activity as an act of 
terrorism. However, the law refers to a number of Turkish Penal Code articles. 
Accordingly, any violent or non-violent act of crime such as assassination, bombing, 
hijacking, robbery, restriction of liberty, threatening and forcing is considered an act 
of terrorism if it is committed to achieve the goals cited in the definition of terrorism 
section. If someone is proven to be a member of a terrorist organization, he or she 
is liable to 12.5 years in prison. If he or she is proven to commit a crime as a 
member of a terrorist organization, this sentence would be even higher (Anti-Terror 
Law, 1991, article 3). 
Recidivism 
Recidivism refers to the proportion of offenders who are arrested, 
prosecuted, convicted or returned to prison within a year of release from a 
correctional program (Maltz, 1984). The elapse time of re-arrest, re-prosecution, 
re-conviction, or return may vary from study to study. In fact, the term recidivism 
has not been applied to terrorism because terrorists are viewed as recidivist 
offenders. 
Terrorism scholars have a tendency to see terrorists as ―once a terrorist 
always a terrorist‖. This stereotypical view of terrorist assumes one type of 
terrorist in terms of personality characters and commitment. However, in practice, 
even terrorists tend to make a distinction between professional terrorists and 
non-professional terrorists. They define a professional terrorist as someone who 
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dedicates 24 hours of a day to the cause. Those who have sympathy to the 
ideology or who actively support the organization, but who do not have an official 
membership fall under the non-professional category. These non-professionals 
may concurrently be involved in terrorist activities while they maintain their 
regular activities.  
In Turkey, official databases regarding crime and terror offenses have not 
been designed in a way to measure recidivism. Therefore, a researcher has no 
way to measure what great a portion of the terrorism and crime is perpetrated by 
recidivist offenders or what motivates recidivist offenders to repeat their offenses. 
This research is not interested in recidivism. Instead, it attempts to model 
patterns of involvement in relation to socio-demographic characters and 
backgrounds. 
Degree of Involvement 
As aforementioned, terrorism scholars have a tendency to define unique 
terrorist characteristics. They then attempt to associate these characteristics with 
different processes in terrorism, such as becoming a terrorist, engaging in a 
terrorist act, and leading a terrorist organization. For example, psychological 
profiling studies of terrorist characteristics have aimed to measure the impact of 
some personality attributes such as being extrovert and hostile neurotic on 
becoming a terrorist (Victoroff, 2005).    
 This study hypothesizes that there is no one best profile that defines a 
typical terrorist. However, certain sociological characteristics may play different 
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roles in different processes. This study is interested in the process of involvement 
in terrorist acts rather than becoming a terrorist in the first place. In other words, 
the central focus of this study is the factors that may have an impact on the 
degree of involvement in terrorist act. The degree of involvement has to do with 
the level of activity. In this study, the degree of involvement is measured by 
arrest history. Terrorists who have a prior arrest history are defined as highly-
involved, whereas terrorists who do not have a prior arrest history are defined as 
less-involved.  
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Figure 1: Terrorists by Position in the organization 
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In order to better understand how ―involvement‖ works as a process in a 
terrorist‘s life, one needs to know the differences between the various positions in 
a typical terrorist group. As Figure 1 illustrates, there are three types of terrorists 
depending on the positions in a terrorist organization. Accordingly, there are 
professional and non-professional terrorists. Professional terrorists maintain a 
standard terrorist life. The clandestine nature of terrorist activities requires that a 
terrorist be isolated from the entire society. Professional terrorists, in this sense, 
do not marry; stay in terrorist cells; assume leadership positions; and plan and 
engage in violent terrorist attacks. 
On the other hand, terrorist organizations have a wide array of secondary 
missions (legal and illegal). Hence, they should recruit many non-professional 
cadres as they hire professionals. Most of the time, the number of non-professional 
cadres is far higher than that of professionals. Non-professionals maintain a 
regular lifestyle in which they drift in and out of a terrorist life. They try to remain 
their anonymous role and continue their legitimate professions. In a sense, they 
become terrorists only when they are given instructions to carry out certain 
missions. The types of missions carried out by non-professionals are somewhat 
different than those of professionals. Non-professional terrorists are sometimes 
assigned certain legal duties such as managing a solidarity association. They may 
also take part in some violent terrorist attacks. They arrange public meetings on 
various policy issues to form a public opinion on their behalf. Depending on their 
activity level (involvement), they remain under the risk of being frequently arrested.  
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This study aims to model if there is a pattern in the involvement of non-
professional terrorists in relation to their sociological characteristics and 
backgrounds. This research hypothesizes that there are factors other than 
instructions of leadership such as school dropout, death or arrest of family 
members, and unemployment that determine a non-professional terrorist‘s degree 
of involvement in terrorist activities.    
Organization of the Study 
The first chapter of this dissertation research highlights the problem 
statement, purpose of the study, research questions, and definitions of important 
terms. The purpose of this study is to identify what impacts involvement in terrorism 
among DHKP/C and Hezbollah members and to understand the differences and 
similarities between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members in terms of 
involvement level. The significance of the study lies in its originality as the study 
seeks to understand the underlying factors of involvement in terrorism. This study 
assumes that characteristics of terrorists are not totally identical.  
The second chapter reviews the related literature about terrorist profiling, 
demographic studies, and what impacts involvement level. This chapter identifies 
the variables that may have an impact on involvement in terrorism; relative 
deprivation, frustration-aggression, and social learning theories as they apply to the 
behaviors of terrorists, the nature of terrorism studies in general, the issues relating 
to terrorism studies, and to what extent previous researches identified the factors of 
involvement.  
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The third chapter introduces the methodology of the research. This chapter 
summarizes the methodology including research design, sources of data, sampling, 
and data analysis. This study is an exploratory one in the sense that it explores the 
patterns of involvement in terrorist activities. The subject topic is rarely touched by 
terrorism scholars. The required data was collected from autobiographies of 
terrorists. In general, autobiographies are not written in a way to conduct an in-
depth analysis about terrorists. However, in the DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah 
cases, the content and format of a typical autobiography allows researchers to 
conduct studies beyond descriptive purposes. In general, profiling studies suffer 
from several methodological shortcomings such as lack of quality data collection 
and weak statistical techniques (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Silke (2001). This study 
contributes to the literature by using terrorists‘ autobiographies, a relatively hard-to-
access data source, and advanced multivariate techniques. 
The fourth chapter presents the findings of statistical analysis. This section 
contains outputs concerning demographics and other characteristics of terrorists, 
bivariate relationships of variables, and multivariate relationships between 
involvement in terrorism and demographic and other characteristics. Findings 
suggested that terrorists with some negative life experiences such as school 
dropout and family arrest have a greater involvement in terrorist activities than 
terrorists with no such experiences.  
The final chapter concludes with a broad discussion of the results. In this 
section, the researcher first presents a list of supported and unsupported 
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hypotheses to lay the groundwork for further discussions. The purpose of this study 
goes beyond a theoretical contribution. The practical implications of this study will 
help criminal justice specialists at all levels to better identify the terrorist offender. 
 
 
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Terrorism is a complex phenomenon; therefore, it cannot be explained in 
vacuum (McCormick, 2003). What makes terrorism so attractive for dissident 
groups is its effectiveness among other alternative forms of dissidence. Terrorism is 
a choice made by terrorists and terrorist organizations. However, how, what, why, 
and when terrorist make these choice is subject to a hot debate among scholars. 
Terrorism theories can be broken down into four categories depending on 
their point of interest: (a) strategic theories; (b) structural theories; (c) psychological 
theories and (d) sociological theories. Strategic theories views terrorism as an 
instrument to achieve a set of goals identified by rational actors, while structural 
theories see the terrorism resulting from internal dynamics of political organizations. 
Psychological and sociological theories, on the other hand, emphasize the 
influence of individual factors such as personality, gender, age, education, and 
political affiliation.  
These four set of theories have some applications for this research. 
However, in strategic and structural theories, the main focus is on the determinants 
of decision to act. In other word, the dependent variable which is the focus of 
interest is ―terrorist act‖. On the other hand, psychological and sociological theories 
center their focus on individual characteristics and their likely relationship with 
terrorist decision making in different processes of terrorism. Both approaches 
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attempt to draw a terrorist profile and try to find out common psychological and 
sociological attributes of terrorists. While these theories emphasize individual 
factors, there are significant differences about their explanations of what factors 
lead an individual to resort terrorism. Psychological theories of terrorism take a 
behavioral approach and assume an atypical personality. Sociological theories, 
however, emphasize the importance of demographic traits such as age, gender, 
education, and social class on the behaviors of terrorists. 
The psychological approach is deemed more promising, but it is subject to 
criticism in two respects. First, some scholars such as Laquer (1999) and 
Wilkinson (1998) argued that there is no profile of a terrorist. In this opinion, the 
fact that the nature of terrorism varies over time and geography results in a 
constant change in the profiles of terrorists. According to Laquer (1999), one can 
be sure about some sociological characteristics such as the age of terrorists, by 
saying that terrorists are mostly young, but their psychological characteristics 
may vary across different cultures. White (2002) furthers a similar argument to 
that of Laquer (1999) when he says that individual personalities vary 
considerably that it is impossible to draw a single behavioral profile. Second, 
studying psychological profiles involves some methodological issues such as 
limited accessibility of research subjects. According to Israeli (1997), even the 
most comprehensive studies about the personality of terrorists rely on historical 
analysis of biographical information. 
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The issue of accessibility of research subject is also applicable for 
sociological profiling. However, juxtaposed each other sociological variables are 
far more accessible than psychological variables. The data regarding 
demographical background of terrorists such as age, gender, education, and 
social class can be obtained from government authorities or published 
biographies of terrorists. Hence, sociological profiling is considered a more 
reliable strategy than psychological profiling even though it is not completely 
infallible. 
Given the limitations of a psychological approach, this study takes a 
sociological approach to the research at hand. A psychological profiling seems 
less achievable because the researcher does not have a direct contact with 
terrorists. However, the researcher has an access to the secondary data 
sources, which makes it possible to gather data about sociological characteristics 
and backgrounds of terrorists. The literature about sociological theories will be 
reviewed next to understand what sociological variables were examined by 
previous studies.    
Sociological Theories 
Sociological theories can be broken down into four parts; sociological 
profiling, relative deprivation, frustration-aggression, and social learning. 
Sociological profiling does not offer a theoretical explanation to terrorism. Rather, 
it focuses on the common sociological attributes of terrorists such as age, 
gender, education, and social class. Sociological profiling assumes that terrorism 
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is a function of some socio-demographic characteristics common to all terrorists. 
It does not offer far-reaching accounts as to why these demographic attributes 
are related to one‘s choice of terrorism or greater involvement in terrorism. In this 
sense, profiling is a simplistic way of understanding the relationship between 
terrorism and demographic attributes.  
Relative deprivation theory assumes that political violence result from the 
gap between expectation and actual achievement. Frustration-aggression theory 
asserts that political violence is a result of desperation, which occurs in the face 
of oppression. Finally, social learning theory suggests that violence results from 
the observation and imitation of an aggressive role model. Studies and evidence 
related to each sociological explanation are provided next to have a better insight 
about sociological characteristics of terrorist.  
Sociological Profiling 
This study aims to answer the question, ―To what extent are terrorists 
similar or different in terms of their degree of involvement in terrorist activities?‖ 
Studies regarding the demographics of terrorists have some applications to this 
study. Demographic analysis is usually applied to find who becomes a terrorist 
and for what reasons. This study, however, tries to determine if there is a 
difference between the involvement levels of terrorists in relation to their certain 
sociological characteristics. The hypothesis that terrorists have different 
involvement levels in respect to their educational levels, gender, social class and 
certain other characteristics has not been studied yet. The findings of this study 
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would not only contribute to current literature, but also would help security 
personnel to identify terrorists who might repent and turn over information. 
Previous studies on terrorist characteristics attempted to define a common 
terrorist portrait to understand why some individuals engage in terrorism while 
others do not under similar conditions. This type of analysis was extensively used 
in the past (Clark, 1983; Handler, 1990; Hassan, 2001; Pedahzur, et al., 2003; 
Russell & Miller, 1977; Sageman, 2004; Strentz, 1988; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). 
Previous studies concerning the sociological characteristics of terrorists can be 
categorized under two different headings: Early studies and contemporary studies 
of terrorist characteristics. Early studies relate to the studies of early terrorist 
movements in Russia in the late nineteenth century (Itenberg, 1965; Mironov 
(1975). Contemporary studies concerns contemporary terrorist organizations 
worldwide ( Russell & Miller, 1977; Sageman, 2004). These studies started toward 
the end of the 1970s when terrorism soared to the top of the world‘s agenda.  
Early Studies on Terrorist Characteristics 
Studies regarding terrorist characteristics date back to the 19th century. A 
number of scholars studied the Russian populist movement of the 1870s by using 
quantitative data (Itenberg, 1965; Mironov 1975; Young, 1980). There were two 
major reasons for scholars to study the populist movement extensively. The size of 
the group was manageable and there were available biographical materials on 
most activists. Almost all activists were arrested at least one time in their lives. Also, 
tsarist police were very diligent in their record-saving efforts.  
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The first two statistical analyses of terrorist profiles appeared as early as the 
1870s. M.M. Merkulov, who was an official in Third Section of Tsarist Russia, wrote 
a report about some 1600 terrorists (Young, 1980). He included several categories 
such as age, educational attainment, social status, and geographical origin. 
Merkulov was able to identify the potential recruitment grounds such as universities. 
Another study was conducted by terrorists from Narodnaia Volia (People‘s Will) 
themselves, who attempted to study the revolutionaries in the movement. 
Narodnaia Volia was a political party formed by a dedicated group of narodniks in 
Russia in 1879. Narodnaia Volia‘s study revealed that terrorists had diverse 
backgrounds (Young, 1980).  
Both Merkulov‘s and Narodnaia Volia‘s studies were short in terms of the 
number of variables included, which would allow identifying a true revolutionist 
character. Further, these studies suffered from the self-serving objectives of the 
researchers. Merkulov was seeking to write an official report, while Narodnaia Volia 
was trying to recognize its own cadres. Therefore, the findings of these studies 
were suspicious. 
After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, populism attracted great attention 
from Russian scholars who studied the general characteristics of early populism 
activists of the 1870s based on their arrest records. Merkulov‘s confidential record 
was published after the revolution. Moreover, several other research projects were 
launched by Russian scholars who drew some official and unofficial data sources 
which were available to them. The major source of data was individual 
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autobiographies of populist movement activists from the 1860s and 1870s. Stalin‘s 
reign in 1925, however, gave a halt to such studies for the next two decades. The 
Russian scholars‘ initiative for the biographical study of populist activists could not 
go beyond the 1880s. Following Stalin‘s death, studies on revolutionary populism 
were regenerated in the 1950s (Young, 1980).  
One of the best studies on revolutionary populism was conducted by 
Itenberg (1965) who examined the Dvizhenie v. Narod of the 1870s. In a similar 
study to that of Merkulov, Itenberg‘s (1965) study compared 1800 detained activists 
from Dvizhenie. This study, however, suffered because of the number of variables 
introduced and therefore revealed little about the characteristics of revolutionists. 
Itenberg‘s (1965) study identified Dvizhenie activists as educated men and women 
from the university towns of Russia. 
Another study was conducted by Mironov (1975) who used advanced 
statistical techniques in his analysis of revolutionary activists. Mironov (1975) tested 
the impact of some social background factors on the participation of the populist 
movement of the 1870s. Even though he did not mention the size and source of his 
data, Mironov‘s (1975) statistical analysis disclosed some significant background 
factors on the participation. Accordingly, age and educational level as opposed to 
religion, nationality, and social origins, constituted the most important factors of 
revolutionary predisposition.   
More recently, a study on populist activists was carried out by an American 
historian. Young (1980) conducted a statistical analysis based on group and 
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individual biographies of activists within the populist movement of the 1870s. In his 
statistical analysis of 355 activists, Young (1980) first took 131 activists, who later 
turned to terrorism, to examine the hypothesis that quantifiable background and 
developmental variables (such as gender, father‘s occupation, birth date, province 
of birth, educational attainment, occupation of self, entry date, arrest history) 
distinguish terrorists from non-terrorists. His findings indicated that there are no 
background and developmental variables that are common to all terrorists, which 
distinguishes them from their non-terrorist counterparts.  
Young (1980) then investigated the role of group dynamic or radical 
fraternity, and the continued coercion and oppression from the autocratic Russian 
tsars in turning to political terrorism by examining the biographies of three active 
terrorists: Mark Natanson, Sofia Perovskaia, and Nikolai Morozov from Narodnaia 
Volia. He concluded that these individuals felt frustration and that revenge mixed 
with a sense that highly dedicated individuals could change the course of history as 
later illustrated by the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 in Russia.  
Thirdly, Young (1980) tested the hypothesis that quantifiable background 
and developmental variables have no impact on levels of involvement within the 
terrorist movement. Level of involvement was measured with an interval scale 
ranking from least to most extreme terrorist acts.  He used the same groups of 131 
activists who turned to terrorism as samples. Results revealed that it was 
circumstances within the terrorist group rather than a specific terrorist profile which 
determined the involvement level.  
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Finally, Young (1980) tested the hypothesis that there is a relationship 
between prior arrest and detainment experiences and the level of political violence 
subsequently committed by individual terrorists. To test this hypothesis, he created 
a scale of time spent in incarceration prior to the commission of first terrorist act. He 
then used the previously created scale of level of involvement. Findings suggested 
a relationship between prior arrest history and detainment experiences and level of 
political violence committed by individual terrorists.  
In conclusion, studies on the Russian populist movement suffered from a 
common shortcoming. Most utilized arrest data, which, according to Young, 
reflected the assessment of tsarist police practices rather than the revolutionary 
movement itself. Young‘s (1980) study, however, differed from early studies by its 
sampling technique. He used published autobiographies of activists from the 
populist movement who turned to violence. Young‘s (1980) comparison of violent 
and non-violent activists (terrorists and non-terrorists) revealed no significant 
differences.  
Contemporary Profiling Studies 
Contemporary (terrorist) profiling studies were first introduced in the 1970s 
when many scores of people were inspired by a socialist revolution ideal. Since 
then, many profiling studies were conducted with different orientations. Most 
recently, the orientation has changed to religiously motivated terrorists (Hassan, 
2001; Pedahzur, Perliger, & Weinberg, 2003; Sageman, 2004). Thus, 
Contemporary profiling studies can be analyzed under three different headings in 
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terms of their scopes: (a) Worldwide Analysis of the Terrorist Profile; (b) Regional 
and Domestic analysis of the Terrorist Profile; and (c) Analysis of Middle Eastern 
suicide and non-suicide terrorists. The next three sections present brief information 
about the studies under each category. Findings are summarized in a different 
section.  
(a) Worldwide Analysis of the Terrorist Profile 
The first worldwide analysis of terrorist profiling was conducted by Russell 
and Miller in 1977. The findings of this study were widely cited in terrorism 
literature. Russell and Miller (1977) attempted to draw a sociological profile of 
Contemporary urban terrorists by compiling more than 350 terrorist cadres and 
leaders from German, Irish, Turkish, Spanish, Argentinean, Brazilian, Iranian, 
Palestinian, Japanese, and Uruguayan terrorist groups. Russell and Miller‘s (1977) 
study confirmed some of the widely reported sociological characteristics of terrorists 
in the 1970s such as age, gender, educational and socio-economic background, 
and marital status. They collected the information regarding these variables from 
published data. 
However, their study suffered from some methodological issues such as 
comparing the characteristics of terrorists from various part of the world and then 
making generalizations about terrorist characteristics, which ultimately harmed the 
validity of their study. On the other hand, they limited their analysis with urban 
terrorists by leaving out those carrying out rural guerilla warfare. Still, the findings of 
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this study have been cited widely and used as references when making some 
generalization about terrorist characteristics (RA Hudson, 2002). 
Long after Russell and Miller (1977), Sageman (2004) compiled information 
from public domain on 172 persons who identify themselves as a members of 
―Salafi Mujahidin‖, an informal umbrella organization under which a number of 
religiously-motivated and transnational terrorist groups convened such as the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Al-Qaeda. When compiling the information for his 
analysis, Sageman (2004) used the documents and transcripts of legal 
proceedings, government documents and press, academic and internet articles.  
In his analysis, Sageman (2004) included: social background as measured 
by social origin, education, socio-economic status, occupation, family status; 
psychological background as measured by mental illness and terrorist personality 
(pathological narcissism, paranoia, and authoritarian personality); circumstances of 
joining the jihad as measured by age, place of recruitment, faith, employment, and 
relative deprivation; and social affiliation as measured by friendship, kinship, 
discipleship, and worship. Sageman (2004) also presented a social network 
analysis of global Salafi Mujahidin and the characteristics of this network. Sageman 
(2004), however, did not include terrorists engaged in local terrorism; his sampling 
is biased toward the groups engaged in transnational terrorism and toward those 
terrorists who have not been investigated. 
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(b) Regional and Domestic Studies of the Terrorist Profile 
The lack of worldwide data sources about terrorists led many researchers to 
conduct regional studies on the terrorist profile. For instance, Clark (1983) focused 
on the profile of Basque separatists from what is known as ETA (Euzkadi ta 
Askatasuna). Clark (1983) used two different kinds of biographical information. The 
first consisted of 48 case studies of ETA members. The second included more 
limited information on 447 other ETA members. Clark‘s (1983) study examined the 
age, sex, and socioeconomic background of members and families, and the ethnic 
and linguistic characteristics of ETA terrorists. Clark‘s (1983) study also discussed 
various processes in the lives of ETA members including radicalization of Basque 
youth, recruitment, relationship with families, friends, and loved ones, and leaving 
the organization.  
Another study by Weinberg and Eubank (1987) examined the profiles of 
Italian terrorists. Obtaining information from two major newspapers in Italy and from 
court files, Weinberg and Eubank (1987) reported biographical characteristics of 
Italian terrorists such as sex, age, place of birth, place of residence, role in the 
organization, group affiliation, nature of relationship to other terrorists, occupation 
prior to becoming terrorist, and membership to political organizations prior to 
becoming a terrorist. This was also the first known study that ever examined the 
role of women in a terrorist organization; of the 2,512 terrorists whose biographical 
characteristics were reported, 451 were women.   
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The final study to be mentioned in this category was conducted by Handler 
(1990) who analyzed the socioeconomic profile of American terrorists. Handler 
(1990) placed the American experience with domestic terrorism in his focus as 
some issue-oriented and reformist political groups such as anti-abortionists began 
to take stage in American politics toward the end of 1970s. To this end, he 
compiled the biographical backgrounds of 280 known right-wing and left-wing 
terrorists who were active in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Differently than previous studies, Handler (1990) tabulated socio-economic 
variables with right-left wing affiliation, gender, and position in the terrorist 
organizations. As for socio-economic variables, Handler (1990) included education, 
religion, race, occupation, income, and parents‘ occupation and income. Handler‘s 
(1990) study of right and left wing terrorists serves to achieve understanding of 
reasons as to why people choose to participate in specific groups.  
(c) Analysis of Middle Eastern Terrorist and Suicide Bombers 
Most recently, another category of profiling studies has emerged with a 
special interest in Middle Eastern terrorists. In fact, Russell and Miller‘s (1977) 
study included Middle Eastern terrorist organizations long before this category of 
profiling started. However, early terrorist organizations in the Middle East such as 
Al-Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) acted with a 
Marxist-Leninist motive even though their ultimate purpose was the same as their 
contemporary religious counterparts. On the other hand, recently established 
terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas 
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came into the picture by using religious motives. Since these organizations were 
involved in highly sensational suicide attacks during the last two decades, the 
characteristics and motives of their militants drew considerable scholarly attention.  
For instance, Hassan (2001) conducted an on-site study and interviewed 
almost 250 members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza during three years 
between 1996 and 1999. Most of the terrorists Hassan (2001) interviewed were 
participants in attempted suicide attacks but failed to complete the attack as 
planned. Hassan (2001) was able to interview her subjects in meetings arranged by 
intermediaries. Hence, Hassan‘s (2001) study has been extensively cited for her 
exceptional data collection method (Krueger & Malecková, 2003; Newman, 2006; 
Silke, 2004; Victoroff, 2005). 
Normally, the clandestine structure of terrorist organizations and terrorists‘ 
lives rarely allows the independent researcher to have systematic access to the 
research subject. Most independent researchers who previously conducted profile 
studies had to rely on secondary resources. Hassan‘s (2001) study, however, 
constitutes an exception to this. Unfortunately, she did not report any specific 
demographic and socio-economic variables of terrorists she interviewed as part of 
her promise to keep the records strictly anonymous. 
Pedahzur et al. (2003) compared the characteristics of suicide and non-
suicide terrorists in the Middle East. Pedahzur et al. (2003) did not limit their study 
with a specific terrorist organization. They collected data from an Israeli daily 
newspaper (Ha‘aretz) by detecting all terrorist events (suicide or non-suicide) 
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between 1993 and 2002. The population of their research consisted of 819 
subjects, 743 of whom were non-suicide and 80 were suicide terrorists. Among the 
variables included were previous experiences in terrorism acts, education, 
ideological affiliation, marital status, age, socio-economic background, and gender. 
Pedahzur et al.‘s (2003) study offered a useful comparison of terrorists with 
different motives, suicidal and non-suicidal. However, this study was criticized on 
the basis of its data sources. More specifically, it heavily relies on journalistic 
accounts. However, heavy reliance on journalistic accounts is problematic because 
researchers have limited ways to know the reliability of information given unless 
they triangulate or confirm the same information from another data source 
(Sageman, 2004). 
Most recently Berrebi (2004) attempted to investigate the potential link 
between terrorism and economic desperation. Another focus of his study was to 
investigate the potential similarities and differences between terrorists from Hamas 
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the general population of Palestine. 
Berrebi (2004) collected data from the biographies of 335 (285 killed and 50 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaders) terrorists from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
and Hamas from their online sources. His data set included the age, poverty status, 
education, marital status, resident type (rural vs. urban), and district of residence.  
Berrebi‘s (2004) comparison between terrorists and the general population 
of Palestine indicated that terrorism studies can take the advantage of quasi-
experimental research designs by using control groups. In the terrorism field, the 
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root cause of approach is highly problematic from a methodological standpoint; 
therefore, terrorism scholars have not been so eager to apply it (Newman, 2006). 
However, this study can be considered as an exception. One of the significant 
limitations of Berrebi‘s (2004) study was related to the accuracy of biographical 
information. Since the data was collected from terrorist websites, the possibility of 
exaggerating some facts was high. In addition, there was no clear indication of the 
poverty status of terrorists in their biographies. Therefore, the researcher had to 
infer the poverty status by looking at the individual‘s occupation, foreign travel 
history, car ownership, and computer availability, where any of these was available. 
In other words, the poverty status of terrorists was constructed conveniently.  
As seen in this brief review, most profiling studies suffered from a common 
methodological problem, the reliability of information collected. This was because of 
the nature of terrorism studies, which gives a little room to an independent observer 
to conduct an on-site data collection opportunity. Despite this shortcoming, previous 
studies found a similar pattern in the profiles of terrorists. Evidence from the 
aforementioned studies will be provided next to demonstrate that terrorists have 
common social backgrounds and that a similar analysis is possible to determine 
their involvement level as well. 
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Findings of Contemporary Profiling Studies 
Age 
Findings from previous studies suggest that as age increases, participation 
in terrorism diminishes (Clark, 1983; Russell & Miller, 1977; Weinberg & Eubank, 
1987). This is a relationship which also exists between crime and age. This pattern 
(in terrorism) remains remarkably the same across time, geography, and type of 
crime. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no variance between 
participation age, peak age, and dropout age2. The participation age in terrorism 
shows great variance across regions and organizations. The dropout age, however, 
is somewhat similar and begins toward the end of the twenties (Clark, 1983; 
Russell & Miller, 1977; Taylor & Ryan, 1988; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). There is 
no evidence for peak age. 
Age trends change from one group to another. However, terrorists tend to be 
young. Russell and Miller (1977) reported that the average age of a typical terrorist 
ranged from 22 to 25, except for German, Japan, and Palestinian terrorists. The 
mean (participation) age for terrorists from these countries was even lower, ranging 
from 20 to 25. Sageman (2004), however, found that the joining age was almost 26 
for Salafi Mujahidin. Clark (1983) found a similar result to that of Sageman (2004) 
when he said that ETA members tend to be in their middle or late twenties when 
they joined the organization. Weinberg and Eubank (1987) found that a majority of 
                                            
2
 These terms refer to different time periods in a terrorist life. Participation age refers to the age of 
first engagement with a terrorist group. Peak age, on the other hand, represents the age when the 
participation in terrorist activities peaks. Finally, dropout age indicates the age when a terrorist quits. 
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terrorists were between 20 and 29 in age when they joined a terrorist organization. 
The same study also reported that the lowest age of participation was as low as 15 
for Italian women terrorists. A similar pattern was reported by Taylor and Ryan 
(1988) concluding that the average age was dropping in the 1980s for different 
terrorist groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The 
participation in the PKK is also as low as 14, as reported by the organization itself 
on its own website3. 
Even though the mean age for a typical terrorist ranged between 20 and 29 
in most studies, and even lower in some cases, terrorist leaders tend to be older 
than ordinary terrorists. Carlos Marighella of Brazil was 58 and Huseyin Velioglu of 
the Turkish Hezbollah was 49 when they were killed; Abdullah Ocalan of the PKK is 
60 and Dursun Karatas of DHKP/C is 55 and they are still alive4. Russell and Miller 
(1977) found that of the 17 terrorist organizations they examined most leadership 
cadres were in their mid-30s or early 40s. A similar pattern was reported by 
Weinberg and Eubank (1987) for Italian women terrorists; almost 25 percent of their 
samples were at least in their early 30s and higher. 
Although there is evidence for participation and dropout ages, there is no 
evidence for peak age. Normally, a terrorist can participate in any terrorist activity at 
any point in his career. However, younger terrorists are more likely to take risks 
than older terrorists, which in turn affect their willingness to participate in terrorist 
                                            
3
 The PKK has a website which can be reached from www.hpg-online.net. On this website, the 
organization publishes the profiles of killed terrorists.  
4
 Dursun Karatas passed away in August, 2008. 
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acts. On the other hand, one can equally assert that older terrorists are much more 
committed to the causes and therefore their willingness to participate would also be 
more than that of younger terrorists. As a result, the relationship between age and 
participation in terrorist activities is not certain.   
Education 
Profiling studies, in general, concluded that terrorists are well-educated 
persons. For instance, Russell and Miller (1977) reported that two-thirds of the 
terrorists had some type of university degree. The educational level was even 
higher for German Baader-Meinof terrorists with almost 80 percent having a 
university degree. This pattern did not change for the countries with Muslim majority 
such as Turkey, Iran, and Palestine.  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks terrorism scholars focused on the type of 
education as well as its level. Sageman‘s (2004) study of the global Salafi 
Mujahidin measured education in two different ways: the type of education and the 
educational level achieved. According to Sageman (2004), contrary to the common 
view that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia encourages a system of education that 
advocates hatred of the West, only 17 percent of the terrorists he analyzed had 
participated in religious schools. However, a majority of them had a secular 
education in elementary and secondary schools. Sageman (2004) also rejects the 
argument that links the participation in terrorism to a low level of education, which in 
turn makes terrorists vulnerable to brainwashing by religious extremists. According 
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to his findings, almost 71 percent of the terrorists from global Salafi Mujahidin had a 
college or graduate degree. 
Sageman‘s (2004) finding was consistent with that of Kruger and Maleckova 
(2003) who measured the support for political violence among Palestinians. 
Accordingly, the support for political violence against Israeli civilians was more 
common among professionals than labor workers (43 vs. 35 percent); and the 
support was higher among people with secondary education than among people 
with no education (39 vs.32 percent). 
However, the pattern that terrorists are highly educated is not the same 
across terrorist organizations. Russell and Miller (1977) reported that almost none 
of the terrorists from the Provisional Wing of Irish Republican Army (IRA) had 
higher educational levels. Handler (1990) found that the percentage of college 
degree earning among American leftist terrorists was as high as 75 percent 
whereas this figure for rightist ones was only 22 percent. Nevertheless, the number 
of studies which reported that terrorists are highly educated is far more than the 
number of studies which reported otherwise. Does the education level vary 
between highly involved and lowly involved terrorists? Previous studies did not 
report any finding whether there is a relationship between the levels of education 
and involvement.  
Gender 
Findings from previous researches suggested that terrorism is a male 
profession. For instance, Russell and Miller (1977) reported that among the Latin 
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American and European terrorist groups they profiled, male terrorists accounted for 
more than 80 percent whereas female terrorists accounted for only 16 percent. 
Clark (1983) reported that males accounted for 91 percent of all ETA terrorists 
arrested between 1979 and 1980. In Weinberg and Eubank‘s (1987) biographical 
study of Italian terrorists who acted between 1970 and 1984, 82 percent was male.  
Russell and Miller‘s (1977) findings suggested that gender proportion is 
closely associated with the strategy followed. In Russell and Miller‘s (1977) study, 
urban terrorists were predominantly male. On the contrary, females usually 
assumed secondary positions in urban-based terrorist groups. On the other hand, 
rural-based insurgent groups in Latin America such as the FSLN and Shining Path 
of Peru included a large number of female terrorists in their cadres.  
Handler‘s (1990) finding indicated that gender proportion may also be 
related to the political orientation of a terrorist group. In his study of American 
terrorists, Handler (1990) found significant differences in the number of female 
cadres between the left-wing and right-wing terrorist organizations. Accordingly, of 
the American right-wing terrorists he studied, 89 percent was male and 11 percent 
was female. However, gender proportion in American left-wing terrorist groups was 
almost even, with 54 percent male and 46 percent female. Similar to Handler‘s 
(1990) finding, Russell and Miller (1977) reported that the number of women served 
in two leftist Latin American groups, Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and July Second 
Movement, reached up to 60 percent in 1976. Weinberg ad Eubank (1987) reported 
a parallel pattern; of the 451 Italian female terrorists they studied, only 10 percent 
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were affiliated with neo-fascist terrorist groups. The remaining 90 percent were 
connected with different leftist groups such as the Red Brigades. 
A couple of explanations were brought as to why females join a terrorist 
group at a low rate which is disproportionate to their population rate in society. In 
Galvin‘s (1983) view, the women are involved in terrorism with a totally different 
motivation than the men. In her opinion, most of the time women are attracted to 
terrorism with an expectation for glory and power. Weinberg and Eubank (1987) 
found that companionship and family ties were cited as other reasons for female‘s 
for their involvement in terrorism. Of the Italian terrorists they profiled, 27 percent 
were related by family and companion ties to other terrorists.  
Previous researches also questioned the level of involvement in terrorist 
activities by gender. Most studies reported that female terrorists mostly carry out 
low profile jobs in a terrorist organization. For instance, Russell and Miller (1977) 
found that most of the terrorist attacks that occurred in Latin America and West 
Europe between 1966 and 1976 were planned and executed by male terrorists. 
Females were mostly deployed in jobs that required little or no man power such as 
intelligence collection, and assisting terrorist cadres as nurses or couriers. A similar 
pattern was reported by Clark (1983) about the ETA members in Spain. Clark 
(1983) stated that ETA systematically denied women from being involved 
particularly in active duties. In addition, there was a ―pronounced antipathy‖ against 
women in the ETA. 
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On the other hand, there were women terrorists, especially from leftist 
groups, who assumed leadership positions. According to Handler (1990), of the 
American leftist women terrorists, 35 percent were identified as a member of the 
leadership team, while of the men, 27 percent assumed leadership positions. In the 
past, there were charismatic female terrorist leaders who brought great influence on 
many female terrorists such as Sofia Perovskaia of Narodnaia Volia, Susanne 
Albrecht, Gudrun Esslin, and Ulrike Meinhof of the Baader-Meinof, Leila Khaled of 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Palestine (PFLP), and Dora Maria Tellez 
of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Nevertheless, women‘s 
involvement in terrorism in general and terrorist attacks in particular still remains 
low. 
Social Class (Socioeconomic Status) 
Is terrorism a response to poor market opportunities? Previous profiling 
studies have tried to answer this question by examining the socioeconomic class 
where terrorists come from. Russell and Miller (1977) found that most of the 
terrorists they surveyed were either upper-middle class or upper class. Most of the 
European and Japanese terrorists were the children of affluent families except 
terrorists from certain terrorist groups such as the PKK, the LTTE, and the 
Revolutionary Armed Force of Columbia (FARC). For instance, the German RAF 
and the Italian Red Brigades were exclusively composed of middle-class terrorists 
who had dropped out of high schools or universities. Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, socialist ideology attracted many affluent young people from West Europe, 
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the United States, and Japan into the radical groups with a sense of responsibility 
for the sufferings of the poor of the world (RA Hudson, 2002). 
However, not all terrorists in Russell and Miller‘s (1977) study were middle 
and upper class members. Terrorists from the PKK, LTTE, and FARC, as well as 
terrorists from paramilitary groups of Ireland such as the Official Irish Republican 
Army (Official IRA) and the Provisional Republican Army (Provisional IRA) were 
mostly coming from working class families. Related to their social class, terrorists 
from these paramilitary groups did not have a higher educational background 
either. For Palestinian terrorist groups, most of the rank and file cadres were of a 
lower class of their society, while their leadership cadres were middle and upper 
class.  
Similarly to that of the gender proportion, the strategy of terrorist groups 
(urban versus rural) seems to be one of the factors which determine the social 
class of terrorists. Most rural-based insurgent terrorist groups such as the PKK, 
FARC, and the Provisional IRA attracted people from lower the segments of 
society. On the other hand, most urban-based leftist terrorist groups such as the 
Japanese Red Army, German Baader Meinhof, and Uruguayan Tupamaros 
recruited people from middle and upper classes. This fact was clearly stated by 
Uruguayan Chancellor Jorge Peirano Facio in 1970 when he said ―for each family 
of the upper class there is a Tupamaro‖ (Russell & Miller, 1977). 
A similar prototype was reported by Clark (1983) about the terrorists from 
the Basque region of Spain. Most of the ETA terrorists in his study were either 
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working class or lower middle class. Considering the fact that ETA is a rural-based 
insurgent group that is aiming to separate a part of Spain and that most of its 
members were industrial small town workers, this result corresponds to that of 
Russell and Miller (1977).  
The same analysis was also true for American right-wing and left-wing 
terrorists. According to Handler (1990), right-wing American terrorists were mostly 
middle and lower class, while left-wing American terrorists were mostly middle and 
upper class. As a result, one can conclude that terrorists may come from a wide 
variety of social class backgrounds. However, upper-middle class and upper class 
members prefer left-wing and urban-based terrorist organizations, while lower-
middle class and working class members make their choice for right-wing and rural-
based terrorist organizations. 
Studies of Middle Eastern terrorists founded similar results to the previous 
researches. For instance, Hassan‘s (2001) interview with 250 Palestinian suicide 
bombers indicated that none of the suicide bombers were ―desperately poor‖. 
Similarly, Berrebi‘s (2004) comparison of 48 killed suicide bombers from Hamas 
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the general population of Palestine 
revealed that the terrorists were less likely to come from impoverished families 
when compared to the general Palestinian population. Kruger and Maleckova‘s 
(2003) study found no support for the link between poverty and participation in the 
(Lebanon) Hezbollah. 
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Most recently, Sageman (2004) points out that the traditional way of 
measuring socioeconomic status tends to ignore differences among the various 
clusters. His analysis of the Global Salafi Mujahidin revealed that most of the 
leadership cadres and core Arab clusters (terrorists from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Egypt, and Syria) were of the middle and upper classes. On the other hand, most of 
the Southeast Asian cluster (terrorists from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) 
and the Maghrep Arab cluster (terrorists from Morocco, France, and Algeria) were 
of the middle and lower classes. Overall, three-fourths of all terrorists he examined 
were middle and upper classes. According to Sageman (2004), this was ―refuting 
the argument that terrorism emerges from poverty (p. 74)‖. 
Similar to Sageman‘s (2004) point on socioeconomic status of terrorists, this 
study is a comparison of two different clusters of terrorists; highly involved versus 
less involved terrorists. Previous studies, however, did not present any evidence of 
whether social class has an impact on the degree of involvement. On the other 
hand, there is no conceptual argument about whether differential involvement in 
terrorism is a function of socioeconomic status.  
Place of Recruitment (Rural versus Urban)  
Terrorists groups recruit members in the areas where they concentrate their 
operations most because local recruits have the advantage of knowing the area of 
operation and the ability to contact local aides. Therefore, urban-based terrorist 
organizations focus on urban areas, whereas rural-based terrorist organizations 
targets rural areas for recruitment. For the potential recruits of terrorists, a terrorist 
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organization‘s being conveniently available in a surrounding area becomes a 
significant factor in their decision to join in. Previous researches support this 
argument. 
For instance, Russell and Miller (1977) reported that most of the terrorists in 
Latin American and European terrorist groups in the 1970s joined from urban 
areas. This pattern was almost the same across different groups such as the 
Uruguayan Tupamaros, the German Baader-Meinof, and the Italian Red Brigades. 
For Palestinian terrorists, especially those from the PFLP, many were born or lived 
a significant portion of their lives in urban cities. Most of the terrorist organizations 
mentioned in Russell and Miller‘s study were based in urban cities of their country 
of origin.  
Weinberg and Eubank (1987) reported that 65 percent of the Italian terrorists 
they surveyed were recruited from big cities, whereas only 10 percent were from 
small cities. On the other hand, 30 percent of the terrorists were born in small 
communities where the populations were under 100,000. When the place of birth is 
compared to the place of recruitment, it is clear that almost half of the terrorists 
recruited from big cities were mobile and emigrated from smaller communities. 
Weinberg and Eubank‘s (1987) findings were similar to those of Russell and Miller 
(1977) because they studied urban-based neo-fascist and leftist terrorists groups. 
Studies on rural-based terrorist organizations, such as Clark‘s (1983) 
analysis of ETA of Spain, did not report the place of recruitment. Clark (1983), 
however, reported that a typical ETA member comes from a working class or lower 
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middle class. He concluded that those from the working class were not likely to be 
employed by large factories but rather by small factories in small towns. In other 
words, the ETA, which is a rural-based (Basque region) terrorist organization in 
Spain, recruits its members among the dwellers of small industrial towns in Basque, 
Spain.  
Despite ample evidence indicating a relationship between the place of 
recruitment and the type of organizations, there is no evidence for differential 
involvement in terrorism activities and the place of recruitment. In Turkey, both 
urban-based and rural-based terrorist groups organize their activities in the slums of 
big cities where most of the residents are the immigrants of rural towns of the inner 
country. The immigrant population is concentrated in certain neighborhoods. The 
integration of the immigrant population into the urban society takes a long time, 
which in turn makes them vulnerable to the exploitation of terrorist organizations. 
Even though most of the terrorists join from urban cities, many have a rural family 
background. However, to what extent this feature of terrorists impact the level of 
involvement is not clear.  
Marital Status 
According to Russell and Miller (1977), unmarried terrorists is the rule. The 
need for security, mobility, and dedication to the cause prevents many terrorists 
from taking the responsibilities of a family and forces them to remain single. Russell 
and Miller‘s (1977) findings indicated that 75-80 percent of Latin American, 
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European, Middle Eastern and Asian terrorists were single. The only exception was 
Uruguayan Tupamaros, with almost 30 percent of its cadres being married.  
Contrary to the findings of Russell and Miller (1977), Sageman (2004) found 
that almost 75 percent of Salafi Mujahidin members were married. Sageman (2004) 
attributes the high marriage rate among the Salafi Mujahidin to their faith. 
Accordingly, Islam encourages its believers to marry and have children. Thus, the 
pattern of low marriage rate among the Palestinian terrorists in Russell and Miller‘s 
(1977) study was not confirmed by Sageman‘s (2004) study of the Salafi Mujahidin. 
For one thing, Palestinian terrorists in Russell and Miller‘s (1977) study were not the 
members of religious oriented groups. Rather, terrorists in Russell and Miller‘s 
(1977) study were from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and 
the Black September Organization, both of which were secular and did not have a 
religious orientation. Sageman (2004) also confirmed that this high marital status 
pattern is unique to Salafi Mujahidin as studies on other types of terrorism found 
that a typical terrorist is an unmarried one. Sageman (2004) also denoted that most 
terrorists were single because they were either too young, or still students, or 
finically unable to afford a marriage.  
In conclusion, previous studies found that most of the terrorists from leftist 
groups are unmarried, whereas most of the terrorists from religiously motivated 
groups are married. However, previous studies did not report any finding on the 
association between the level of involvement in terrorist acts and martial status. 
One can still assume that there might be a difference in the level of involvement 
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among the terrorists in relation to their marital status. Those who have family 
responsibilities are expected to have a lesser involvement in terrorist acts because 
there is a risk of being arrested in frequent involvement. In other words, married 
terrorists have a stake in conformity and they take part in low-profile terrorist 
activities.  
Degree of Involvement 
Hudson (2002) pointed out that it may be misleading to consider terrorists as 
―former professionals‖ (p.49). As aforementioned, there are many terrorists who are 
able to keep their identity anonymous while acting on behalf of a terrorist 
organization, but maintain their legitimate professions. These people continue to 
practice their normal jobs, but act for the terrorist organization whenever they 
receive an order from the leadership. Hudson (2002) mentioned ETA and IRA 
terrorists as an example. In order to avoid police infiltration, the ETA established a 
team of ―sleeping commandos‖. These commandos maintain a regular life style 
with regular jobs, but after work they are assigned to carry out specific missions 
without knowing each others‘ identity. The ETA permits its young members (not the 
leadership cadres) to serve only for three years before they let them return to 
normal society. In terrorist organizations such as the RAF and Red Brigades, 
however, terrorism is a ―full-time profession‖. ―Sleeping Commando‖ type of backup 
positions and supportive missions are not limited to the ETA only. Most of the leftist 
terrorist organizations in Turkey, as well as the religiously motivated Turkish 
Hezbollah, use non-professional part-timers to carry out specific missions. Hudson 
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(2002) and some other scholars pointed out the existence of non-professionals or 
part-timers, but there is no study in the literature that specifically focused on these 
individuals.   
Occupation 
Russell and Miller (1977) found that the principal occupation among the 
Latin American terrorists was that of student. Terrorists from Tupamoros and the 
followers of Carlos Marighella were mostly in their early twenties and conducted 
terrorist operations as part of their college work on university campuses. In the 
1970s, over 70 percent of Argentinean and Uruguayan and 50 percent of Brazilian 
arrested terrorists were students. Older terrorists had mostly high-profile 
occupations such as banking, engineering, and journalism. Palestinian terrorist 
organizations such as PFLP and Al-Fatah had the same pattern as their Latin 
American counterparts. Terrorist groups in Palestine were composed of terrorists 
from high-profile jobs and university graduates. Sageman (2004) found a different 
pattern for the global Salafi mujahidin. Accordingly, 42 percent of the Salafi 
mujahidin were professionals who had high-profile jobs such as physicians, 
architects, and teachers; 33 percent had semi-skilled jobs such as police, military, 
civil service, and students; and 25 percent were unemployed.  
According to Weinberg and Eubank (1987), 27 percent of the Italian 
terrorists were students; 26 percent were manual workers; 15 percent were white-
collar clerks; and 7 percent were professionals (like architects, lawyers, journalists, 
and physicians). Finally, Handler (1990) found that of the American right-wing 
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terrorists 75 percent had blue-collar jobs, while only 18 percent had white-collar 
jobs. The pattern was different for American left-wing terrorists; only 24 had blue-
collar jobs, while 39 percent had white-collar jobs.  
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Table 1: Reported Characteristics of Terrorists 
 
Researcher Data Source Sample Size Age Gender Marital Education Socialclass Occupation 
Russell & 
Miller (1977) 
Government, 
newspaper, and 
research 
publications 
350 Terrorists 
Worldwide 
22-25 (Mean) 80% male vs. 
16% female 
75% single 
vs.25% 
married 
Two-thirds 
had some 
College 
Degree 
Most upper-
middle and 
upper 
Most high-
paying jobs 
(only 70% of 
Latin student) 
Sageman 
(2004) 
Government and 
legal documents, 
research/internet 
articles 
172 Salafi 
Mujahidin 
from Middle 
East, France, 
and 
Indonesia  
26 (Mean) NA 25% single 
vs. 75% 
married 
71% college 
and graduate 
degree 
75% middle 
or upper class 
75%  either 
high or mid-
level jobs; 
25%  
unemployed 
Clark (1983) Biographies from 
open sources and 
government  
records 
495 ETA 
members 
from Spain 
25 (Mean) 
 
NA NA NA Most working 
class or 
lower-middle 
class 
NA 
Weinberg & 
Eubank 
(1987) 
Biographies from 
open sources and 
court files 
2512 Italian  
 
20-29 (Mean) 
 
82% male vs. 
12% female 
NA NA NA 27% student; 
26% manual 
worker; 15% 
White-collar 
Handler 
(1990) 
Biographies and 
Autobiographies 
from FBI records 
280 terrorists 
from U.S. left 
vs. right 
 
NA 54% male vs. 
45 female 
(left);89%-
11% (right) 
NA 75% (left) 
college, 22 
(right) college 
 
NA 24% blue-
39% white 
collar (left) vs. 
75% - 18% 
(right)  
Pedahzur et. 
al (2003) 
Ha’aretz (Israeli 
daily newspaper) 
819 Middle 
Eastern 
(suicide vs. 
non-suicide) 
24.5 vs.22.4 
(Mean) 
 
99% male-1% 
female vs. 
97%-3% 
16% married-
84% single 
vs.40%-60% 
 
17% secular-
83% non-sec. 
vs. 64%-36%. 
 
Both suicide 
and non-
suicide have 
low SES 
 
NA 
Berrebi 
(2004) 
Biographies from 
online sources 
335 terrorist 
from PIJ and 
Hamas 
50% of them 
were 
between 18-
24 
NA 39% single 
vs. 32% 
married 
 
65% some 
college 
degree 
Mostly non-
poor  
NA 
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Relative Deprivation 
Another line of inquiry in terrorism researches concentrated on what is 
known as relative deprivation. This theory posits that people feel deprivation 
when they perceive that they are treated unjustly when compared to some 
standards or reference groups. Relative deprivation is often related with 
economic conditions. Accordingly, people may turn to collective violence such as 
revolutions, rebellions, and riots when they are economically deprived. This study 
seeks to find out whether relative deprivation is related to the level of involvement 
in terrorism. 
The application of relative deprivation to terrorism is not new. Early studies 
of terrorist characteristics sought to understand whether low socioeconomic 
status was an indicator of a typical terrorist character (Clark, 1983; Russell & 
Miller, 1977; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). None of these studies, however, 
indicated that terrorists were economically deprived. This pattern seems to have 
not changed for Contemporary terrorists. The plight of Palestinian people pushed 
many scholars to research whether terrorism in the Middle East is related to 
poverty (Berrebi, 2004; Hassan, 2001; Krueger & Malecková, 2003; Sageman, 
2004). Findings from these studies did not suggest a direct relationship between 
terrorism and poverty. However, reducing the relative deprivation concept simply 
to the poverty level may be considered as a flaw because not all people with low 
socio-economic status feel deprivation. Hence, researchers need to fully 
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understand the theoretical underpinnings of relative deprivation before they 
initiate a test of the concept.  
Basic Assumptions and Versions of Relative Deprivation 
The assumptions of relative deprivation theory correspond to the 
assumptions of the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard, Doob, Miller, 
Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). Both theories assert that individual feel deprived of 
something they have a desire for. The major difference between the relative 
deprivation theory and the frustration-aggression hypothesis is that the former 
asserts that thinking others as having something and feeling oneself as entitled 
to have the same thing are necessary preconditions for deprivation, whereas the 
latter asserts that the desire for something and thinking it feasible to obtain are 
sufficient to instill frustration (Berkowitz, 1972).  
The term ‗relative deprivation‘ was first used by Samuel Stouffer and his 
colleagues of the Research Division of the U.S. Army in their study named The 
American Soldier (Davis, 1966). They used it as a provisional explanation for 
their findings that the respondents they examined were better off in some 
situations whereas they were worse off in other situations in reference to 
comparison groups. Since then relative deprivation has attracted a great 
attention from political scientists (Gurr, 1968, 1970; Nagel, 1974), sociologists 
(Davis, 1959; Merton & Rossi, 1997; Runciman, 1966) and psychologists 
(Adams, 1965; Crosby, 1976; Pettigrew, 1964, 1967). Four famous models of 
relative deprivation will be discussed for further clarification.  
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Davis (1959) was considered first to establish a formal theory of relative 
deprivation. According to him, an individual who lacks certain goods and 
opportunities will have a sense of injustice whenever he feels that others have 
those goods and opportunities. Davis‘ (1959) formulation of relative deprivation 
encompasses three essential conditions for deprivation: the individual who lacks 
something desired should (a) perceive others have it; (b) have a desire for it; and 
(c) have a feeling of entitlement for it. In the absence of anyone of these factors, 
deprivation does not occur. In Davis‘ (1959) opinion, the individual can make two 
distinct comparisons, the first one of which occurs between in-group members 
and the second of which occurs between out-group members.  
Adding another condition to that of Davis (1959), Runciman (1966) 
claimed that an individual should also feel that obtaining the desired goods and 
opportunities is feasible. According to Runciman (1966), this last condition helps 
the individual to distinguish between unrealistic and realistic hopes. If the 
individual knows that his desire is an unrealistic one, he does not feel a 
deprivation. If an individual thinks otherwise, he feels a deprivation. Runciman 
(1966) made a differentiation between egoistic deprivation in which an individual 
compares himself to others and fraternal deprivation in which the individual 
compares his group to other groups. 
Contrary to Davis (1959) and Runciman (1966), Gurr (1970) made a 
definition of relative deprivation by making no assumption about the sources of 
expectation. He defined relative deprivation as the individual‘s perception of 
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discrepancy between his expectations and capabilities. Accordingly, the 
expected status or standards may not only be determined in reference to others. 
Rather, the so-called or perceived deprivation may also reflect a desire for one‘s 
own past condition, or an abstract ideal, or standards put by leaders.  
In Gurr‘s (1970) opinion, if the source of deprivation is based on a loss of 
what a person has once had or believed he could have, it is a decremental 
deprivation. In this situation, that person experiences a relative deprivation by 
reference to his own past condition. In other words, the person‘s value 
capabilities begin to decline while his value expectation remains at the same 
level. Examples include the loss of political influence by oppositional groups or 
the decline in status of the middle class population as the status or influence of 
the working-class population increases. 
In aspirational deprivation, however, the person does not experience a 
significant loss. Rather, he is angered since he has no means to attain increasing 
or intensifying expectations. Contrary to decremental deprivation, in aspirational 
deprivation expectations begin to rise while capabilities remain the same. For 
instance, the contemporary demands of the African American population in the 
1970s for social equality when compared to those made earlier reflected an 
increase in the expectations of African Americans for more status. According to 
Gurr (1970), traditional people‘s mere exposure to education increases their 
expectations. Such an increase in expectations may cause a relative deprivation 
if the level of actual achievement (or capabilities) remains the same.  
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As a special case of aspirational deprivation, Gurr (1970) defined a third 
category of deprivation, called progressive deprivation, in which an upward 
improvement in both expectations and achievements generates an expectation of 
continued improvement. If the achievements stabilize or decrease somehow, 
then a progressive deprivation is likely. This kind of deprivation is seen in 
societies where there occurs an economic recession in a growing economy. 
Gurr‘s (1970) concept of progressive deprivation can be considered as a 
generalized version of Davies‘ J-curve (1962) (see Figure 2.1). According to 
Davies (1962),  individuals feel angry when they lack certain standards and 
opportunities (a) if they have a desire for them and (b) if they possessed them in 
the past. The major difference between relative deprivation theory and Davies‘ J-
Curve (and also Gurr‘s progressive deprivation) is that the former claims that an 
individual should make a comparison with others while the latter posits that the 
individual can also make a comparison with his past. In addition, Davies (1962) 
did not talk about the feasibility of desires. 
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Empirical Support for Relative Deprivation 
Empirical support for relative deprivation can be examined under two 
different headings: general support for relative deprivation and support from 
terrorism literature.  
General Support for Relative Deprivation 
Runciman‘s (1966) categorization of egoistic deprivation (self versus 
others) and fraternal deprivation (my group versus other groups) and Gurr‘s 
(Gurr, 1970) introduction of decremental, aspriational, and progressive 
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Figure 2: Davies J-Curve (1962) 
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deprivation enhanced the earliest applications of relative deprivation theory. 
Since then, the theory has received a mixed support. For instance, Brush (1996) 
examined the extent of empirical support for relative deprivation theory (as 
manifested by Gurr) by reviewing the studies listed in the Social Science Citation 
Index. According to his findings, relative deprivation theory received a 
considerable support during the first half of the 1970s. However, the support for 
the theory declined during the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 
1980s especially among the political scientists and sociologists. This pattern, 
however, was not the same among psychologists. Crosby (1976), who was a 
psychologist herself, reported that she found support for egoistic deprivation in 
95 different studies.  
At this point, it is reasonable to ask why there is a disagreement on the 
empirical validity of relative deprivation theory between psychologists on the one 
side and sociologists and political scientists on the other side. According to Brush 
(1996), psychologists more often directed their attention to the feelings of 
resentment, whereas sociologists and political scientists focused more on the 
occurrence of collective violence. More specifically, while psychologists often 
succeeded in explaining individual deprivation, political scientists and sociologists 
failed to explain how individual deprivation is transformed into collective violence. 
Today, it is known that strains of aspiration can produce psychopathology 
(Parker & Kleiner, 1966). However, the relationship between strain and collective 
violence is suspect.  
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According to Laqueur (1977), no truly scientific theory of collective 
violence has emerged, maybe because no quantitative measure suffices to 
understand the qualitative nature of human frustration. On the contrary, Brush 
(1996) argued that refutation of a theory in general, and relative deprivation 
theory in particular, should not be taken as a failure. Rather, refutation, as well as 
validation, would be taken as progress because oftentimes the theories in social 
science are judged by harsh standards. In natural science, however, each 
experiment is considered as progress toward the perfection of a theory 
regardless of failure or success5.  
Support for Relative Deprivation from Terrorism Literature 
Terrorism researchers rarely questioned the link between relative 
deprivation and participation in terrorist activities. However, there are a handful of 
studies which question the relationship between poverty and socioeconomic 
class and participation in terrorist activities. For instance, Kruger and Maleckova 
(2003) tested if there was a link between poverty (or education) and participation 
in the (Lebanon) Hezbollah. Comparing a dataset on 129 Hezbollah members to 
the general Lebanese population, they found that there was ―little direct 
connection between poverty or education and participation in terrorism (p.141)‖. 
More precisely, members of Hezbollah were as likely to come from wealthy 
                                            
5
 For example, theories about the assumed properties of the atom were accepted long before 
atoms could be observed. Hence, current charges against relative deprivation theory relating to 
its unobservable parts would not be taken as a critical flaw. Rather, each study in the literature 
has a contribution in the current status of relative deprivation theory. 
61 
 
 
 
families and have a high education level as they were to come from poor families 
and have a low education level.  
Other than Krueger and Maleckova (2003), some of the aforementioned 
studies examined the probable link between poverty and participation in 
terrorism. For instance, Berrebi‘s (2004) analysis of 285 suicide terrorists found 
no evidence for economic deprivation even though they were considered as the 
most economically deprived of all terrorists. Hassan‘s (2001) vis-à-vis interview 
with 250 Palestinian terrorists did not find any support for poverty. 
These studies, however, have failed to construct relative deprivation. 
Mostly, relative deprivation is either implied or simply reduced to poverty, 
unemployment, or low socioeconomic status without knowing if these factors 
really led people to relative deprivation in reality. The deprivation, on the other 
hand, cannot be measured simply with poverty level or socioeconomic status. A 
true measurement of relative deprivation should be able demonstrate the gap 
between expectation and achievement.  
The only exception to these studies was Sageman‘s (2004) analysis of 
172 global Salafi Mujahedin. As mentioned early on, Sageman (2004) reported 
that most of the terrorists he examined were either middle or upper class 
members. Based on this finding, he concluded that terrorism does not arise from 
poverty. However, he still found evidence of relative deprivation when he 
compared terrorists‘ occupational skills to their actual employment status. 
According to his findings, there was a considerable discrepancy between 
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terrorists‘ occupational skills and their employment status. For most terrorists, 
Sageman (2004) continued, relative deprivation was a temporary situation rather 
than a ―structural deprivation in their original background (p.p.95)‖. In conclusion, 
Sageman‘s (2004) analysis demonstrated that poverty does not necessarily lead 
someone to join a terrorist organization. This was evident in previous studies 
(Table 2). However, if expectations rise contrary to the actual achievements, this 
might probably result in relative deprivation, which in turn may lead one to join a 
terrorist organization.  
 
Table 2: Reported Findings on Poverty and RD* 
Researcher Samples Variables Findings 
 
Brush (1996) Previous studies on 
Relative Deprivation 
(meta-analysis) 
Relative Deprivation Studies by psychologists 
mostly supported the theory, 
while studies by sociologists 
did not support it. 
 
Krueger and 
Maleckova 
(2003) 
Compared 129 
Hezbollah members to 
General Lebanese 
population 
 
Poverty (inferred from 
parent‘s occupation, 
economic conditions) 
Found no support for the link 
between poverty and 
participation in terrorism 
Hassan 
(2001) 
250 Hamas and PIJ 
members 
Poverty (measured by 
social class) 
Many were middle class 
members, but none of them 
were desperately poor 
 
Berrebi 
(2004) 
285 Suicide terrorists 
from PIJ 
Poverty (inferred from 
occupation, foreign 
travel history, car 
ownership) 
 
Found no evidence favoring 
the link between poverty and 
suicide terrorism 
Sageman 
(2004) 
172 Salafi Mujahidin 
from Middle East, 
France, and Indonesia 
Relative Deprivation 
(qualitatively 
measured by the 
discrepancy between 
actual jobs and 
occupational skills) 
Found support for relative 
deprivation.  
Notes: RD refers to relative deprivation 
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Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis 
Does frustration have a role in terrorist decision-making? To what extent 
can frustration explain the variation in the involvement level of terrorists? At first 
glance, a relationship between a frustrating event and a consequent involvement 
in terrorism seems likely. However, constructing such a relationship requires an 
extensive psychological analysis of terrorists, which is very demanding and hard 
to apply in the study of terrorism due to difficulties in the accessibility of research 
subjects. 
On the other hand, the relationship between frustration and aggression 
had been largely examined in the psychology long before it was first applied to 
the study of social violence in the 1970s. The frustration-aggression hypothesis 
has dominated the psychological study of aggression during the preceding three 
decades of its invention in 1939 by Dollard and his colleagues. Although the 
concept has been extensively criticized in the following years and the original 
version has been reviewed several times, the central proposition of a causal 
relationship between a preceding frustrating event and a following aggressive 
behavior still remains as the rule (Berkowitz, 1969, 1972; Feshbach, 1971; 
Whiting & Child, 1953). The hypothesis has inspired several other modern 
concepts regarding the nature and source of human aggression, such as the 
relative deprivation theory of social violence (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970) and the 
scapegoat theory of prejudices (Allport, 1954). 
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Basic Assumptions and Versions of Frustration-Aggression 
The hypothesis initially proposed that ―the occurrence of aggression 
always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the 
existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression‖ (Dollard, et al., 
1939). In this context, frustration was defined as the ―interference with an 
instigated goal response at its proper time in the behavioral sequence‖. 
Occasionally, however, the term frustration is used not only as the process of 
blocking a personal goal, but also as reaction to such blocking. In other words, in 
order for a person to be considered frustrated, that person should not only be 
thwarted from reaching his goal, but should also show some types of reactions.  
If frustration always leads to aggression, how does this process occur? In 
developing the original formulation, Dollard et al. (1939) stated that the certainty 
of aggression depends on (a) the reinforcement value of interfered goal 
response, (b) the level of frustration, and (c) the number of interference. In the 
occurrence of aggression; first, the reinforcement value of the interfered with goal 
is important because frustration is related to goal attainment. Second, the level of 
frustration becomes a significant factor because not all frustrations instigate 
aggression, but rather frustration instigates aggression only if it is complete. 
Third, if frustrations can be leveled, then the amount of interference becomes 
important. That is, frustration is an additive process and it develops cumulatively.   
Dollard et al. (1939) recognized that sometimes aggression may be 
inhibited and it may break out in a different form. Inhibition occurs when the 
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anticipated severity of punishment exceeds the anticipated gratification of 
aggression. In such situations, frustration results in covert aggression. Dollard et 
al. (1939) denoted that inhibited overt aggression cannot be taken as 
nonaggression. Accordingly, inhibited overt aggression can be considered as 
covert aggression. Those who manifest the aggression covertly sometimes are 
described as ―furious inside‖.  
One of the significant components of the frustration-aggression hypothesis 
concerns the displacement of aggression. Dollard et al. (1939) proposed that 
frustration directs aggression against the primary source of frustration. However, 
at times frustration instigates aggression against an alternative target. The 
displacement of the target occurs if there is an association between the primary 
and the alternative source of frustration. The strength of instigation is related to 
the similarities between the primary and alternative targets.  
How long can an instigation to aggression ensue?  Instigation to 
aggression can only be reduced by aggressive or hostile activities either against 
the primary or alternative targets. Since frustration is an additive process, the 
instigation to aggression increases with every frustration until it eventually results 
in violence. Consequently, one may imply from the theory that frustration has 
long-term effects. 
As aforementioned, the frustration-aggression hypothesis assumes that 
(a) aggression is always based on frustration and (b) frustration always leads to 
aggression. It was soon when proponents of the hypothesis acknowledged that 
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these assumptions were too simplistic and general. Miller (1941), one of the 
coauthors of the original version, then had to rephrase the latter part holding that 
frustration may lead to a number of responses, one of which is ―instigation to 
aggression‖. Thus, he clearly acknowledged that frustration may not only result in 
aggression, but also may result in alternative actions. 
Miller‘s revised version of the frustration-aggression hypothesis put forth 
that (a) any aggressive behavior occurs as a result of frustration, and (b) 
frustration instigates behaviors that may or may not be aggressive. Accordingly, 
frustration is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for aggression. Thus, 
Miller‘s (1941) reformulation was applied to the second part of Dollard et al.‘s 
(1939) original proposition.  
Other than Miller (1941), there have been a number of attempts to revise 
the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis. For example, Barker et al. (1941) 
proposed what they called as the Frustration-Regression Hypothesis. Maier 
(1949), on the other hand, developed his Frustration-Fixation Hypothesis. 
However, these two revisions made negligible contributions to the original 
version of the theory. Probably, the most sweeping contribution was made by a 
contemporary scholar, Berkowitz (1962).  
Like Dollard et al. (1939), Berkowitz (1962) recognized that a frustrating 
event increases the probability of aggression and this relationship exists ―in many 
animal species, including man‖ (p. 2). Berkowitz (1962) also agreed with Dollard 
et al. (1939) when he held that ―frustration is an interference with an instigated 
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goal response at its proper time in the behavioral sequence‖ (p.6). On the other 
hand, he asserted that goal response should be active and the individual should 
be prevented from reaching that goal if frustration is to result in aggression. In 
other words, for Berkowitz (1962), frustration is neither a simple deprivation nor a 
state of mind, but rather it is an interference with the realization of a (specific) 
goal-driven activity at a specific time.  
Contrary to Dollard et al. (1939) and Miller (1941), Berkowitz (1962) 
identified that frustration is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
aggression. However, frustration stimulates an emotional reaction which then 
creates a ―readiness‖ for aggressive behaviors. In Berkowitz‘s (1962) opinion, 
even this readiness is not sufficient alone to create aggression unless there are 
what he calls as ―suitable cues‖. Berkowitz (1962) defined suitable cues as 
stimuli that are associated with previous or present frustrating instigators. 
Accordingly, all stimuli which can be associated with a frustrating experience 
could be a potential aggressive cue one day. In this context, the probability of 
aggression depends on two factors: (1) the strength of association between the 
stimulus and the past or the present frustrating instigators; and (2) the strength of 
readiness. 
When does frustration actually result in aggression? According to 
Berkowitz (1962), the state of aggressiveness or aggressive drive ends 
whenever the frustrated individual encounters an aggression-triggering stimulus. 
In other words, aggression results whenever the frustrated individual finds an 
68 
 
 
 
appropriate target to direct his aggression. However, the appropriateness of 
target or the existence of aggression-triggering stimulus does not suggest that 
the target could be anyone or anything. For Berkowitz (1962), aggressive means 
and agents may be substituted whereas a target may not. That is, aggression 
cannot be displaced in the sense of changing the primary target. Attacks on 
alternative targets can be explained by excess violence that is committed by 
extremely ready aggressors. 
Empirical Evidence for Frustration-Aggression 
The literature on the terrorist profile has often questioned the probable link 
between frustration and joining in terrorism. A majority of the existing studies 
found support for this relationship. For the purpose of this study, a summary of 
literature is presented, in addition to the attempt to determine what factors have 
been considered to cause frustration, which ultimately motivate potential 
terrorists to participate in terrorism.  
In a study of Palestinian women‘s motivation to participate in terrorism, 
Berko and Erez (2007) found that 5 out of 14 women they interviewed reported 
that they sought revenge for harms and losses which they suffered and which 
they attributed to Israeli military operations before they joined a terrorist 
organization. Of the women who sought revenge, three mentioned offenses 
against their brothers and two indicated their brothers‘ death as their motivations.  
In another study of Columbian terrorists, Florez-Morris (2007) used an in-
depth interview with 42 terrorists. She reported that the police use of excessive 
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force in demonstrations was one of the motivating factors for joining in a terrorist 
organization. Furthermore, some terrorists reported that they joined terrorist 
organizations because of the belief that they were going to become a 
government target. 
On the other hand, there is an apparent dearth of literature focusing 
specifically on the impact of frustration on engaging in terrorist activities. On the 
other hand, studies on the characteristics of suicide bombers could help us to 
better understand what role frustration plays in the ―involvement‖ process. A 
number of researchers point out that frustration has an undeniable role in 
engaging in suicide attacks.  
Stern (2003), for example, mentions that real or perceived humiliation of 
the Palestinian people by Israeli policies has given a rise to desperation and 
unmanageable outrage among the Palestinian people. Sprinzak (2003), on the 
other hand, points out that Hamas‘ resorting to suicide bombing did not result 
from their opposition to the peace process, but it was rather a tactical choice 
which was meant to take revenge for humiliating Israeli actions. According to 
Sprinzak (2003), Baruch Goldstein‘s massacre of 29 Palestinians in Hebron in 
1994 was a turning point for Hamas to resort to suicide bombing. According to 
Hudson (2002), ―Hamas thrives on the misery and frustrations of Palestinians‖ 
(p.183). Similarly, in Mogadham‘s (2003) opinion, the fact that many suicide 
bombers in Palestine have a desire to take revenge is attributable to the high rate 
of casualty and injury especially during the Second Intifada. In addition, 
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Moghadam (2003) continues, many Palestinians, as well as Israelis, have 
remained untouched by the violence so far and almost everybody has a loved 
one who has either been injured or killed. 
Empirical evidence supports the points made by Stern (2003), Sprinzak 
(1991), Hudson (2002), and Moghadam (2003). For instance, Weinberg et Al. 
(2003) studied the motivations of 80 suicide bombers by comparing their profiles 
to those of 743 Palestinians who were imprisoned for committing other types of 
terrorist activities. They reported that there was evidence that suggested that 
suicide bombers had negative experiences with Israeli authorities and thus acted 
in vengeance.  
Similarly, in a study of 87 Palestinian suicide bombers, Yom and Saleh 
(2004) reported that many of the bombers had an experience of violent 
encounters with the Israel Defense Force in which they were either imprisoned, 
or injured, or lost their family members. Soibelman‘s (2004) analysis of ―the 
factors underlying the development of the Palestinian suicide bomber‖ presented 
similar findings. Having interviewed five bombers caught before they detonated 
the bombs, Soibelman (2004) reported that all had some types of negative 
experiences with Israeli military forces such as shooting and killing a friend, 
beating, and unnecessary use of force at checkpoints.  
Most recently, Well and Horowitz (2007) surveyed the biographies of 43 
Hamas members and the opinions of 23 terrorism experts. They identified 10 
different motivational factors (latent variables) that may have an effect on 
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committing a suicide attack. Among the motivations they identified were 
psychological disorder, small group dynamics, operational usefulness, religious 
factors, frustration against Israeli oppression, economic factors, cultural factors, 
revenge, and social network factors. Using what is known as structural equation 
modeling as a statistical technique, they found that frustration was the second 
most important factor for volunteering to commit a suicide attack. Although they 
suffered from lack of a theoretical model, previous terrorism studies found that 
frustration, revenge, police use of excessive force, government repression, 
vengeance, and negative experiences with military forces were related to either 
participation in terrorism in general or the commission of a suicide attack.  
 
Table 3: Reported Findings on Frustration 
 
Researcher 
 
Samples 
 
Significant Findings 
 
Berko and Erez 
(2007) 
Interviewed 14 Palestinian 
women  on women 
participation in terrorism  
Revenge (as a result of harms and losses 
which they attributed Israeli military 
operations) 
 
Florez-Morris 
(2007) 
Interviewed 42 Columbian 
terrorists 
Police use of force, government repression, 
inequality, injustice 
 
Weinberg et. al 
(2003) 
Compared the profiles of 80 
suicide bombers to those of 
743 Palestinians  
 
Vengeance, negative experiences with 
military forces 
Yom and Saleh 
(2004) 
Analyzed the biographies of 
87 suicide bombers 
 
Violent encounters with military forces  
Soibelman (2004)   
 
 
Wells & Horowitz 
(2007) 
Interview with 5 suicide 
bombers  
 
Analyzed the biographies of 
43 suicide bombers from 
Hamas, Conducted surveys 
on 23 terrorism experts 
Negative experiences with military forces 
 
 
Frustration against Israeli authorities (was 
the second biggest factor out of 10 
motivations) 
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 Social Learning Theory of Deviance 
Both relative deprivation and frustration-aggression theories suggested 
that terrorism results from feelings of economic deprivation, hopelessness, and 
frustration. Accordingly, some politically discontented people commit to terrorism 
thinking that there is no way to express their feelings of discontent other than by 
using violence (Knutson, 1984). An alternative explanation to relative deprivation 
and frustration-aggression is offered by social learning theory. This theory 
suggests that terrorism is learned just like any other human behaviors (Akers & 
Silverman, 2004). From this point of view, terrorism is a consequence of social, 
economic, and political influences rather than a consequence of dysfunctional 
personality traits such as deprivation, hopelessness, and frustration (Schmid, 
2005). 
Indeed, the argument about terrorism being a consequence of social, 
economic, and political influences is not new. Three decades ago, Cooper (1976) 
pointed out that terrorism is functional in the sense that the harm terrorists do is 
secondary compared to their primary political objectives. Cooper (1976) 
compared the logic of conventional warfare to the logic of unconventional fighting 
methods. In this sense, terrorism is instrumental because the ultimate goal of 
terrorists is not to terrorize, but to achieve political objectives.  
Today, a considerable number of researchers think that terrorism is a 
function of learned ideological values whether they are political or religious 
(Crenshaw, 1988; RA Hudson, 2002). From the learning perspective, terrorists 
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are viewed as rational individuals. That is, the psychological typology with 
terrorists is useless because the probability of having a mental illness is no more 
likely for terrorists than it is for non-terrorists. Psychological accounts, on the 
other hand, tend to ignore the social processes by which terrorist behaviors are 
learned just like any other human behaviors. The basic assumptions of the social 
learning theory are presented next to understanding in what way the theory 
differs from relative deprivation and frustration-aggression.  
Basic Assumptions and Versions of Social Learning 
Social learning of deviance refers to a set of theories that explain how 
deviant and criminal behaviors are acquired, maintained, and changed. The 
social learning of deviance seeks to understand the social and cultural 
determinants of crime, deviance, and conformity. This theory proposes that both 
criminal and deviant behaviors are subject to the same learning processes as 
conforming behaviors. 
Although the application is new, the social learning perspective on 
terrorism seeks to explain whether terrorist behaviors are learned (Akers & 
Silverman, 2004). The theory posits that individuals learn terrorism through 
observing one another. Accordingly, if the observed behavior yields the desired 
outcome, then the individual who observes that behavior is likely to imitate. 
Unlike relative deprivation and frustration-aggression in which the emphasis is 
more on social structure, the social learning theory of terrorism puts an emphasis 
on social processes. While relative deprivation and frustration-aggression explain 
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why certain feelings and attitudes that promote terrorism emerge, social learning 
explains how people espouse these feelings and attitudes and why they result in 
terrorism. 
Social learning was examined by both psychologists and sociologists to 
understand how people learn what they do. This study is interested in whether 
social learning can be applicable to terrorist behaviors just like it was applied to 
other human behaviors. Following this, social learning perspectives are reviewed 
to project the social processes by which deviant behaviors are learned and to lay 
the foundation for research hypotheses.  
Gabriel Tarde’s Three Laws of Imitations 
The earliest formulation of the learning theory dates back to the works of a 
French social theorist, Gabriel Tarde, (1843-1904), who was considered the 
forerunner of contemporary learning theorists. Tarde (1962) focused on the 
social processes whereby behaviors are learned through imitation. Tarde‘s 
(1962) social learning perspective viewed learning as a function of imitation. He 
proposed a concept of social learning called ―three laws of imitations‖. These 
laws were (1) the law of close contact, (2) the law of imitation of superiors of 
inferiors, and (3) the law of insertion. Tarde‘s (1962) three laws of imitation 
describe how and why individuals deviate. 
First, individuals imitate those with whom they have a close contact. 
Imitation occurs in various forms. In general, individuals tend to imitate the 
customs and fashions of their close contacts. If individuals are surrounded by 
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deviant people, they are likely to imitate these people more than others with 
whom they have no such contacts. 
Second, imitation occurs in a top-down fashion. Accordingly, the young 
imitate the older; the poor imitate the rich; and the peasants imitate the nobles. 
Crime is the effort of the young or the poor to imitate the older and the wealthy. 
Individuals try to follow high-status people with a hope of rewards that are 
associated with the behaviors of the superior class. Deviance by high-class 
people is likely to encourage others in the society to do the same.  
Third, new behaviors are superimposed on the old ones in a way that they 
either encourage or discourage them. This occurs because of the power that is 
inherent to originality. If the new fashion is drug using, for example, then it may 
spread among college students who previously used alcohol. On the other hand, 
those students who used alcohol may also begin to use drugs at the same time.  
Tarde‘s (1962) learning theory is based on behaviorism and explains 
learning solely with environmental factors. Further, Tarde (1962) focused solely 
on imitation as a form of learning, whereas he disregarded other forms of 
learning such as observing and modeling. Nevertheless, Tarde‘s (1962) learning 
perspective as articulated in his three laws of imitation pioneered the 
contemporary learning theories. Also, the theory had a significant impact on the 
study of deviance.  
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Albert Bandura’s Social Learning of Violence 
The social learning theory of Bandura (1973) has become the most 
influential theory of learning and development in the last century. Bandura (1973) 
proposed that direct reinforcement does not account for all learning processes. 
Adding his observational learning concept, or what he calls modeling, Bandura 
(1973) argued that people can learn aggressive behaviors through observing 
each other. Observational learning or modeling can be applicable to a variety of 
human behaviors including crime and deviance (Bandura, 1973).  
Bandura (1973) identified three different models of observational learning 
based on his famous Bobo doll test. Accordingly, a live model involves an actual 
person who demonstrates an aggressive behavior. In the verbal instructional 
model, aggressive behavior is learned through descriptions or explanations. The 
symbolic model involves a real or imaginary figure who demonstrates an 
aggressive behavior in books, films, or television programs.  
In Bandura‘s (1973) opinion, indirect or external reinforcement is not the 
only factor that influences learning. However, there are also intrinsic 
reinforcements such as pride and sense of accomplishment. This exclusive focus 
on intrinsic reinforcement makes Bandura‘s (1973) theory is a cognitive learning 
model as opposed to traditional learning theories that are generally categorized 
under behavioral theories. Cognitive learning emphasizes the importance of 
psychological factors in shaping human behaviors. While behavioral learning 
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assumes a permanent change in behaviors, cognitive learning assumes a 
change in information, but not necessarily in behaviors. 
 Bandura (1973) also pointed out different sources of modeling. 
Accordingly, modeling comes from three different sources with family being the 
most prominent one. Children who show aggressive behaviors have parents who 
also show similar behaviors. A second category of modeling occurs through 
environmental experiences. For instance, individuals living in highly criminal 
areas are more likely to show violent behaviors than those living in safer areas. 
The final category of modeling is offered by the mass media. Movies and 
television present violent behaviors in a way that spectators take them as if they 
are the norms. For instance, heroes never get punished and even praised for 
their violent actions, which reinforces violence in the eyes of spectators.  
Bandura‘s (1973) learning perspective had a tremendous impact on 
theories regarding human personality. Replacing the behaviorist approach, 
during the 1960s a ―cognitive revolution‖ occurred in psychology and Bandura 
(1973) made a great contribution to this movement. Moreover, he is considered 
to be the father of cognitive revolution in the field of psychology.  
Edwin Sutherland’s Differential Association 
Integrating Tarde‘s (1962) imitation to criminology, Sutherland (1947) put 
forth his differential association theory of crime. The theory argues that criminal 
behavior is learned through the interaction with others. Similar to Tarde‘s (1962) 
law of close contact, Sutherland (1947) proposed that learning occurs within 
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intimate groups. Differently from Tarde (1962), however, Sutherland (1947) does 
not restrict learning to imitation. Rather, the process of learning criminal 
behaviors involves all mechanisms of learning as well as imitation. A seduced 
person, for example, learns through association, which is a process different from 
imitation.  
The principle part of Sutherland‘s (1947) learning theory is what he calls 
as differential association. Accordingly, a person becomes criminal when 
exposed to the excess of definitions favorable to the violation of law as opposed 
to the definitions unfavorable to the law. By and large, all people in a society 
have some types of membership to the intimate personal groups where they are 
exposed to the excess definitions unfavorable to the violation of societal rules. In 
their families, people learn how to obey the law. However, most people at some 
point in their lives become involved in groups where the law is defined as 
unfavorable. For instance, one may have intimate friends who might define the 
law that prohibits the use of drugs as unreasonable. In Sutherland‘s (1947) 
opinion, however, mere exposure to unfavorable definitions of the law is not 
sufficient to convince someone to become involved in criminal groups. Such an 
involvement occurs only when the definitions unfavorable to the law exceed the 
definitions favorable to the law. Thus, it is not the simple exposure to criminal 
definitions that matters, but it is the differential associations with criminal and 
non-criminal groups that determine the involvement in criminal activities. On the 
other hand, the excess definitions favorable to the violation of law alone are not 
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sufficient to yield criminal behaviors. Sutherland (1947) states that the learning 
process ―includes the techniques of committing crime, which are sometimes very 
complicated, sometimes very simple‖ (p.75). Finally, cultural meaning that is 
attached to criminal behaviors is also a crucial component of criminality. This 
may include motives, rationalizations, and attitudes that might lead someone to 
commit crime. 
In short, criminal behaviors result from a social learning process that 
occurs in the course of interaction with intimate groups such as family and 
friends. Learning criminal behaviors occurs as a result of excess definitions 
unfavorable to the law over the definitions favorable to the law. Thus, the 
difference between unfavorable definitions and favorable definitions is important 
to channel someone into the criminal direction. This is also what Sutherland 
(1947) refers to as differential association.  
Sutherland‘s (1947) differential association theory gained much more 
attention than Merton‘s anomie in the years following his reformulation of the 
theory in 1947. Subsequent theories of social learning were mostly based on 
Sutherland‘s (1947) differential association either in the form of critical debates 
on the merits of the theory or in the form of its revision or extension. Sutherland, 
himself, was one of the first to criticize his own theory when he admitted that he 
failed to incorporate criminal opportunities to the emergence of criminal 
behaviors (Cohen, Lindesmith, & Schuessler, 1956). Sutherland‘s own criticism 
then helped Cloward and Ohlin (1960) develop their sub-cultural theory of 
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delinquency in which they argued the role of illegitimate opportunities. Another 
critical point was generally based on the lack of any psychological explanation 
about how learning occurs. Sutherland was criticized for his failure to provide any 
psychological details to the learning process (RL Akers, 1977; Ronald Akers, 
1977; Burgess & Akers, 1966; Jeffery, 1965).  
Empirical Evidence for Social Learning 
As aforementioned, the application of social learning to terrorism is new 
(Akers & Silverman, 2004). The evidence presented here was drawn from 
previous terrorism studies. Research findings and arguments indicated that 
social learning as a theory of human behavior can also be applicable to terrorist 
behaviors. The roles of family and friends in shaping human behaviors were 
extensively studied by psychology literature. On the other hand, there are 
examples in terrorism literature indicating that differential association or 
behavioral modeling through family and friends is possible for terrorists.  A 
number of researchers indicated that family and friends are the principal means 
of recruitment and terrorists‘ motivations to involve in terrorist activities (RA 
Hudson, Majeska, Division, & Congress, 1999; Krueger & Malecková, 2003; 
Moghadam, 2003; Nesser, 2006; Ozeren, 2007; Ozsoy, 2007; Sageman, 2005; 
Weinberg & Eubank, 1987; Wolters, 2002).  
For instance, Sageman (2004) study of global Salafi mujahidin 
emphasized the importance of friendship and kinship in mujahidin‘s recruitment 
strategy. He found that mujahidin relied mainly upon a bottom-up process of 
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recruitment in which a person is recruited by a friend and a family member 
instead of a top-down process in which recruitment is organized mostly by the 
organization. The reason for adopting a bottom-recruitment strategy was the 
security. Friendship had an important role in the formal association of 68 percent 
of the mujahidin, while kinship had a role in the recruitment of 14 percent of the 
mujahidin (p.112).   
 
Table 4: Reported Findings on Social Learning 
Researcher Samples Variables Findings 
Sageman 
(2004) 
172 Salafi Mujahidin 
from Middle East, 
France, and Indonesia 
 
Friendship, kinship Friendship had an effect on 
68%, kinship had an effect on 
14% of the mujahidin 
Weinberg & 
Eubank 
(1987) 
 
2512 Italian Terrorists 
 
Family 13% of the Italian terrorists 
had family ties 
Wells and 
Horowitz 
(2007) 
43 suicide bombers 
from Hamas and 23 
terrorism experts 
Friends, family 
members, and cultural 
factors  
Social network and cultural 
factors were less effective 
when compared to economic 
and frustration factors 
 
Russell & 
Miller (1977) 
350 Terrorists 
Worldwide 
Place of Recruitment University environment was 
the primary ground (implying 
friends) 
    
 
 
Weinberg and Eubank‘s (1987) analysis of 2,512 Italian terrorists also 
found that family had a role in the decision to participate in terrorism. Thirteen 
percent of the terrorist they examined had such relationship, mostly as husbands 
and wives. Weinberg and Eubank (1987) added that the proportion would be 
even higher because the number of unmarried couples was unknown (p.83).  
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In their analysis of 43 suicide bombers from Hamas, Wells and Horowitz 
(2007) hypothesized that Hamas recruit preferentially among friends and family 
members of existing militants just like Al-Qaeda. However, they found less 
support for social network factors compared to economic and frustration 
indicators. The impact of environment and cultural factors on individual decision-
making was also studied in the literature. Some researchers claimed that people 
who live in environment (or culture) where political violence is considered a norm 
are subject to an overwhelming exposure to terrorist propaganda (Berko & Erez, 
2007; Della Porta, 2006; Moghadam, 2006; Post, Ruby, & Shaw, 2002; Shelley, 
2008; Wells III & Horowitz, 2007). However, empirical evidence showed mix 
support for environmental or cultural factors. In their analysis of 43 suicide 
bombers from Hamas, Wells and Horowitz (2007) found little support for cultural 
factors when these were compared to economic and frustration factors (p.11). A 
similar finding was reported by Sageman (2004) who analyzed 172 global Salafi 
mujahidin. He found that 70 percent of the mujahidin were recruited in countries 
where they were not born and grew up. Contrary to Wells and Horowitz (2007) 
and Sageman (2004), Russell and Miller (1977) found that  the environment 
where terrorists were first recruited into terrorism was important. Their analysis of 
worldwide terrorists of the 1960s and 1970s found that universities were the 
primary recruiting grounds for terrorists (p.57). In conclusion, social learning 
variables including family, friends, and environment had little support in terms of 
their effects on the participation in terrorism (Table 4). 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
Studying terrorism involves some methodological issues. Silke (2001) 
pointed out specific key problems while building upon Schmid and Jongman‘s 
(1988) earlier work on terrorism research. Accordingly, if the aim of research in 
any field is to develop from one level to the next level of understanding, namely 
from the exploratory level to the descriptive and explanatory levels, terrorism 
researches have failed to achieve such aim. In Silke‘s (2001) opinion, the reason 
for this failure is that terrorism is not a topic that is easily researched. The 
clandestine nature of terrorist networks makes key actors (or terrorists) hard to 
access, at least in a systematic manner. According to Schmid and Jongman 
(1988), only 24 percent of those terrorism researchers whom they surveyed 
indicated that they had obtained information from interviews with terrorists.  
Silke (2001) attempted to make a similar analysis to that of Schmid and 
Jongman (1988) by reviewing scholarly articles published between 1995 and 
1999 in two academic journals, Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism. His analysis revealed that only in 22 percent of articles did 
researchers use some type of interviewing, a result not different than that 
achieved by Schmid and Jongman (1988) after a decade. The proportion of 
structured and systematic interviews is even less. Only 1 percent of all articles 
used systematic interview. Further, of all the researchers interviewed, 97 percent 
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indicated that they used opportunity (convenient) sampling. In opportunity 
sampling, however, the researcher has no way to know whether he or she is 
studying the population of interest. In other words, in most studies they reviewed, 
sampling bias was likely. 
The quality of research is not limited to method of data collection. 
According to Silke (2001), only 20 percent of articles provided new knowledge 
over and above what was already known. Moreover, only 3 percent of the articles 
he reviewed used inferential statistics. Besides, terrorism researches rarely use 
statistics and when they do, they are five times more likely to use descriptive 
statistics. On the other hand, in forensic psychology and criminology, two similar 
areas to terrorism studies in terms of subject of interest, the use of statistics is 
more than 60 percent with the majority being inferential statistics. Finally, Silke 
(2001) denotes that the reason for statistics being so uncommon is that terrorism 
researches need extensive efforts but existing studies were hardly the production 
of collaborative efforts. 
That being said, this study was exploratory in nature because it attempted 
to explore the motives that may have an effect on terrorists‘ differential 
involvement in terrorist activities. As seen in the literature review section, a study 
with this specific focus has not been conducted yet. Most profiling studies have 
been conducted to find out the motives of terrorists before they were channeled 
into terrorism. Studies of this type, however, contributed to terrorism literature 
only to a certain extent in terms of understanding what makes a person a 
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terrorist. Today, we know little about true motivations of terrorists beyond their 
demographic characteristics.  
This study utilized terrorist autobiography as the data source. Surveying 
autobiographies is a well-known data collection technique in terrorism studies, 
but the major problem is the availability. Further details regarding how 
autobiographies were collected will be provided in the data collection section. 
Finally, this study was distinctive in the sense that it used inferential statistics in 
an effort to extend its findings beyond the simple description of a typical terrorist. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study addressed the following research questions and hypotheses;  
1. To what extent terrorists are similar or different in terms of their degree of 
involvement in terrorist activities?  
2. What factors are influential in the degree involvement in DHKP/C and 
Turkish Hezbollah?  
Research Question One 
This question asks what impacts involvement in terrorism or what 
differences and similarities exist between terrorists in terms of their involvement 
in terrorist activities. In order to answer this question, 11 different hypotheses 
were developed. Hypotheses 1 through 8 are bivariate hypotheses since they 
propose a bivariate relationship between involvement in terrorism and different 
factors such as social class, education, work status (employment status), loss of 
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a loved one in a counter-terrorism operation, school dropout, family arrest, family 
association to a terrorist group and recruitment method (family, relatives, friends, 
and others). Hypotheses 9, 10, and 11 are multivariate hypotheses since they 
propose a multivariate relationship between involvement in terrorism and the 
concepts of relative deprivation, frustration, and social learning, each of which 
was constructed by the combination of the above factors. Each hypothesis was 
tested twice, once for DHKP/C and once for Turkish Hezbollah members. 
Multivariate hypotheses tested both the combined effect of independent variables 
(model testing) and the individual effect of each variable in the model. 
H1. The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is negatively related to 
terrorists‘ social class levels. 
H2. The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is positively related to 
terrorists‘ education levels. 
H3. The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is positively related to 
terrorists‘ probability of being unemployed. 
H4. The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is higher for those who 
have lost a loved one in a counter-terrorism operation than for those who 
have not. 
H5. The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is higher for those who 
have dropped out of school than for those who have not. 
H6. The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is higher for those who 
have experienced a family arrest than for those who have not. 
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H7. The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is higher for those who 
have a family member (father, mother, brother, and sister) associated to a 
terrorist group than for those who do not. 
H8. The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is higher for those who 
have been first recruited by a family member, or by a relative, or by a 
friend than for those who have been recruited by other means (by reading 
publications or in prison). 
H9. Relative deprivation has a significant effect on the probability of 
involvement in terrorist activities controlling for social class, age, gender, 
and marital status6. 
H10. Frustration has a significant effect on the probability of involvement in 
terrorist activities controlling for age, gender, and marital status  
H11. Social learning has a significant effect on the probability of involvement in 
terrorist activities controlling for age, gender, and marital status. 
Research Question Two 
The second question asks what impacts DHKP/C members‘ involvement 
in terrorist activities different than Turkish Hezbollah members or vice versa. Is 
there any difference in the motivations of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish 
Hezbollah members? As stated in previous hypotheses, motivations for 
involvement in terrorist activities are assumed to be identical for both DHKP/C 
                                            
6
 Hypotheses regarding the individual effect of variables that constitute relative deprivation, 
frustration, and social learning were not stated. However, they were tested for significance 
proposing that their individual effect was significantly different from zero.   
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and Turkish Hezbollah members. Thus, following hypotheses are stated in the 
null form.  
H12. There was no difference in social class levels between the groups of 
arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
H13. There was no difference in education levels between the groups of 
arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
H14. There was no difference in work status between the groups of arrested 
DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
H15. Arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members were not 
different when compared in respect to having a loved one killed in a 
counter-terrorism operation. 
H16. There was no difference in school dropout rates between the groups of 
arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
H17. Arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members were not 
different when compared in respect to having an arrested family member. 
H18. Arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members were not 
different when compared in respect to having a family member associated 
to a terrorist group.  
H19. There was no difference in recruitment methods between the groups of 
arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
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Sources of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 (Socialclass) 
Hypothesis 1 was based on the researcher‘s own field experiences. 
Terrorism literature provided mixed evidence about the social class of terrorists. 
Russell and Miller (1977), for instance, found that most of the terrorists around 
the world were middle or upper class members. Sageman (2004) reported a 
similar pattern for global Salafi mujahidin. However, Clark reported that the 
majority of ETA members were either from working or lower middle classes. This 
study assumes that most DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members come from 
the lower classes of society7. Terrorists with low social class background 
generally come from poorer sectors of the society. They either reside in rural 
areas or slums in urban areas. Their parents are either illiterate or had little 
education (Sayari, 1985).  
Social class has become one of the determinants of involvement in 
terrorist activities. First of all, DHKP/C members‘ social class levels have 
changed a great deal since the 1970s. As Russell and Miller (1977) reported, the 
terrorists of the 1970s came from the middle or upper middle classes of society. 
Before they were radicalized, most of these terrorists were first organized under 
highly ideological and intellectual organizations such as the Federation of Idea 
Clubs and Revolutionist Youth (Yayla, 2005). However, the military coup of 1980 
                                            
7
 Social class is inferred from father‘s occupation. Further details are given in measurement 
section.  
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forced terrorist organizations and their militants underground. In the second half 
of the 1980s when most terrorists were released from prisons, they altered their 
recruitment strategy by organizing in the slums of big cities and acting 
clandestinely. As a result, certain characteristics of terrorists including their social 
class have undergone considerable changes.  
Second, Turkish Hezbollah members‘ social class cannot be assessed 
independently from the socioeconomic status of the region in which the 
organization is most active. As mentioned earlier, Turkish Hezbollah organized 
mostly in the south-eastern part of Turkey. This part of the country is known as 
the most underdeveloped region in terms of economic indicators like GDP per 
capita. Therefore, social class is assumed to be one of the most important 
indicators of the involvement in terrorist activities for Turkish Hezbollah members.  
Hypothesis 2 (Education) 
Hypothesis 2 was developed based on the findings in literature and the 
relative deprivation theory. Accordingly, previous studies reported that a majority 
of leftist and religiously motivated terrorists were highly educated (Berrebi, 2004; 
Handler, 1990; Pedahzur, et al., 2003; Russell & Miller, 1977; Sageman, 2004). 
However, they did not provide any evidence regarding why highly educated 
people join in terrorist organizations. This study expects that, as the education 
level increases, the probability of participation in terrorist activities increases 
because highly educated people are more likely to experience relative 
deprivation especially when they fail to achieve their expectations.  
91 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 (Workstatus) 
Hypothesis 3 was based on the principles of relative deprivation theory 
and the findings of Sageman (2004). Indeed, terrorists‘ work status has not 
drawn enough attention from terrorism scholars when compared to social class. 
In most studies, terrorists were assumed as full-time (terrorism) workers (Clark, 
1983; Russell & Miller, 1977; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). However, they ignored 
the fact that most terrorists act on a part-time or what this study calls as ―non-
professional‖ basis. With this hypothesis, it is expected that those who are 
employed (full-time or part-time) are less likely to participate in terrorist activities 
than those who are unemployed because employed people are less likely to 
experience relative deprivation.  
Hypothesis 4 (Loss) 
Hypothesis 4 tests the effect of loss of a loved one (in a counter-terrorism 
operation) on the probability of involvement in terrorism. This hypothesis was 
drawn from the works of Berko and Erez (2007). These studies found that 
terrorists seek revenge for harms and personal losses they suffer and which they 
attribute to police and military operations before they join a terrorist organization. 
Accordingly, it is expected that both DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members 
who lost a loved are more likely to participate in terrorist activities than those who 
had no such loss. 
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Hypothesis 5 (School Dropout) 
Like Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 5 reflected the researcher‘s own field 
experiences. This hypothesis tests the effect of school dropout on the probability 
of involvement in terrorism. Previous studies viewed school dropout as an 
educational category (Post, 2005; Russell & Miller, 1977). For instance, the 
educational level of a university dropout was defined as ―some college education‖ 
even though they did not graduate from a university (Russell & Miller, 1977, p. 
57; Sevinc, 2008, p. 172).  
On the other hand, dropout can be taken as an indicator of frustration 
especially when the person had to leave school against his will. According to my 
own observation, most dropout terrorists have to leave school against their will 
because they are permanently suspended from school for participating in illegal 
activities. In such situations, school dropout is likely to cause frustration because 
it interferes with educational objectives. As noted in the literature review, 
interfered with goals are important in the occurrence of frustration because it is 
related to goal attainment (Dollard, et al., 1939). Thus, it is expected that 
terrorists who dropped out of school are more likely to participate in terrorist 
activities than those who did not, due to the element of frustration.  
Hypothesis 6 (Familyarrest) 
Hypothesis 6 was developed based on the findings of previous studies. It 
tests the relationship between family arrest and involvement in terrorism. A 
number of studies found that police and military operations (negatively) motivate 
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relatives of terrorists to join a terrorist organization (RA Hudson, 2002; 
Moghadam, 2003; Soibelman, 2004; Sprinzak, 1991; Stern, 2003; Wells III & 
Horowitz, 2007; Yom & Saleh, 2004). Hence, it is expected that terrorists who 
had a family arrest are more likely to participate in terrorist activities than those 
who had no such experiences.  
Hypothesis 7 (Family) 
Hypothesis 7 was based both on the findings of previous studies and the 
researcher‘s own experiences. A number of studies reported that family 
association (to a terrorist organization) was an effective factor in the involvement 
in terrorism (Moghadam, 2003; Sageman, 2004; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987; 
Wells III & Horowitz, 2007). With this hypothesis, it is expected that terrorists who 
had a family member associated with a terrorist group are more likely to 
participate in terrorist activities than those who did not have such a family 
member.  
Hypothesis 8 (Friends and Relatives) 
Like family association to a terrorist organization, friends and relatives 
were equally important to be recruited into a terrorist organization (Moghadam, 
2003; Sageman, 2004; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987; Wells III & Horowitz, 2007). It 
is expected that those who were recruited by friends and relatives were more 
likely to engage in terrorist activities than those who were recruited by other 
means.   
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Hypothesis 9 (Relative Deprivation) 
Hypothesis 9 is a multivariate hypothesis of relative deprivation8. This 
hypothesis was drawn from Gurr‘s (1970) aspirational deprivation. As pointed out 
in the literature review, Gurr (1970) stated that traditional people‘s mere 
exposure to education increases their expectations. Such an increase in 
expectations may cause a relative deprivation if the level of achievement remains 
the same. Hypothesis 9 tests the combined effect of education and work status 
on the probability of involvement in terrorism. The purpose of testing the 
combined effect is to understand how well these two variables combined predict 
the probability of arrest. Other than the combined effect of education and work 
status, the individual effect of education and workstatus are also tested. Testing 
the individual effect of education is important because as long as work status 
remains the same, education serves to increase relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970). 
This in turn increases the probability of involvement in terrorism. Testing the 
individual effect of work status is also important because a positive change in 
work status is expected to increase the probability of relative satisfaction, which 
in turn decreases the probability involvement in terrorism.  
Hypothesis 10 (Frustration) 
Like Hypothesis 9, Hypothesis 10 is a multivariate hypothesis which was 
designed to test the effect of frustration on the involvement in terrorism. This 
                                            
8
 Multivariate hypothesis is a hypothesis proposing a relationship among more than two 
phenomena (Powell, 1997). 
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hypothesis was based on the findings from literature. A number of studies found 
that frustration is one of the factors that have an effect on involvement in 
terrorism (Florez-Morris, 2007; R Hudson, 2000; Moghaddam, 2005; Soibelman, 
2004; Sprinzak, 1991; Stern, 2003; Van Bruinessen, 1988; Wells III & Horowitz, 
2007; Yom & Saleh, 2004). Among the factors the researchers of these studies 
found are losses which terrorists attributed to military operations (Berko & Erez, 
2007; Moghadam, 2003), police use of excessive force (Florez-Morris, 2007), 
and humiliation by police and military forces (Sprinzak, 1991; Stern, 2003). 
Based on these findings, Hypothesis 10 tests the combined effect of family 
arrest, loss, and school dropout. Loss was mentioned by Berko and Erez (2007), 
Weinberg et al. (2003), and Soibelman (2004). Family arrest was mentioned by 
Sprinzak (1991), Stern (2003) and Florez-Morris (2007). School dropout was not 
explicitly mentioned. However, Dollard et al. (1939) stated that frustration is 
related to goal attainment. Therefore, dropout can be assessed as what they 
refer to as ―interfered goal‖ (Dollard, et al., 1939).  Testing the combined effect of 
these variables is important provided that frustration is an additive process and 
develops cumulatively (Dollard, et al., 1939). It is expected that frustration has a 
significant effect on the probability of involvement in terrorism. Other than the 
combined effect of family arrest, loss, and school dropout, their individual effect 
are also tested to see their contribution to the model. It is expected that all three 
variables of frustration positively and significantly influence the probability of 
involvement in terrorism.  
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Hypothesis 12 (Social Learning) 
Hypothesis 12 was designed based on the findings in literature. This 
hypothesis tests the effect of social learning on the involvement in terrorism. In 
other words, this hypothesis is interested in whether terrorists learn terrorism 
through social processes. There is ample theoretical reasoning showing that 
social learning is possible for terrorists (Crenshaw, 2000; Fields, 1979; RA 
Hudson, 2002; Moghaddam, 2005; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987) . However, no 
specific learning theory has been applied to terrorism so far. Findings from 
previous studies demonstrated that many terrorists had intimate groups such as 
family and friends with whom they are differentially associated and are thereby 
exposed to the excess definitions favorable to revolt against government (Berko 
& Erez, 2007; Krueger & Malecková, 2003; Moghadam, 2003; Weinberg & 
Eubank, 1987). Based on these findings, Hypothesis 11 tests the combined 
effect of family association and the recruitment method of terrorists on the 
involvement in terrorism. The impact of family and friends on terrorist decision-
making was studied by few scholars although it was echoed by many. Among the 
studies cited, Weinberg and Eubank (1987) mentioned the impact of 
companionship and family ties; Sageman (2004) mentioned the impact of 
friendship and kinship; and Wells and Horowitz (2007) mentioned the impact of 
friends, family members, and cultural environment on participation in terrorist 
activities. As well as the combined effect of family association and the 
recruitment method, individual effects are also tested on the probability of 
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involvement in terrorism. It is expected that both the combined and individual 
effects of family association and recruitment are significant.  
Hypotheses 12 Through 19 
Since in previous hypotheses motivations for involvement in terrorist 
activities were assumed to be identical for both DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah 
members, hypotheses 12 through 19 were all stated in the null form. 
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Conceptual Model  
Ross (1996) stated that there are different processes in a typical terrorist 
life such as joining a terrorist organization, involvement in terrorist activities, and 
quitting terrorism (Figure 3). The literature review showed that the process of 
becoming a terrorist or joining a terrorist organization has been addressed many 
times (Berko & Erez, 2007; Florez-Morris, 2007; Hassan, 2001; Russell & Miller, 
1977; Sageman, 2004; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987; Wells III & Horowitz, 2007). 
The process of involvement in terrorist activities has only been addressed from 
suicide bombing perspective (Berrebi, 2004; Soibelman, 2004; Wells III & 
Horowitz, 2007; Yom & Saleh, 2004). The process of quitting terrorism, on the 
other hand, has not drawn enough attentions of terrorism scholars (Victoroff, 
2005)9. 
As shown in Figure 3, terrorists are involved in terrorist activities at 
different levels. According to their involvement levels, terrorists can be examined 
under two different groups; professionals and non-professionals. Professional 
terrorists dedicate their entire life to the terrorist activities. They act clandestinely, 
do not marry, stay in terrorist cells, assume administrative or commanding 
positions, and plan and engage in violent terrorist attacks. Non-professionals, on 
the other hand, maintain a regular life-style. They drift in and out of terrorism. 
They sometimes assume legal duties such as running a student association at a 
                                            
9
 Since factors that may have an effect on quitting terrorism have not been addressed in the 
literature, the figure does not depict what makes a terrorist quit terrorism. 
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university10. They may also take part in violent terrorist attacks such as throwing 
Molotov cocktails at banks and public buildings and hanging banners with a 
bombing mechanism. They go to demonstrations, try to provoke crowds against 
the police, confront the police, and chant terrorist slogans.  
Compared to professionals, non-professional terrorists do not always act 
when they are given instructions, but act on the basis of their own decisions. This 
gives them some freedom to participate or not to participate in terrorist activities. 
Their involvement levels vary by their commitment to their organization‘s 
objectives. There are individual factors that may have an effect on their 
commitment such as being frustrated against the authority or feeling relatively 
deprived for their economic problems. These factors not only impact their 
commitment to terrorism (joining to a terrorist organization) but also may have an 
effect on their involvement levels. Sometimes they get arrested and imprisoned 
for their offenses. However, they generally serve a shorter time in prison 
compared to professionals. Most resume to terrorist activities because once they 
are criminally charged, their records adversely affect their quality of life and 
future opportunities. Still, they may get never caught by the police for their 
offenses if they are not recognized by their identity. In anyway, terrorists quit 
terrorism at some point in their life either because they age, or because they are 
killed, or just because they wish to maintain a regular life.  
                                            
10 For instance, DHKP/C supports a nationwide student association called The Federation of 
Turkish Student Association (TODEF).  
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The literature review showed that relative deprivation, frustration, and 
social learning can explain individuals‘ joining a terrorist organization. This study 
assumes that they also can explain some of the variations in involvement in 
terrorist activities. In other words, involvement in terrorist activities cannot only be 
explained by the instructions given by terrorist leaders. Terrorists who are acting 
a on a non-professional basis have some freedom to make their own decisions 
because they do not maintain a regular terrorist life. They drift in and out of 
terrorism.  
As shown in Figure 3, these concepts are not mutually exclusive. For 
instance, terrorists who were frustrated against some negative life experiences 
might also have been exposed to social learning. In such situations frustration is 
learned through social processes. A terrorist may learn frustration from family 
members or close associates. Thus, both family arrest and loss of loved one can 
be considered a function of family association and/or friend association. Similarly, 
frustrated terrorists may also have been exposed to relative deprivation. For 
instance, terrorists who dropped out of school may feel relatively deprived if they 
think that they cannot realize their expectations anymore. On the other hand, 
social learning and relative deprivation are different concepts. Therefore, they are 
depicted as mutually independent concepts. Further discussions on these 
concepts and their relevance to this study are presented in measurement and 
validation of measurement sections of this chapter. 
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Data 
This study used two different datasets. These datasets were collected from 
Turkish National Police Records. Datasets, DHKP/C (N=75) and Turkish Hezbollah 
(N=144), were drawn from terrorist autobiographies by Teymur (2004; 2007)11.  
Autobiographies that were used to construct DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah 
datasets were written by terrorists from DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah during their 
membership process before they were confiscated by the police in counter-
terrorism operations that were conducted against terrorist cells between 1990 and 
2000.  
In general, autobiographies offer valuable information about terrorists‘ 
demographics, motivations, and family backgrounds. Terrorist organizations ask 
their recruits to write their autobiographies as part of a membership procedure. The 
reason for asking autobiographies is two-fold: First, terrorist organizations want to 
know the motivation of the new recruits. Second, they ask new recruits to write 
about their references such as family members, friends, and relatives so that they 
can check their backgrounds and know the applicant better. Terrorists write their 
autobiographies in essay format. However, this does not mean that they are totally 
free about what to include. The fact that most of the information was common to 
most autobiographies indicates that terrorists write their autobiographies as a 
response to a standard set of questions. In this sense, autobiographies were 
authored in a similar format to a semi-structured interview.  
                                            
11
 Samih Teymur is a high-ranking TNP officer at the Counter-Terrorism Unit in Ankara, Turkey. 
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Before entering the variables into the datasets, Teymur (2004; 2007) first 
determined what variables he could extract from terrorist autobiographies. In 
general, there were three types of variables in terms of the way they were 
operationalized. First, data relating to gender (gender), marital status of self 
(maritalstatus), education level (education), and work status (workstatus) were all 
clearly indicated in most autobiographies.  
Second, data regarding the age (age), social class (socialclass), and 
school dropout (dropout) were not directly drawn from autobiographies, but from 
other variables. For instance, social class was defined based on father‘s 
occupation12. Age was calculated by subtracting the date of report from the date 
of birth13. Dropout, on the other hand, was drawn from educational categories.  
Third, data regarding the prior arrest of self (arrest), arrest of a family 
member (familyarrest), family members‘ association with a terrorist organization 
(familyassociation), recruitment method (recruitment) or loss of someone which 
the terrorist attributes to military and police operations (loss) were also common 
to most autobiographies even though there were missing cases14. Most terrorists 
included detailed information about these variables. For instance, those who 
mentioned a loss of somebody important indicated who (by their code names), 
when, and where they lost people important to them. Similarly, those who 
mentioned a family arrest indicated when and where that arrest took place. 
                                            
12
 Socialclass was not available in Turkish Hezbollah members‘ autobiographies. 
13
 Turkish Hezbollah members included ages in their autobiographies. 
14
 Like social, familyarrest was not available in Turkish Hezbollah members‘ autobiographies. 
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Further details on how these variables were operationalized are provided in the 
measurement section.  Also, issues on reliability and validity of autobiographies 
are discussed in detail at the end of this chapter.  
Sample 
The population of interest for this research is all terrorists who have an 
affiliation to a domestic organization in Turkey. Indeed, there are no statistics 
showing the actual size of the population. Since terrorist organizations act 
clandestinely, terrorists who act on behalf of a terrorist organization can be 
considered a hidden population. Therefore, selection of samples was 
accomplished in two stages.  
Selection of Terrorist Organizations 
In the first stage, two different terrorist organizations were determined for 
inclusion in the study.  As mentioned earlier, in Turkey there are as many as 
twenty different domestic terrorist organizations of different orientations and 
different sizes. In general, terrorist organizations can be clustered under three 
different groups with respect to their motivations. (a) Marxist-Leninist or leftist, 
such as DHKP/C, MLKP (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party), and TKP/ML 
(Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist); (b) Religiously-motivated or radical, 
such as Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA-C (Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front), and 
the Islamic Movement (IH); (c) Ethnic or separatist such as PKK (Kurdistan‘s 
Worker Party).  
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Within these clusters, DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah were selected 
purposely because they were thought to be representative of the most domestic 
terrorist organizations in Turkey in two respects. First, DHKP/C and Turkish 
Hezbollah were responsible for almost half of all terrorist incidents that happened 
during the last fifteen years. Second, these two terrorist organizations have the 
largest terrorist population within their respective clusters (leftist and radical 
camps) (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Terrorist Incidents in Turkey (1994-1995) 
Responsibility Incidents Arrest  Civilian 
Casualties 
Security Forces 
Casualty 
Leftist  
DHKP/C 
TKP/ML 
MLKP 
 
 
2,503 
665 
1,528 
 
 
8,410 
2,529 
2,508 
 
 
112 
70 
22 
 
 
259 
112 
82 
 
Radicals 
Turkish Hezbollah 
IBDA-C 
ICB 
Hizb-ut Tahrir 
Vasat 
 
 
523 
253 
182 
463 
5 
 
 
10,720 
751 
327 
734 
200 
 
 
530 
44 
- 
- 
24 
 
 
71 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
Source: Sevinc (2008). 
 
Table 5 demonstrates the statistics of terrorist incidents that happened 
between 1994 and 2006 in Turkey. The statistics show the total number of 
terrorist incidents, the name of the terrorist organization which claimed 
responsibility for the incidents, the number of arrested terrorists, the number of 
casualties of civilians, and the number of casualties of security forces. 
Accordingly, DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah were responsible for almost half of 
106 
 
 
 
the 6,122 terrorist incidents (49%) that occurred during the above mentioned 
period. Further, the number of arrested terrorists gave some ideas about the 
population of DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah. For instance, three-fifths of all 
arrested terrorists from the leftist cluster consisted of DHKP/C members (60%). 
Similarly, a great majority of those who were arrested from the radical cluster 
were Turkish Hezbollah members (84%). These figures indicated that the 
DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah are most probably the largest terrorist 
organizations within their respective clusters. In addition to the size of population 
and the number of terrorist incidents for which they assumed the responsibility, 
the number of casualties of civilians and security forces indicated that these two 
were the most violent groups among the leftist and radical terrorist organizations 
(Sevinc, 2008).  
On the other hand, there was no terrorist organization selected from the 
ethnic cluster. There were three different reasons as to why this cluster was 
excluded from the study. First, most separatist terrorist organizations, except the 
PKK, have been inactive for the last two decades. A majority of them abandoned 
violence and engaged in legitimate political processes. Second, the PKK was the 
only group to focus within this cluster, but there were difficulties in obtaining 
relevant data about the PKK terrorists. The organization was mostly active in the 
rural sides of south-eastern Turkey and recruited its members mostly from this 
part of the country. Their recruitment process was different from those of the 
DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah. More specifically, there were few accessible 
107 
 
 
 
documents about the backgrounds of PKK terrorists to investigate. Third, 
interviewing the PKK terrorists in prisons was another option for data collection, 
but mostly terrorists in prisons were reluctant to talk about their stories15.   
Selection of Terrorist Autobiographies 
Having determined the terrorist organizations in which the samples are 
drawn, autobiographies of terrorists were selected conveniently from DHKP/C 
and Turkish Hezbollah terrorists‘ court files. As mentioned, this study utilized 
terrorist autobiographies as the source of data. These autobiographies were 
collected by Teymur (2004; 2007) from court files. Autobiographies are 
considered documentary evidence of membership to terrorist organizations. 
Given their high importance, terrorist organizations archive them under high 
security. Therefore, counter-terrorism units do not have a high number of terrorist 
autobiographies in their court files. Since evidence is kept in separate files, there 
is no way to determine the total number autobiographies under police security. 
Therefore, Teymur (2004; 2007) conveniently drew 219 autobiographies from court 
files with the permission of authorities. 
From the methodological standpoint, convenient sampling is a non-
probability sampling technique. In convenience sampling, not all units in a 
population have the equal opportunity of being selected (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2000). In this study, sampling was biased toward the terrorists who 
had previously given an autobiography and whose autobiographies were seized 
                                            
15
 Given the researcher‘s police background, this was even harder. 
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by the police. On the other hand, given the nature of terrorism studies in which 
researchers mostly lack the opportunity to create a sampling frame that is 
representing the whole population, non-probability sampling is a norm. Hence, 
terrorism is one of the applied social research fields where probability sampling is 
not feasible.  
Although samples cannot be considered as representative of the 
population of interest, the generalizability of the findings was not the primary goal 
of the current study. As noted earlier, the purpose of the current study was to 
explore the patterns of involvement in terrorist activities using an accessible 
population. Still, the findings of this study can be generalized to DHKP/C and 
Turkish Hezbollah terrorists.  
Measurements 
Dependent Variables 
Research Question One 
The first question is interested in the patterns of differential involvement in 
terrorist activities. The dependent variable, arrest, measures whether the 
individual terrorist has a previous arrest history. The variable is measured as a 
dichotomous variable (―0‖ indicating non-arrested terrorists and ―1‖ indicating 
arrested terrorists). This variable is clearly indicated in most autobiographies and 
taken as a measure of involvement in terrorist acts. Accordingly, those who have 
at least one arrest history were defined as ―arrested‖ to indicate greater 
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involvement, otherwise as ―non-arrested‖ to indicate lesser involvement in 
terrorism.  
The construction of involvement in terrorist activities seems weak in two 
respects. First, the dependent variable measures the involvement in terrorist acts 
in probability (0, 1) rather than in frequency, which increases the likelihood that 
an observation occurs by chance. For instance, the involvement in terrorist acts 
for a terrorist who was previously arrested only once could be measured as high 
whereas the actual involvement level might be low. On the other hand, a terrorist 
might have been arrested more than once but still might be measured as if he or 
she was arrested once. In the first case the arrest rate is inflated whereas in the 
second case it is understated just because it is measured in probability. 
On the other hand, the arrest rate was measured based on a criterion that 
a terrorist should have at least one arrest history to be qualified for the ―arrested‖ 
category. Most of the terrorists, however, had an arrest history of more than once 
but still categorized if they were arrested only once (Teymur, 2004). The fact that 
most terrorists had an arrest more than once reduces the probability of miscoding 
by chance.  
Another issue is related to the dependent variable‘s quantitative nature. 
Obviously, the quantitative nature of the dependent variable curtails the quality of 
the terrorist act(s) involved. For instance, those who were arrested for plotting a 
bomb and those who were arrested for hanging illegal banners on the streets are 
grouped under the same category as they have a previous, one-time arrest 
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history. Further, a researcher has a limited or no way to know about the reason 
for the arrest that the author is talking about. This is because in their 
autobiographies terrorists do not mention the details of the event for which they 
have been arrested—in order not to be recognized and their identity given 
away16. As a result, lack of quality in the data would potentially lead the 
researcher to draw unreliable conclusions from quantitatively constructed 
measures. However, terrorists in both DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah datasets 
were all applicants or, what this study already describes as non-professional 
terrorists, who generally take part in minor offenses. Therefore, the quantitative 
measurement of the dependent variable should not result in any significant loss 
in the quality of the terrorist act indicated (by arrest) in autobiographies when the 
reason for the arrest is the issue. Further, unlike in the United States in Turkey 
the term arrest does not refer to a simple police detention rather it is used to refer 
a judge‘s decision. If a person is arrested on a judge‘s decision, he or she goes 
to the jail at least until the next hearing. That is, arrest shows that there is strong 
evidence against the person relating to an offense. As a result, the quantitative 
nature of the dependent variable is not considered a threat to the validity of its 
construction.  
Research Question Two 
This question is interested in whether the pattern of differential 
involvement changes from the DHKP/C to Turkish Hezbollah. This question begs 
                                            
16
 They use their code names in their autobiographies.  
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for a comparison of arrested DHKP/C versus arrested Turkish Hezbollah 
members. Thus, the dependent variable measures arrest by organization ("0‖ 
indicating arrested Turkish Hezbollah members and ―1‖ indicating arrested 
DHKP/C members).  
Independent Variables 
In general, independent variables can be categorized into three groups: 
demographics, family backgrounds, and recruitment. Demographic variables in 
this study include age (age), gender (gender), education (education), school 
dropout (dropout), marital status (maritalstatus), work status (workstatus), and 
social class (socialclass). Variables indicating family backgrounds include family 
arrest (Familyarrest), family association (familyassociation), and loss of 
somebody (loss). There is one variable in the last category: method of 
recruitment (recruitment) 
Age 
DHKP/C members did not indicate their exact age when writing their 
autobiographies. Instead, they put their date of birth. As mentioned earlier, 
DHKP/C members‘ ages were calculated by subtracting the date of birth from the 
date of report. Turkish Hezbollah members, on the other hand, explicitly indicated 
their age in their autobiographies. Thus, in both datasets, age was measured in 
ratio level. 
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Gender 
Both DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members explicitly indicated their 
gender in their autobiographies. As presented in descriptive statistics in Table 8, 
Turkish Hezbollah‘s gender makeup was disproportionate (with 1 female against 
143 males), which reduced the explanatory power of this variable for this group. 
On the other hand, DHKP/C‘s gender composition was almost even. Gender was 
measured as a nominal (dichotomous) variable (―0‖ indicating female and ―1‖ 
indicating male). 
Education 
In both DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah datasets, education level was 
measured based on educational level at the time (date) of report. In Teymur‘s 
(2004; 2007) datasets, education was measured in a 10-item nominal measure. 
According to the highest degree obtained, there were primary school graduates, 
middle school graduates, high school graduates, and university graduates. Those 
who dropped out were also measured as primary school dropout, middle school 
dropout, high school dropout, and university dropout. Other than graduates and 
dropouts, there were also students at the time when they wrote their 
autobiographies. To reduce the number of categories, dropout categories were 
collapsed and cases in these categories were added in the educational category 
where the person attended last before the dropout17. Accordingly, education was 
                                            
17
 Alternatively, dropouts could have been incorporated into the educational categories where the 
person had a degree last. A treatment of this type, however, could cause a significant information 
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measured on a 4-point ordinal scale (―1‖ indicating primary school, ―2‖ indicating 
middle school, ―3‖ indicating high school, and ―4‖ indicating university). Thus, the 
primary school category included primary school graduates and dropouts. The 
middle school category included middle school graduates and dropouts. The high 
school category included high school graduates, dropouts, and current students. 
The university category included university students, dropouts, and current 
students. Since categories are rank-ordered, the higher the education level, the 
better, or vice versa.  
Maritalstatus 
Marital status of both DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members was also 
specified in all autobiographies. Marital status was measured on a 3-point 
nominal scale: never married, married, and divorced/separated. In Turkish 
Hezbollah dataset, there was no observation in divorced/separated category. 
Therefore, the scale was recoded into a nominal (dichotomous) scale (―0‖ 
indicating never married and ―1‖ indicating married). In DHKP/C datasets, there 
were 2 observations in the divorced/separated category. This category was 
collapsed and the 3-point scale was recoded in a nominal (dichotomous) scale 
using the same indicators.  
                                                                                                                                  
loss because the proportion of dropouts among DHKP/C members was as high as 47 percent. In 
the past, Russell and Miller (1977) measured the educational level of the terrorists in this way. In 
a most of recent study of Turkish terrorists, Sevinc (2008) included the dropouts in the 
educational categories where the person attended last. 
 
114 
 
 
 
Socialclass 
Social class refers to hierarchical stratification in a society. Although there 
is no agreed upon operational definition, occupation, education, and family 
background (father‘s and mother‘s work/profession/occupation) are considered 
as generally-accepted determinants of social class (Krieger, Williams, & Moss, 
1997). In this study, the social class of DHKP/C terrorists was inferred from the 
father‘s occupation. Accordingly, five categories of social class were described 
(lower class, working class, lower middle class, upper middle class, and upper 
class) using Gilbert‘s (2008) classification18. Thus, socialclass was measured on 
a 5-point ordinal scale (ranging from ―1‖ indicating lower class and ―5‖ indicating 
upper class). Since categories are rank-ordered, the higher the social class, the 
better, or vice versa. There was no indicator of social class for Turkish Hezbollah 
members. Therefore, the social class of Turkish Hezbollah members was not 
measured. 
                                            
18 Gilbert‘s classification of social class is widely used as a way of classifying people in any 
society. In this model, five different categories of social classes are defined as stated above. 
Accordingly, those who reported that their fathers were a state employee and doing a white collar 
job were considered lower middle class members. In Gilbert‘s model, white collar employees 
were considered to be part of the lower middle class. Some reported that both father and mother 
were state employees indicating that family income was doubled. These were classified under 
upper middle class members. Those blue collar and clerical workers who work for the state or 
private sector organizations were considered to be part of the working class even though their 
income level was close to that of members of the lower middle classes. Compared to white collar 
workers, blue collar and clerical workers had less job security since most worked on contract. 
Those who reported that their fathers were farmers and owned a small field were considered part 
of the working poor. Compared to the lower middle class and working class members, they had a 
greater risk of economic insecurity and poverty. Finally, some reported that their fathers were 
self-employed, did not have regular income, and relied on government benefits to survive. They 
were considered to be part of the underclass.  
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Workstatus 
Work status refers to the employment status of respondents. In both 
DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah datasets, work status is defined using a 4-point 
nominal scale (―1‖ indicating unemployed, ―2‖ indicating working-part-time, and 
―3‖ indicating working full-time, and ―4‖ indicating students). In this study, 
―Student‖ category was dropped because there were only 4 cases in DHKP/C 
and 8 cases in Turkish Hezbollah datasets. Thus, the new work status variable is 
comprised of a 3-point scale (―1‖ indicating unemployed, ―2‖ indicating working-
part-time, and ―3‖ indicating working full-time). As for the measurement level, 
most researchers treated work (or employment status) as a nominal variable 
(Ferguson, 2000). Still, some others treated it as an ordinal variable (Dickerson, 
et al., 2004; Liao, 1994). In his book, Interpreting Probability Models, Liao (1994) 
cited employment status (unemployed, part-time, and full-time) as an example of 
ordinal scale. Even though there was ranking among the categories, obviously 
the differences between the categories cannot be treated as the same. 
Therefore, in this study, work status was treated as a nominal variable. 
Dropout 
As stated before, dropout, as a separate variable, was not available in the 
original datasets. Rather, dropout was defined as an educational category. 
Considering that school dropout can be a motivation for some terrorists, dropout 
categories at various educational levels were collapsed into a dummy variable to 
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distinguish school dropouts from non-dropouts19. In other words, if the person 
reported that he or she dropped out of school (at any educational level), that 
person was categorized under ―dropout‖ or otherwise ―non-dropout‖. The 
measurement level was dichotomous (―0‖ indicating non-dropouts, ―1‖ indicating 
dropouts).  
Family Background Variables  
Data regarding the family backgrounds of terrorists included familyarrest, 
loss, and familyassociation. Familyarrest measured whether the person had a 
family arrest. Loss measured whether the person lost a loved in a counter-
terrorism operation. Familyassociation measured whether the person had a 
family members associated with a terrorist group. These three variables are 
dichotomous (―0‖ indicating no and ―1‖ indicating yes) measures. Data relating to 
the arrest of a family member was not available in Turkish Hezbollah members‘ 
autobiographies. Therefore, familyarrest was not measured for Turkish Hezbollah 
members. 
                                            
19
 Reasons for dropout vary. Some terrorists may have simply failed or had to leave school for 
economic or other reasons. This explanation might be true to some extent, but still dropout rate 
was fairly high that almost one half of all DHKP/C members (47%) dropped out of school at some 
level. Therefore, there might be some other reasons that may account for the high dropout rate 
for DHKP/C members. There are two more possible reasons. First, some terrorists may have 
chosen to dropout to carry out certain missions given by their leaders. Considering that terrorists 
in the dataset had no full membership as of the date they dropped out, this was not likely. 
Second, some terrorists may have been expelled or suspended from school due to the criminal or 
disciplinary sanctions imposed on them for participating in illegal activities. In such cases, school 
dropout can be a motivation for greater participation in terrorist activities.  
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Recruitment 
In both DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah datasets, terrorists mentioned the 
person by whom they were recruited first. Response categories included: friends, 
relatives (including family members), organizational publication, in prisons, in 
demonstrations, and others. Since there was small number of cases in the in 
publications, in prison and in demonstration categories, they were collapsed and 
cases were merged with the ―other‖ category. Thus, recruitment is comprised of a 
3-point nominal scale (―1‖ indicating friends, ―2‖ indicating relatives, ―3‖ indicating 
―others‖). 
Relative Deprivation 
The measurement of relative deprivation was challenging. First of all, 
there is no agreed-upon measurement of relative deprivation at the individual 
level. In research areas where researchers can have direct access to the 
research subject, relative deprivation at the individual level was measured using 
self-report data (Crawford & Naditch, 1970; Geschwender & Geschwender, 1971; 
Grofman & Muller, 1973). On the other hand, in terrorism studies where 
researchers have limited access to the research subject, relative deprivation was 
measured with the social class from which people originate (Atran, 2004; 
Moghaddam, 2005; Sageman, 2004). The underlying assumption that drove the 
latter studies was that people of lower classes are more likely to experience 
relative deprivation since they are less likely to achieve their expectations.  
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However, mere social class may not be a good indicator of relative 
deprivation if people can still achieve economic success regardless of their social 
classes. It is true that people have more equal opportunities today compared to 
the 1960s and 1970s when the concept of relative deprivation was first invented. 
It is because in this study relative deprivation is not measured in the light of one‘s 
social class. This study measures relative deprivation as the combined effect of 
education and workstatus controlling for socialclass, gender, age, and 
maritalstatus. As aforementioned, this model is adapted from Gurr‘s (1970) 
―aspirational deprivation‖. 
Frustration-Aggression Variables 
As aforementioned, terrorism literature did not mention a frustration model 
that applied specifically to the behaviors of terrorists. This study measures the 
frustration as the combined effect of loss, familyarrest, and dropout. Data 
regarding these variables were available in both DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah 
datasets20. All three variables are dichotomous measures. Hence, there is no 
way to determine the certainty of aggression as measured by the level and 
number of frustrating interferences (Dollard, et al., 1939). On the other hand, 
Miller et al. (1941) suggested that ―simply occurrence or existence of a frustrating 
event‖ is a sufficient, if not a necessary, condition for aggression. Therefore, the 
dichotomous-level measurement satisfies the requirement for what Miller et al. 
(1941) calls the ―occurrence or existence of a frustrating event‖.  
                                            
20
 Family arrest was not reported by Turkish Hezbollah members in their autobiographies.  
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Social Learning 
As noted early on, the application of social learning theory to the study of 
terrorism is new. This study draws upon Sutherland‘s (1975) differential 
association theory because it clearly identified the social processes by which 
people learn from each other21. Differential association is mostly measured by 
the number of friends and family members with criminal records. In this study, 
differential association is measured by the combined effect of familyassociation 
and recruitment (method of recruitment).  
Validation of Measurement 
To explore the latent dimensions of the variables used to define theoretical 
concepts (relative deprivation, frustration-aggression, and social learning), two 
different factor analyses were performed, one for DHKP/C and one for Hezbollah 
datasets. This statistical technique is mostly employed to reduce large number of 
variables into a small number of factors. On the other hand, it is also used to 
validate a concept by showing that its constituent variables load on the same 
factor.  
As mentioned in source of hypothesis and measurement sections, 
variables used to define each theoretical concept were constructed based on the 
literature review. Here, factor analysis was conducted to enhance the validity of 
concepts. Before running the analysis, however, both DHKP/C and Hezbollah 
                                            
21
 The theory was not directly tested, but used as a framework. 
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datasets were tested for the assumptions of factors analysis on interval/ratio 
data, absence of high multicollinearity, and no outliers22.  
Factor Analysis on DHKP/C Dataset 
First, factor analysis assumes that variables are measured at interval/ratio 
level. However, none of the variables included in the analysis was measured at 
interval/ratio level. On the other hand, Kim and Mueller (1978) allow the use of 
ordinal variables if the researcher thinks that the assignment of ordinal variable 
do not seriously distort the underlying interval/ratio scaling (p.74). Accordingly, 
education did not seem to distort interval/ratio scaling because as mentioned in 
measurement section, categories of education were rank-ordered. Further, the 
differences between adjacent educational categories can be treated as the same. 
This means that education can be treated as an interval measure. Kim and 
Mueller (1978) also allows the use of dichotomous variable as long as the 
correlation between the variables were moderate (.70 and lower). Dropout, 
familyarrest, familyassociation, and loss were all dichotomous measures. On the 
other hand, when one of the categories was collapsed, both workstatus and 
recruitment qualified for dichotomous-level measurement23. Thus, these variables 
met the criteria for running a factor analysis. 
                                            
22
 Data was not checked for homoscedasticity and multivariate normality. Homoscedasticity is not 
a critical assumption of factor analysis. On the other hand, factor analysis has no distributional 
assumptions when Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used as an extraction method, which 
was the case for this study.   
23
 To this end, ―working part-time‖ and ―working fulltime‖ categories of the workstatus were 
combined under ―employed” category. The ―unemployed” category remained untouched. 
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After these treatments, variables were checked for the absence of 
multicollinearity. There were two methods available to test multicollinearity. The 
first method was to check bivariate correlation coefficients between the variables. 
The second method was to run a collinearity diagnostic which was available in 
SPSS linear regression analysis. Here, the first method was employed. As a rule 
of thumb, correlation coefficient of .70 and above may indicate a potential 
mutlicollinearity issue. As seen in bivariate correlation table (Appendix A), none 
of the bivariate correlations exceeded .70, except the one between familyarrest 
and familyassociation. The correlation between these two variables was 
.821(p=.00), which was highly strong. The crosstab analysis of these two 
variables indicated that of the DHKP/C terrorist who had a family arrest, all 
(100%) had a family association (Appendix B). This indicated that familyarrest is 
a function of familyassociation. Therefore, it was dropped from the analysis.  
Finally, the data was checked for (multivariate) outliers. To detect 
multivariate outlier, one may regress the dependent variable on all independent 
variable with a request for Mahalanobis distance which is available in SPSS 
linear regression analysis. A Mahalanobis distance of 15.0 and above can be 
considered a multivariate outlier. When arrest was regressed on education, 
dropout, loss, familyassociation, workstatus, and recruitment, it was seen that 
three cases (case number 60, 73, and 75) were identified as outliers (Appendix 
C). Therefore, these cases were excluded from the analysis.  
                                                                                                                                  
Similarly, ―friends” and ―relatives” categories of recruitment were combined under ―close 
associates”. The ―others” category remained untouched.  
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After the assumptions were met, a factor analysis was conducted on 
education, workstatus, dropout, loss, familyassociation, and recruitment. Both 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measures of Sampling Adequacy Test (.495=.5) and 
Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity (p=.000) indicated that factor analysis is an 
appropriate method to proceed (Appendix D)24. Thus, one can safely reject the 
null hypothesis that the variables in the correlation matrix are uncorrelated. As an 
extraction technique, principal component analysis (PCA) was used because the 
purpose was not to test a causal model, but validate the items used to test 
theoretical concepts. The PCA was undertaken by employing varimax rotation to 
―maximize the tendency of each variable to load highly on only one factor‖ 
(Hedderson, 1987). 
As seen in Table 6, factor analysis produced three factors indicating that 
there were three dimensions in DHKP/C terrorists‘ motivations. These three 
factors cumulatively accounted for 73% of the total variance explained. Variables 
loaded on different factors indicated that these were the indicators of the same 
phenomena25. For instance, loss and dropout both loaded on factor 1. This 
suggested that loss and dropout were the different measures of the same 
concept. As mentioned before, dropout and loss, along with familyarrest, were 
                                            
24
 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) is a sampling adequacy test. It shows whether variables can be 
grouped under a smaller set of underlying dimension. KMO scores vary between 0 and 1.0. A 
KMO score of .60  and over is desirable but some researchers allow .5 as a cut-off point 
(Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Similarly, Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity tests the null hypothesis 
test variables in correlation matrix are uncorrelated. A statistically significant Bartlett value shows 
that factor analysis is appropriate to proceed (Tobias & Carlson, 1969).  
25
 Hair et al. (1998) consider factor loadings of .6 and above high and .4 and below low. For 
exploratory purposes, some researchers used factor loadings of .4 for central factors and .25 for 
other factors.  
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classified under frustration variables in measurement section. On the other hand, 
education and workstatus loaded on factor 2. This was not surprising considering 
that education and workstatus were categorized under relative deprivation. The 
negative loading for workstatus indicated that workstatus was negatively related 
to the factor (or latent dimension). More precisely, the extent of relative 
deprivation was negatively related to the employment; the higher the probability 
of employment the lesser the relative deprivation. Finally, familyassociation and 
recruitment loaded on factor 3. As mentioned earlier, familyassociation and 
recruitment (method of recruitment) were categorized under of social learning 
concept. 
Table 6 Factor analysis of variables for DHKP/C 
 Component 
 1 2 3 
Education .016 .847 .065 
Dropout .817 .432 -.043 
Loss .877 -.237 .253 
Familyassociation .208 -.108 .817 
Recruitment -.018 .197 .816 
Workstatus .031 -.679 .019 
Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
 
As mentioned in conceptual model section, factor analysis of DHKP/C 
dataset indicated that theoretical frameworks were not mutually exclusive. For 
instance, the factor loading of .253 for loss in factor 3 indicated that this variable 
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can also be considered a social learning variable along with familyassociation 
and recruitment. As noted in conceptual model section, loss is a frustration 
variable, but it also indicates that those who had a loss in a counter-terrorism 
operation had a close associate to a terrorist organization. Likewise, the factor 
loading of .453 for dropout indicated that this variable can also be considered as 
relative deprivation variable along with education and workstatus. It is likely that 
most DHKP/C terrorists‘ being a school dropout may have affected their 
achievement in employment.  
Factor Analysis on Turkish Hezbollah Dataset 
A second analysis was performed on Turkish Hezbollah dataset. Before 
the analysis, the dataset was checked for the assumptions of factor analysis on 
interval/ratio data, absence of high multicollinearity, and no outliers. There was 
no measurement issue after workstatus and recruitment were treated in the same 
way as DHKP/C dataset was treated. A seen in bivariate Table (Appendix E), 
none of the bivariate correlation coefficient was above the moderate level (r=.70). 
This indicated that there was no potential multicollinearity issue.  
After the assumptions were met, a factor analysis was conducted on 
education, workstatus, dropout, loss, familyassociation, and recruitment. Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin Measures of Sampling Adequacy Test indicated that sample size 
was adequate (.496=.5). However, Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity showed that the 
null hypothesis that variables in correlation matrix are uncorrelated cannot be 
rejected (p=557>.05) (Appendix F). That is, factor analysis was not appropriate 
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method to proceed. Therefore, results for factors loadings were not reported. The 
result for Turkish Hezbollah data can be taken as an indication of poor fit for the 
given models.  
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Table 7: Variables in Datasets and Measurement Levels 
 
Name 
 
Label 
 
Values 
 
Measurement Level 
 
Arrest Ever been arrested 0 No Arrest 
1 Arrested 
 
Dichotomous 
 
 
Age   Ratio 
 
Gender  0 Female 
1 Male 
 
Dichotomous 
 
 
    
Maritalstatus  0 Single 
1 Married 
 
Dichotomous 
 
 
Education  1 Primary School 
2  Middle School 
3  High School 
4 University 
 
 
Ordinal 
Workstatus 
 
 1 Unemployed 
2 Part-time 
3 Full-time 
 
 
Ordinal 
Dropout Ever dropped out 0 Non-dropout 
1 Dropout 
 
 
Dichotomous 
Loss Ever lost somebody 0 No 
1 Yes 
 
 
Dichotomous 
Familyarrest Ever had a family 
arrest 
0 No  
1 Yes 
 
 
Dichotomous 
Familyassociation Have a family 
member associated to 
a terrorist group 
 
0 No 
1 Yes 
 
 
Dichotomous 
Recruitment Who did you recruited 
by 
1 Friend 
2 Relatives 
3 Others 
 
 
Nominal 
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Research Design 
Datasets used in this study were collected through cross-sectional 
research design. Indeed, terrorism researchers often have to use cross-sectional 
designs because they have a limited or no way to manipulate situations where 
they can thoroughly have control over variables that are affecting a terrorist‘s life. 
As terrorists act secretly, researchers lack the opportunity to access them 
systematically; assign them randomly to control and experiment groups; and 
assess the impact of variables that may have an effect on their decision making.  
Obviously, the fact that terrorism studies are mostly based on cross-
sectional design creates serious methodological limitations. First of all, cross-
sectional design rarely allows the establishment of a causal relationship as 
measurements are done at one point in time. Sometimes researchers cannot 
establish a temporal relationship between dependent and independent variables. 
In such situations, cross-sectional design simply allows one to identify the pattern 
of relationship between these variables.  
Secondly, in cross-sectional research design researchers have no 
methodological control over variables, which makes it hard to assess the partial 
correlations between dependent and independent variables. For instance, 
research question one and research question two try to address whether 
demographics and social backgrounds matter in differential involvement in 
terrorist activities. To answer these questions thoroughly, one needs to have 
methodological control over independent variables that may have an effect on 
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differential involvement in terrorist activities. In order to overcome such 
methodological challenges, this study uses multivariate statistical techniques 
(ex., logistic regression) to achieve some of the operations (ex., methodological 
control of the measurement process) that naturally exist in experimental designs. 
In other words, this research achieves what methodological control does in 
experimental designs through statistical control. Thus, the researcher improves 
the cross-sectional design ―to approximate post-test only control group design‖ 
and assess the partial correlations between differential involvement and its 
predictors (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000, p. 118)26. Further details 
concerning statistical analysis are discussed in the data analysis section.  
Data Analysis 
Research Question One 
Research hypotheses relating to research question one will be analyzed 
through both bivariate and multivariate analysis techniques. Bivariate analysis is 
the analysis of two variables at the same time. Bivariate testing of research 
hypotheses is needed because this study is an exploratory one. Hence, the 
relationship between the DV and the IV should be examined on a one-to-one 
basis before it is tested in a multivariate setting. Multivariate analysis, on the 
other hand, examines more than two variables simultaneously. In general, 
multivariate analysis is used to refine the findings of bivariate analysis. In 
                                            
26
 Post-test only control group design is a special type of experimental design. 
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particular, because involvement in terrorist activities (DV) is multidimensional, 
testing the combined effects of variables is essential. 
Bivariate Hypothesis Testing 
A number of statistics was available to measure the strength and 
significance of (bivariate) association between DV and IVs. As stated in the 
measurement section: the dependent variable (arrest) was a dichotomous 
measure and independent variables included dichotomous (dropout, loss, 
familyarrest, and familyassociation), ordinal (socialclass, and education) and 
nominal (workstatus and recruitment) variables. Hypotheses 1 though 8 were 
tested by constructing contingency tables using the SPSS crosstab function. 
Statistical significance was determined through Pearson‘s chi-square and the 
Mantel-Haenszel chi-square (or linear-by-linear association). All statistical tests 
were conducted at the .05 alpha level. Results were considered statistically 
significant when the p-value was less than .1.  
Multivariate Hypothesis Testing 
Hypotheses 9 through 11 were tested using binary logistic regression. 
Binary logistic regression is an appropriate multivariate analysis technique to 
predict a dichotomous DV from a set of nominal, ordinal, and interval/ratio IVs; to 
determine the amount of variance in the DV that is explained by the combined 
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IVs; and to calculate the effect size made by each IV. When testing hypotheses 9 
through 11, the hierarchical logistic regression method was used27.  
Research Question Two 
Research question two asked whether the arrest pattern varies between 
the DHKP/C and the Turkish Hezbollah. In other words, the statistical analysis 
used to answer this question was to compare arrest rates of DHKP/C and 
Turkish Hezbollah members on a number of independent variables. Since the 
variables on which group differences were measured were dichotomous, ordinal, 
and nominal, crosstab analysis with a Pearson Chi-Square test was an 
appropriate method.   
Missing Data Analysis 
Some of the variables have a high number of cases with missing values 
(ex., <%9 and larger). This reduces the sample size, especially, in a multivariate 
analysis when the missing cases are dropped. Missing values should be handled 
carefully. Otherwise, an improper treatment will distort analysis. A proper 
treatment is important because, when missing data is imputed, the researcher 
assumes that missing cases are analytically different from those nonmissing. On 
the other hand, missing data must be deleted if the researcher cannot prove that 
missing cases are analytically different.   
                                            
27
 This method is used when there are control variables. 
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 There is no simple rule to decide whether to delete or impute missing 
values. If the proportion of missing values is small, a common treatment is to 
drop the cases with missing values from the analysis. Mostly statistical programs 
do this by default. If, however, the proportion of missing values is large, 
researcher‘s task is to detect whether missing has occurred nonrandomly or 
randomly. If missing occurs in a nonrandom fashion, then they must be imputed 
without dropping the observation. If, however, missing occurs randomly across all 
observations, then the researcher may either choose to drop the cases or run the 
analysis twice, first with dropping the cases and then imputing cases, to see if 
there is any difference between the two analyses. For univariate analysis 
imputing the missing values tends to reduce bias, but for multivariate analysis it 
can distort correlation coefficient. However, researchers still allow imputation for 
multivariate analyses at least when the analysis is run twice, again first with 
deletion and then with imputation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000). 
Treatment of Missing Values 
Missing values can be distributed across the data set or at least within one 
or more subsample (ex., missing more among females than males). While the 
former is called ―missing completely at random‖ (MCAR), the latter is called 
―missing at random‖ (MAR). Both MCAR and MAR can be detected through 
SPSS MVA (missing value analysis) function as it supports Little’s MCAR Test 
for MCAR and Separate Variance t-Test for MAR. Little’s MCAR is a chi-square 
test in which the mean value of each variable is compared with the mean of value 
132 
 
 
 
of its missing cases. If the p value of chi-square analysis is not significant, then 
MCAR can be assumed. Similarly, Separate Variance t-Test is t-Test in which 
independent variables are tested against dependent variables whether the 
missing values of independent variables occur in a random fashion with respect 
to dependent variables. Next, the results of Little’s MCAR and Separate Variance 
t-Test are presented to determine whether there is MCAR or MAR. Since these 
two tests run the analysis on the basis of mean values, only those variables that 
are continuous in nature or that can be treated as continuous are included.  
Little’s MCAR Test and Separate Variance t-Test  
Test on DHKP/C Dataset 
In order to understand whether missing values occur across all 
observations a Little‘s MCAR test is conducted on DHKP/C dataset. Along with 
dependent variable (arrest), independent variables (gender, age, maritalstatus, 
education, socialclass, loss, dropout, familyarrest, and familyassociation) that are 
stated in hypotheses were included in the test28. The univariate statistics analysis 
showed that socialclass, loss, familyarrest, and familyassociation have all high 
number cases with missing values (more than %5) (Appendix G). However, 
missing values seem to be distributed randomly across all observations. The null 
hypothesis that missing values are MCAR (missing completely at random) cannot 
be rejected (p>.05) (Appendix H). 
                                            
28
 Workstatus and recruitment were not included because these variables were categorical 
measures.  
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Another test for MAR was conducted using variables with missing values 
more than 5 percent. Separate Variance t-Test is t-Test indicated that 
independent variables are MAR (missing at random) with respect to dependent 
variable (arrest) (Appendix I). The results of these two tests showed that 
imputation of missing values was not appropriate for DHKP/C dataset.  
Test on Turkish Hezbollah Dataset 
Both Little’s MCAR Test and Separate Variance t-Test were conducted on 
Turkish Hezbollah datasets using the same set of variables. The univariate 
statistics showed that age, education, dropout, and familyassociation have all 
high number of cases with missing values (more than 5%) (Appendix J). 
However, missing values were distributed randomly across all observations. The 
null hypothesis that missing values are MCAR (missing completely at random) 
cannot be rejected (p>.05) (Appendix K). Similarly, Separate Variance t-Test is t-
Test indicated that independent variables with high number of missing values are 
MAR (missing at random) with respect to dependent variable (arrest) (Appendix 
L). The result for Turkish Hezbollah dataset indicated that imputation was not 
appropriate. 
Since no imputation is undertaken, missing values should be deleted 
before running the analysis. However, SPSS do this by default. Therefore, 
analyses were run without imputation and deletion, but SPSS automatically 
excluded missing cases. Deletion of the missing cases, however, reduced the 
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sample size for DHKP/C dataset, but still assumption for adequate sample size 
was not violated in any case. Further details are presented in Chapter IV. 
Reliability and Validity Issues 
Measurements of variables in the datasets are not immune to reliability 
and validity issues, some of which have already been addressed in the sampling 
and measurements sections. In this section, reliability and validity issues 
regarding the source of data or data collection are discussed in detail. From the 
methodological standpoint, the survey of autobiographies is considered a valid 
method of data inquiry as they reflect the author‘s semi-official accounts of one‘s 
personal life experiences (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Surveying 
autobiographies is one of the special types of secondary data analysis. In the 
absence of any other means and when researchers have difficulty in accessing 
the population of interest, autobiographies become a valuable source of 
information. For instance, in both DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah cases, 
terrorists provided information about their demographics, family backgrounds and 
motivations; all are important to know to identify a typical DHKP/C and Turkish 
Hezbollah member.  
Besides, a number of terrorism scholars, so far, have utilized terrorist 
biographies and autobiographies to describe a typical terrorist personality 
(Berrebi, 2004; Della Porta, 1992; RA Hudson & Majeska, 1999; Sageman, 
2004). Some scholars used open sources such as terrorist websites or 
publications to have access to terrorists‘ biographies (Berrebi, 2004; Della Porta, 
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1992; Sageman, 2004). Others used official sources to obtain autobiographical 
information about terrorists (RA Hudson, 2002; Sageman, 2004). Some others 
interviewed friends and family members of terrorists to obtain their biographies 
(Hassan, 2002). That is, in terrorism studies, biographical information has been a 
popular means of data collection of terrorists‘ backgrounds due to the ease of 
access. 
On the other hand, autobiographies are not written for the purpose of 
research; therefore, they may potentially have some bias and problems with 
reliability and validity. The major issue in using autobiography for research 
purposes relates to their authenticity. In general, all records that are deliberately 
produced to deceive and that are unconsciously misinterpreted are considered 
inauthentic. Therefore, using autobiographies without testing their accuracy can 
bias the findings of any research. 
Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) mention two different procedures that can 
be employed by researchers to ensure authenticity. Accordingly, the researcher 
can first critically examine the intention of the author in writing their 
autobiographies. In both DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah cases, terrorists submit 
their autobiographies to their leadership to become an official member of their 
respective organizations. It is not wrong to assume that terrorists are aware that 
leadership has the capability to verify the accuracy of the information they 
provide in their autobiographies. In fact, it is known that all applicants, as a rule, 
are subject to a background check before they are admitted into a terrorist 
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organization. Terrorist autobiographies, in this sense, can be considered reliable 
sources of information. 
Second, Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) continue, researchers, 
themselves, can verify some of the facts by cross-checking the information 
mentioned in autobiographies. For instance, if someone is talking about a prior 
arrest history in his autobiography, this can be crosschecked from official records 
for verification. Unfortunately, this was not the case for DHKP/C and Turkish 
Hezbollah members since they did not include their official names in their 
autobiographies. Even though a crosscheck of this type was not possible, still the 
information concerning the facts about their demographics and family 
backgrounds can be considered reliable because of the internal investigation 
system (or background check) that exists in a typical terrorist organization over 
the new applications. Aside from the facts, the only way that a terrorist can 
escape from the truth is when they are talking about their motivations, which is 
also possible in a typical survey. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Descriptive Statistics for Research Question One 
A descriptive statistical analysis was performed on the cases from 
DHKP/C (N=75) to determine population characteristics (Table 8). The arrest rate 
was quite high with more than two-thirds of the DHKP/C terrorists having a prior 
arrest history (69%). Age distribution showed that more than two-fifth of all 
DHKP/C terrorists were between 21 and 25 (45%)29. On the other hand, one-third 
of them were between the ages of 14 and 20 (33%). Two-thirds of all DHKP/C 
terrorists were male, whereas the remaining one-third was female (67% vs. 
33%). As noted in the literature review section, unmarried terrorists were the 
norm. This was also true for the DHKP/C members with almost 90 percent being 
single. 
Another finding which was consistent with the literature was DHKP/C 
members‘ education level. Even though there were dropouts, almost one-third of 
all DHKP/C terrorists had some university education (30%). A majority of them 
had some high school education (36%). Contrary to their educational level, 
almost two-thirds of the DHKP/C members were unemployed (65%). This can 
probably be attributable to the fact that almost half of them had dropped out of 
school at some point in their educational career (47%). 
                                            
29
 Originally, age was measured in ratio level. The mean age was 23.43(SD=5.78). In Table 8, the 
age is described in categories along with other categorical variables. 
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Other than their demographics, DHKP/C members provided some 
information about their family backgrounds and how they were first recruited into 
the organization. Accordingly, more than half of the DHKP/C members had a 
family member associated with a terrorist organization (56%). Almost half of them 
had a family arrest (45%). Similarly, almost half of them reported that they were 
first recruited by their relatives (which included their family members) (45%). On 
the other hand, almost a quarter of them indicated that they were first recruited 
by a friend (24%).  
Another descriptive statistical analysis was performed on Turkish 
Hezbollah members (N=144) to determine their population characteristics.  The 
number of arrested and non-arrested Hezbollah members was almost evenly 
distributed (46% vs. 49%). More than half of the Hezbollah members were 
between the ages of 14 and 20 (54%). The gender proportion showed that 
almost all Hezbollah members were male (99%)30. The proportion of married 
terrorists, on the other hand, was considerably high with almost one-third being 
married (30%).  
Almost half of the Hezbollah members had some high school education 
(47%). On the other hand, the proportion of those who had some university 
education was less than 10 percent. Nevertheless, more than one-third of the 
Hezbollah members were working on a full-time basis (37%). The proportion of 
those who dropped out of the school was almost 10 percent.  
                                            
30
 This may be due to a sampling error, but Hezbollah is generally known as a male-dominant 
terrorist organization. 
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Like DHKP/C members, Hezbollah members also provided some 
information about their family backgrounds. More than one-third reported that 
they had a family member who had an affiliation to a terrorist organization (37%). 
On the other hand, they did not report any information on family arrest. More than 
two-thirds reported that they were first recruited either by a friend or by their 
relatives (69%). 
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of DHKP/C and Hezbollah Datasets 
        DHKP/C       Hezbollah 
VARIABLES   N=75           %   N=144          % 
Arrest 
Not Arrest 
Arrested 
Missing 
  
20 26.7 
52 69.3 
3 4.0 
 
  
71 49.3 
67 
6 
46.5 
4.2 
 
Age 
14-20 
21-25 
26-35 
35< 
  Missing 
 
25 33.3 
34 45.3 
11 14.7 
5 6.7 
0 0.0 
 
 
78 54.2 
25 17.4 
15 10.4 
1 .70 
25 17.4 
 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
 
 
25 33.3 
50 67.7 
 
 
143 .70 
1 99.3 
 
Maritalstatus 
Single 
Married 
  Missing 
 
67 89.3 
8 10.7 
0 0.0 
 
 
98 70.0 
42 30.0 
4 2.8 
 
Education 
Primary School 
Middle School 
High School 
University 
  Missing 
 
10 13.3 
14 18.7 
27 36.0 
23 30.7 
1 1.3 
 
 
34 23.6 
17 11.8 
68 47.2 
10 6.9 
15 10.4 
 
Workstatus 
Unemployed 
Working Part-time 
Working Full-time 
  Missing 
 
49 65.3 
11 14.7 
10 13.3 
5 6.7 
 
 
51 35.4 
11 7.6 
53 36.8 
29 20.1 
 
Dropout 
Non-dropout 
Dropout 
Missing 
 
39 52.0 
35 46.7 
1 1.3 
 
 
115 79.9 
14 9.7 
15 10.4 
 
Loss 
No 
Yes 
  Missing 
 
38 50.7 
30 40.0 
7 9.3 
 
 
118 81.9 
23 16.0 
3 2.1 
 
Familyarrest 
No 
Yes 
  Missing 
 
25 33.3 
34 45.3 
16 21.3 
 
 
NA NA 
NA NA 
 
Familyassociation 
No 
Yes 
  Missing 
 
25 33.3 
42 56.0 
8 10.7 
 
 
83 57.6 
53 36.8 
8 5.6 
 
Recruitment 
Friend 
Relative 
Other 
  Missing 
 
18 24.0 
34 45.3 
16 21.3 
7 9.3 
 
 
51 35.4 
49 34.0 
30 27.0 
5 3.5 
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Bivariate Statistics for Research Question One 
As mentioned early on, Hypotheses 1 through 8 are bivariate hypotheses. 
These hypotheses will be tested by constructing contingency tables using the 
SPSS Crosstab function. Statistical significance of the associations will be tested 
by Pearson‘s Chi-square.  
Hypothesis 1  
As seen in Table 9, the average probability of arrest was 73 percent when 
the impact of social class was zero. This figure, however, did not significantly 
change when the arrest was predicted from social class. Accordingly, the 
probability of arrest was 75 percent for underclass, 71 percent for working poor, 
80 percent for working class, 72 percent for lower middle class, and 67 percent 
for upper class terrorists. As a result, social class appeared to have no significant 
impact on arrest (p<0.5)31. The hypothesis regarding the relationship between 
Hezbollah members‘ social class and their arrest could not be tested because the 
data concerning the social class of Hezbollah members was not available. 
Hypothesis 2 
Unlike social class, education seemed to have an impact on DHKP/C 
members‘ probability of arrest. As seen in Table 9, the average probability of 
arrest was 72 percent without education. However, the probability of arrest 
changed noticeably across the categories of education. Accordingly, those who 
                                            
31
 For socialclass and education, the linear-by-linear chi-square test was used since they were 
measured in ordinal. 
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went to primary (44%) and middle schools (64%) were less likely to have an 
arrest than an average DHKP/C member whereas those who went to high school 
(76%) and university (83%) were more likely to experience this (72%). The 
impact of education on the arrest rate of DHKP/C members was statistically 
significant (p<0.5). Moreover, the pattern of arrest across educational categories 
suggested that the probability of arrest increased as educational level increased 
(Figure 4).   
 
 
Figure 4: DHKP/C Members’ Arrest Rate by Education 
 
 
143 
 
 
 
On the other hand, education did not seem to have an impact on 
Hezbollah members‘ probability of arrest. As seen in Table 9, the average 
probability of arrest was 50 percent without education. However, the probability 
did not seem to vary significantly across different educational categories, except 
for those who went to a university (25%). The differences were not statistically 
significant (p>0.5).  
Hypothesis 3 
Like education, work status was a significant determinant of arrest for 
DHKP/C members. As seen in Table 9, the average probability of arrest was 72 
percent when the impact of work status was zero. However, this figure was not 
identical across different categories of work status. Accordingly, the probability of 
arrest was 81 percent for those who were unemployed; 50 percent for those who 
were working part-time; and 50 percent for those who were working full-time. The 
differences were statistically significant (p<0.5). The pattern of arrest within the 
categories of work status indicated that the probability of arrest dropped as work 
status improved (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: DHKP/C Members’ Arrest Rate by Work status 
 
 
On the other hand, work status did not seem to have a significant impact 
on Hezbollah members‘ probability of arrest. As seen in Table 9, the average 
probability of arrest was equal (50%) for all work status categories. The 
probabilities within the categories of work status, however, were not significantly 
different. Accordingly, the probability of arrest was 58 percent for those who were 
unemployed; 45 percent for those who were working part-time; and 43 percent 
for those who were working full-time. As seen in these figures, the probability of 
arrest dropped as works status improved. However, the differences were not 
statistically significant (p>0.5).
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Table 9: Socialclass, Education, and Workstatus by Arrest 
  DHKP/C HEZBOLLAH 
Variables χ
2
(df) No Arrest 
n % 
 
Arrest 
n % 
 
No Arrest 
n % 
 
Arrest 
n % 
 
Socialclass 
Underclass 
Working poor 
Working class 
Low-mid class 
Upper-mid class 
Total 
 
.134 (1)/NA Socialclass(N=64) 
5 25.0 
2 28.6 
2 20.0 
5 27.8 
3 33.3 
17 26.6 
 
Socialclass(N=64) 
15 75.0 
5 71.4 
8 80.0 
13 72.2 
6 67.7 
47 73.4 
 
Socialclass(N=64) 
NA NA 
NA NA 
NA NA 
NA NA 
NA NA 
NA NA 
 
Socialclass(N=64) 
NA NA 
NA NA 
NA NA 
NA NA 
NA NA 
NA NA 
 
Education 
Primary 
Middle School 
High School 
University 
Total 
 
4.859(1)**/.080(1) Education 
5 55.6 
5 35.7 
6 24.0 
4 17.4 
20 28.2 
 
Education 
4 44.4 
9 64.3 
19 76.0 
19 82.6 
51 71.8 
 
  
17 51.5 
8 47.1 
31 47.0 
6 75.0 
62 50.0 
 
  
16 48.5 
29 52.9 
35 53.0 
52 25.0 
62 50.0 
 
Workstatus 
Unemployed 
Working Part-time 
Working Full-time 
Total 
 
6.57**(1)/2.21(1)  Workstatus 
9 15.6 
5 50.0 
5 50.0 
19 28.4 
 
Workstatus 
38 84.4 
5 50.0 
5 50.0 
48 71.6 
 
Workstatus 
21 42.0 
6 54.5 
29 56.9 
56 50.0 
 
Workstatus 
29 58.0 
5 45.5 
22 43.1 
56 50.1 
 
      
Notes: *p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
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Hypothesis 4 
Having a loss in a counter-terrorism operation was important for DHKP/C 
members, but not for Hezbollah members. As seen in Table 10, the probability of 
arrest was considerably higher for DHKP/C members who had a loss (86%) than 
for those who had no such loss (58%). The difference between two probabilities 
were statistically significant (p<0.5). On the other hand, the probability of arrest 
for Hezbollah members was somewhat higher for those who had a loss (61%) 
than for those who had no such loss (47%). However, the difference was not 
statistically significant (p>.05). 
Hypothesis 5 
Similarly to losing somebody in a counter-terrorism operation, school 
dropout was an important factor for the arrest of DHKP/C members. As seen in 
Table 10, the probability of arrest was higher for dropouts (85%) than it was for 
non-dropouts (61%). The difference between these two probabilities was 
statistically significant (p <.05). On the other hand, school dropout was not as 
significant for Hezbollah members as it was for DHKP/C members. Accordingly, 
the probability of arrest was somewhat higher for dropout Hezbollah members 
(57%) than it was for non-dropout Hezbollah members (49%). However, the 
difference was not statistically significant (p>.05). 
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Hypothesis 6 
As noted in Chapter II, police and military operations motivate relatives of 
terrorists against the authority. According to the results presented in Table 10, 
this was the case for DHKP/C members. Of those who had a family arrest, four-
fifths (80%) had an arrest, while of those who did not have a family arrest less 
than three-fifths (56%) had an arrest. The difference between these two groups 
was statistically significant (p<.05). On the other hand, the hypothesis regarding 
the relationship between Hezbollah members‘ family arrest and their arrest could 
not be tested due to the unavailability of family arrest data for Hezbollah 
members.  
Hypothesis 7 
The literature review puts forth that family ties to a terrorist organization 
was one of the determinants of one‘s recruitment into a terrorist organization. 
This study tests whether it is equally important to one‘s involvement in terrorist 
activities. As seen in Table 10, of the DHKP/C members who had family 
associations to a terrorist organization, four-fifths (80%) had an arrest, while of 
those who had no such association slightly more than half (52%) had an arrest. 
The difference between these two groups was statistically significant (p<.05). 
This finding suggested that family ties have an impact on DHKP/C members‘ 
(greater) involvement in terrorist activities.  
Family ties to a terrorist organization seemed to have an impact on 
Hezbollah members‘ involvement in terrorist activities as well. Of the Hezbollah 
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members who had a family tie to a terrorist organization more than half (55%) 
had an arrest, while of the Hezbollah members who had no such tie less than 
half (45%) had an arrest. However, the difference between the groups was not 
statistically significant (p>.05).  
Hypothesis 8 
The literature review revealed that family and friends are the two 
prominent agents by means of which terrorist organizations recruit new 
members. This study tests whether those individuals recruited by relatives 
(including family members) and friends were more likely to be arrested than 
those who were recruited by other means. As seen in Table 10, the probability of 
arrest was 85 percent for DHKP/C members who were recruited by relatives; 61 
percent for DHKP/C members who were recruited by friends; and 57 percent for 
DHKP/C members who were recruited by other means (in prisons, in 
demonstrations, and via reading publications). The differences between the 
groups were statistically significant at the .1 alpha level (p=.059<.1). On the other 
hand, the probability of arrest was 47 percent for Hezbollah members who were 
recruited by relatives; 52 percent for Hezbollah members who were recruited by 
friends; and 49 percent for DHKP/C members who were recruited by other 
means. Obviously, the differences between groups were not statistically 
significant (p>.05).   
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Table 10: Loss, Dropout, Familyarrest, Familyassoc, and Recruitment by Arrest 
  DHKP/C HEZBOLLAH 
Variables χ
2
 (df) No Arrest 
n % 
 
Arrest 
n % 
 
No Arrest 
n % 
 
Arrest 
n % 
 
Loss 
No 
Yes 
Total 
 
6.03**(1)/1.58(1) Loss 
15 41.7 
4 13.8 
19 29.2 
 
Loss 
21 58.3 
25 86.2 
46 70.8 
 
  
61 53.1 
9 39.1 
70 51.1 
 
  
53 46.5 
14 60.9 
67 48.9 
 
Dropout 
Non-dropout 
Dropout 
Total 
 
5.16**(1)/.322(1)   
15 39.5 
5 15.2 
20 28.2 
 
  
23 60.5 
28 84.8 
51 71.8 
 
  
56 50.9 
6 42.9 
62 50.0 
 
  
54 49.1 
8 59.1 
62 50.0 
 
Familyarrest 
No 
Yes 
Total 
 
3.69**(1)/NA  
10 43.5 
7 20.0 
17 29.3 
 
 
13 56.5 
28 80.0 
41 70.7 
 
 
NA NA 
NA NA 
NA NA 
 
 
NA NA 
NA NA 
 NA NA 
 
Familyassoc 
No 
Yes 
Total 
 
5.66**(1)/1.55(1)  
11 47.8 
8 19.5 
19 29.7 
 
 
12 52.2 
33 80.5 
45 70.3 
 
 
45 56.3 
23 45.1 
68 51.9 
 
 
35 43.8 
28 54.9 
63 48.1 
 
Recruitment 
Friend 
Relative 
Other 
Total 
 
5.646(3)*/.269(3)   
7 38.9 
5 14.7 
6 42.9 
18 27.3 
 
  
11 61.1 
29 85.3 
8 57.1 
48 72.7 
 
  
24 48.0 
25 53.2 
19 51.4 
68 50.7 
 
  
26 52.0 
22 46.8 
18 48.6 
66 49.3 
 
Notes: *p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
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Multivariate Statistics for Research Question One 
Hypotheses 9 through 19 were tested through binary logistic regression 
analysis. For hypotheses 9, 10, and 11, hierarchical logistic regression analysis 
was used because there were control variables in the models. In hierarchical 
logistic regression, all control variables were entered in Block 1 whereas all 
independent (predictor) variables were entered in Block 2. Interpretations were 
made based on the model at Block 2 where both control and independent 
variables were entered into the analysis. For instance, hypotheses regarding the 
combined effect of independent variables were tested based on the block chi-
square scores at Block 2 because these scores tested the significance of the 
model after the independent variables were added to the analysis. Hypotheses 
regarding the individual effect of independent variables were based on the 
significance of the Wald test of the β coefficient and the odds ratio. Before 
running each model, a baseline model was run to test following logistic 
regression assumptions.  
First, logistic regression assumes that variables are measured in a 
dichotomous or interval/ratio level. Therefore, categorical variables must be 
recoded into a set of dummy variables before they are included in the analysis. 
When testing the hypotheses 9 and 11, workstatus and recruitment were recoded 
into a set of dummy variables using the SPSS binary logistic categorical function. 
For the workstatus variable, unemployed served as the reference category, while 
the predictions were made for the working part-time and working full-time 
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categories. For the recruitment variable, others served as the reference category, 
while predictions were made for the friends and relatives categories.  
Second, logistic regression analysis is based upon maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE), which in turn relies on large sample asymptotic normality. If 
there is an inadequate number of case for each combination of independent 
variable, the reliability of prediction automatically declines. Traditionally, the 
minimum ratio of valid cases to independent variable is to be 10 to 1(Hosmer & 
Lemeshow, 2004). None of the logistic regression analysis suffered from 
inadequate sample sizes. However, in the logistic regression analysis of the 
frustration model for DHKP/C members, the ratio of the case to independent 
variable was (53/5) 10.6 to 1, which was barely adequate when the convention of 
10 to 1 was followed. The ratio was sufficient for a logistic regression analysis, 
however, there were still 16 missing values on familyarrest (Table 12). As 
mentioned in previous chapter, the SPSS Missing Value Analysis (MVA) found 
no statistical significant deviation from randomness. Since missing values were 
distributed randomly across all observation, imputation was not appropriate. As 
an alternative, missing values on familyarrest were imputed based on the 
absence of family association. The crosstab analysis of familyarrest and 
familyassociation indicated that of the cases which had no family association 
none had familyarrest (Appendix B). This indicated that if there was no family 
association, there was no family arrest. This further suggested that the absence 
of family arrest could be assumed if the familyassociation value was 0. Based on 
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this finding, seven missing values (case numbers 11, 28, 29, 30, 33, 55, and 56) 
on familyarrest were inferred from familyassociation. After this treatment, it was 
seen that the ratio of the case rose to (59/5) 11.8 to 1 (Table 12).  
Third, logistic regression is sensitive to the multicollinearity issue. 
Multicollinearity results from excessive correlation between independent 
variables. If multicollinearity is detected, the independent variable with the least 
theoretical support must be dropped. Multicollinearity in the logistic regression 
model can be detected through the collinearity diagnostic which is found under 
the SPSS linear regression. Alternatively, researchers can check the standard 
error score for the β coefficient larger than 2.0. If any of the standard error is 
larger than 2.0, this may indicate a potential multicollinearity issue between 
independent variables or cells with a small number of cases (Hosmer & 
Lemeshow, 2004). In this study, the second method was preferred. In any logistic 
regression models, no multicollinearity issue was detected. In the logistic 
regression analysis of the relative deprivation model for DHKP/C members, 
however, the standard error of maritalstatus was larger than 2.0, which indicated 
that there might be a multicollinearity issue. However, there was no other 
standard error exceeding 2.0. This might probably be due to the cells with a small 
number. As seen in Table 8, there were only few cases in the ―married‖ category 
(n=8), which in turn reduced the explanatory power of the variable. Therefore, the 
variable was dropped from the analysis32. 
                                            
32
 Maritalstatus for DHKP/C member was also dropped from further analysis. 
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Finally, logistic regression results can be affected if there are outliers in 
the data. Outliers should be removed from the analysis to obtain more reliable 
results. In order to detect outliers, logistic regression analysis should be run with 
a request for casewise listing of residuals. This function by default detects 
outliers lying outside 2 standard deviations. For all logistic regression analyses, 
casewise listing of residuals were requested from SPSS33. However, no outlier 
case was identified in any logistic regression model.  
Hypothesis 9 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Relative Deprivation for DHKP/C  
A hierarchical logistic regression analysis was performed on arrest as 
dependent variable and two relative deprivation variables, education and 
workstatus, controlling for socialclass, age, and gender. As seen in Table 11, 
there was a good model fit even after the addition of the relative deprivation 
variables (p>.05)34. The model in Block 2 yielded a pseudo-R2 of .469 as 
opposed the model in Block 1 which yielded a pseudo-R2 of .129. This indicated 
that the model in Block 2 has more discriminatory power than the model in Block 
1. On the other hand, classification accuracy was quite high. At Block 1 where 
only control variables were included, the correct classification rate was 6.3 
                                            
33 To calculate the values for studentized residuals and save those residuals to the dataset so 
that outliers can be removed easily, the studentized residuals box was checked from the save 
menu.  
 
34
 For a good model fit, Hosmer and Lemeshow chi-square statistics should be insignificant 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2004). 
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percent for non-arrested DHKP/C terrorists and 98 percent for arrested DHKP/C 
terrorists. The overall correct percentage was 71 percent. With the addition of 
education and workstatus at Block 2, the correct classification rate rose to 62 
percent for non-arrested DHKP/C terrorists and reduced to 91 percent for 
arrested DHKP/C terrorists. The overall correct rate was 83 percent, which was 
quite high.  
As noted early on, the hypothesis regarding the combined effect of 
education and workstatus were tested based on the block chi-square scores at 
Block 2. As shown in Table 11, a test of the relative deprivation model with two 
independent variables against constant-only and the model with control variables 
was statistically significant (p<.01). That is, education and workstatus combined 
significantly distinguished between arrested and non-arrested DHKP/C terrorists, 
controlling for socialclass, age, and gender (H9). 
Hypotheses regarding the individual effects of education and workstatus 
were tested based on the significance of the Wald test of the β coefficient and the 
odds ratio. Accordingly, the log of the odds of arrest was positively related to 
education holding age, gender, socialclass, and workstatus constant (p<.05). In 
other words, the higher the education, the higher the probability of arrest. Since 
education was treated as an interval/ratio, higher numeric values were 
associated with DHKP/C members whose education levels were better. Thus, the 
odds ratio of 3.266 indicated that one unit increase in education increased the 
odds of arrest by 3 times. On the other hand, the log of the odds of arrest was 
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negatively related to workstatus holding age, gender, socialclass, and education 
constant (p<.05). Since unemployed was entered as a reference category, the 
predictions were made for working part-time and working full-time categories. 
That is, as the probability of working part-time and working full-time increased, 
the probability of arrest decreased. The odds ratio of .074 indicated that the odds 
of arrest for a DHKP/C terrorist who was working part-time were .07 times (93% 
less than) the odds of arrest for an unemployed DHKP/C terrorist. Similarly, the 
odds ratio of .037 indicated that the odds of arrest for a DHKP/C terrorist who 
was working full-time were .037 times (96% less than) the odds of arrest for an 
unemployed DHKP/C terrorist.  
In conclusion, both education and workstatus significantly distinguished 
between arrested and non-arrested DHKP/C terrorists. DHKP/C members whose 
educational levels were high were more likely to face relative deprivation due to 
the gap between their educational level and work status.  
Logistic Regression Analysis of Relative Deprivation for Hezbollah 
This time, a hierarchical logistic regression analysis was run on arrest 
versus education and workstatus controlling for age and maritalstatus to test 
whether relative deprivation variables, as a set, significantly predict Hezbollah 
members‘ involvement in terrorism35. Overall, the logistic regression model fit to 
the data well (p>.05). However, the model in Block 2 yielded a pseudo-R2 of 
                                            
35
 Socialclass was not available in the Hezbollah dataset. Gender proportion was also uneven 
(Table 8). Therefore, these two variables were excluded from the analysis.  
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.076, which indicated that the explanatory power of the model was small (Table 
11). Classification accuracy was not impressive and remained the same across 
Block 1 and 2. In Block 1 where only age and maritalstatus were included, the 
correct classification rate was 38 percent for non-arrested Hezbollah members 
and 82 percent for arrested Hezbollah members. The overall correct 
classification rate was 61 percent, which was low. With the addition of education 
and workstatus in Block 2, the correct classification rate did not change. This 
indicated a poor model fit.  
The hypothesis regarding the combined effect of education and 
workstatus was tested based on the block chi-square score at Block 2. A test of 
the relative deprivation model against constant-only and the model with control 
variables was not statistically significant (p>.05). That is, relative deprivation 
variables combined did not significantly distinguish between arrested and non-
arrested Hezbollah members controlling for age and maritalstatus.  
 Hypotheses regarding the individual effects of education and workstatus 
were tested based on the significance of the Wald test of the β coefficient and the 
odds ratio. The log of the odds of arrest was not related to neither education nor 
workstatus (p>.05). In other words, neither education nor workstatus significantly 
distinguish between arrested and non-arrested Hezbollah members.
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Table 11: Logistic Regression Analysis of Relative Deprivation Models 
 DHKP/C Hezbollah 
Variables 
 
Log Odds  
(B) 
 
 
 
SE 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(B) 
 
Log Odds 
(B) 
 
 
 
SE 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(B) 
Block1 
a, d 
      
  Gender -1.124** .810 .325 NA** NA NA 
  Age .113** .065 1.120 .030** .054 1.031 
  Socialclass -.115** .228 .891 NA** NA NA 
  Maritalstatus 
b 
NA** NA NA -1.152** .555 .316 
  Constant -.493** 1.779 .611 -.091** .956 .913 
Block2 
c, g 
      
  Gender 
e 
-.642** 1.017 .526 NA** NA NA 
  Age .164** .084 1.179 .041** .058 1.042 
  Socialclass 
f 
-.069** .301 .933 NA** NA NA 
  Maritalstatus NA** NA NA -1.101** .604 .333 
  Education 1.183** .474 3.266 -.057** .244 .945 
  Workstatus        
  Workstatus(1) -2.600** 1.172 .074 -.501** .788 .606 
  Workstatus(2) -3.294** 1.152 .037 -.263** .567 .769 
  Constant -4.076** 2.663 .017 -.022** 1.194 .979 
Notes:       
a  
DHKP/C Block 1, χ2=5.515, df=3, R
2
=.129 
b  
Maritalstatus was dropped from DHKP/C models  
c
  DHKP/C Block 2 (n=59), χ2=17.455***, df=3, R
2
=.469, Goodness-of-fit=14.166, df=
 
8 
d  
Hezbollah Block 1, χ2=4.761, df=2, R
2
=.068 
e  
Gender was dropped from Hezbollah models since inadequate sample sizes 
f   
Socialclass was not available for Hezbollah datasets 
 
g   
Hezbollah Block 2 (n=91), χ2=.565, df=3, Nagelkerke ρ
2
=.076, Goodness-of-fit=3.191, df=8 
 
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01. 
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Hypothesis 10 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Frustration-Aggression for DHKP/C  
A hierarchical logistic regression analysis was performed on arrest as the 
dependent variable and three frustration variables, loss, dropout, and 
familyarrest, controlling for age and gender. As shown in Table 12, there was a 
good model fit even after the addition of the frustration variables (p>.05). The 
model in Block 2 yielded a pseudo-R2 of .37 as opposed to the model in Block 1 
which yielded a pseudo-R2 of .09. This indicated that the model in Block 2 has 
more discriminatory power than the model in Block 1. Further, the classification 
accuracy was high. On the basis of 2 control variables alone, the correct 
classification rate was 0 percent for non-arrested terrorists and 98 percent for 
arrested terrorists. The overall correct percentage was 68 percent. With the 
addition of the frustration variables, the correct classification rate rose to 50 
percent for non-arrested terrorists, but reduced to 85 percent for arrested 
terrorists. The overall correct classification rate was 75 percent.  
Hypothesis 11 was tested based on the block chi-square value given at 
Block 2. Accordingly, the frustration model against constant-only and the model 
with control variables was statistically significant (p<.05). The result confirmed 
that loss, dropout, and familyarrest, as a set, significantly distinguished between 
the arrested and non-arrested DHKP/C members controlling for age and gender.  
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The hypotheses concerning the individual effects of loss, dropout, and 
familyarrest were analyzed through the Wald statistics. Accordingly, the log of the 
odds of arrest for a DHKP/C member was not related to neither loss (p>.05) nor 
familyarrest (p>.05). On the other hand, the log of the odds of arrest was 
positively related to dropout holding loss, dropout, familyarrest, age and gender 
constant (p<.05). In other words, dropout significantly distinguished the arrested 
terrorists from non-arrested terrorists. Since it was entered as a dichotomous 
covariate, the prediction was made for the higher category of dropout. 
Accordingly, the odds ratio of 6.417 indicated that the odds of arrest for dropout 
DHKP/C members were 6 times the odds of arrest for non-dropout DHKP/C 
members.  
In conclusion, frustration variables, except dropout, did not significantly 
predict arrest. It is obvious that the insignificant effect sizes cannot be attributable 
to control variables because the model with the frustration variable was 
significant against constant-only and the model with control variables. 
Considering that both loss and familyarrest had a significant relationship with 
arrest on a one-to-one (bivariate) basis, insignificant effect size can be 
attributable to small sample size. Logistic regression, as a statistical analysis, is 
based on maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), which in turn relies on large 
sample asymptotic normality. If there is an inadequate number of cases for each 
combination of independent variable, the reliability of prediction automatically 
declines (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2004). 
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Logistic Regression Analysis of Frustration-Aggression for Hezbollah 
To test whether frustration variables combined significantly predict 
Hezbollah members‘ involvement in terrorism, a hierarchical logistic regression 
analysis was performed on arrest as dependent and loss and dropout as 
independent variables controlling for age and maritalstatus. As shown in Table 
12, there was a poor model fit. Hosmer and Lemeshow‘s test of model fit 
indicated that the model which was developed after frustration variables were 
added to the equation did not fit to data well (p<.05). This was also evident in the 
pseudo-R2 score of .095, which was very small. Further, the change in the rate of 
classification was negligible. The overall correct classification rate increased from 
58.6 percent to 59.6 percent.  
Although there was a poor model fit, a test of frustration model against 
constant-only and the model with control variables was statistically significant at 
the .10 alpha level (p=.10). This result confirmed that dropout and loss combined 
significantly distinguished arrested Hezbollah members from non-arrested 
Hezbollah members controlling for age and maritalstatus. Since the overall model 
was statistically significant at the .10 alpha level, the individual effects of dropout 
and loss were tested through Wald statistics. The log of the odds of arrest was 
positively related to loss holding dropout, age and maritalstatus constant 
(p=.058<.10). The odds ratio of 3.303 indicated that the odds of arrest for a 
Hezbollah member who had a loss was 3 times the odds of arrest for a Hezbollah 
member who had no loss. Even though the log of the odds of loss was barely 
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significant, the effect size of 3.303 indicated that loss of somebody is an 
important factor for Hezbollah members in their probability of arrest. On the other 
hand, the individual effect of dropout was not statistically significant (p>.05).
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Table 12: Logistic Regression Analysis of Frustration-Aggression Models 
 DHKP/C Hezbollah 
Variables 
 
Log Odds  
(B) 
 
 
 
SE 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(B) 
 
Log Odds 
(B) 
 
 
 
SE 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(B) 
Block1 
a, d 
      
  Gender -1.066* .665 .344 NA* NA NA 
  Age .067* .055 1.069 .016* .049 1.016 
  Maritalstatus 
b 
     NA* NA NA -.854* .475 .426 
  Constant .047* 1.263 1.049 .015* .868 1.015 
Block2 
c, f 
      
  Gender 
e 
-1.315* .764 .268 NA* NA NA 
  Age .123* .077 1.131 .007* .051 1.007 
  Maritalstatus NA* NA NA -.746* .485 .474 
  Loss .919* .767 2.507 1.195* .631 3.303 
  Dropout   1.859** .789 6.417 .182* .660 1.199 
  Familyarrest 
g 
.848* .714 2.336 NA* NA NA 
  Constant -2.468* 1.840 .085 -.037* .910 .963 
Notes: 
a  
DHKP/C Block 1; χ2=3.804, df=2, R
2
=.088 
b  
Maritalstatus was dropped from DHKP/C models 
c
  DHKP/C Block 2 (n=59); χ2=14.347***, df=3, R
2
=.374, Goodness-of-fit=7.251, df=
 
7 
d  
Hezbollah Block 1; χ2=3.577, df=2, R
2
=.058 
e  
Gender was dropped from Hezbollah models since inadequate sample sizes 
f
  Hezbollah Block 2 (n=111); χ2=4.595*, df=2, R
2
=.095, Goodness-of-fit=18.126, df=8 
g
  Familyarrest was not available for Hezbollah datasets 
 
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
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Hypothesis 11 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Social Learning for DHKP/C  
A hierarchical logistic regression analysis was run on arrest as a 
dependent variable and two social learning variables, familyassociation and 
recruitment, controlling for age and gender. As shown in Table 13, the overall 
model fit was good after social learning variables were added into the equation 
(p>.05). The model in Block 2 yielded a pseudo-R2 of=.366 as opposed to the 
model in Block 1 which yielded a pseudo-R2 of= .139. This indicated that the 
model in Block 2 has more discriminatory power than the model in Block 1. 
Further, the accuracy of classification was satisfactory. On the basis of 2 control 
variables alone, the correct classification rate was 18 percent for non-arrested 
terrorists and 98 percent for arrested terrorists. The overall correct classification 
was 75 percent. With the addition of the social learning variables, the correct 
classification rate for non-arrested terrorists rose to 47 percent, while it reduced 
to 90 percent for arrested terrorists. The overall correct classification rate was 78 
percent.   
The hypothesis concerning the combined effect of familyassociation and 
recruitment was tested based on the block chi-square score for Block 2. As seen 
in Table 13, a test of the social learning model against constant-only and the 
model with control variables was statistically significant (p<.05). That is, social 
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learning variables combined significantly distinguish between arrested and non-
arrested DHKP/C terrorists controlling for age and gender.  
The hypotheses concerning the individual effects of familyassociation and 
recruitment were analyzed through the Wald statistics. The log of the odds of 
arrest was not significantly related to familyassociation (p>.05). That is, family 
association was not a significant predictor of arrest for DHKP/C members. On the 
other hand, the log of the odds of arrest was significantly and positively related 
with relatives holding familyassociation, age, and gender constant (p<.05). In 
other words, those who were recruited by their relatives (including family 
members) were more likely to have an arrest than those who were recruited by 
other means. The odds ratio of 15.869 indicates that the odds of arrest for a 
DHKP/C member who was recruited by relatives were 16 times the odds of arrest 
for a DHKP/C member who was recruited by other means. The log of the odds of 
arrest, on the other hand, was not significantly related to friends (p>.05). In other 
words, recruitment by friends compared to recruitment by other means was not a 
significant predictor for DHKP/C members in their arrest. 
This finding suggested that simply having a family association did not 
seem to have an impact on DHKP/C members‘ involvement in terrorist activities. 
If the person, however, was recruited by one of his relatives (this includes family 
members) the probability of involvement in terrorism increased. That is, family 
association did not guarantee that terrorist behaviors were passed onto other 
family members. 
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Logistic Regression Analysis of Social Learning for Hezbollah  
Another logistic regression model was run on arrest against 
familyassociation and recruitment controlling for age and maritalstatus to test 
whether social learning impacts Hezbollah members‘ probability of involvement in 
terrorism. As shown in Table 13, there was a poor model fit. Even though the p 
value for Hosmer and Lemeshow‘s chi-square for goodness of fit was not smaller 
than the conventional alpha levels, it was still low (p=111). The pseudo R2 of .079 
indicated that the explanatory power of the model was weak. Further, the correct 
classification rate was not impressive. On the basis of two control variables 
alone, the overall correct classification rate was 59 percent, whereas it dropped 
to 56 percent with the addition of the social learning variable. 
As seen in Table 13, a test of the social learning model against constant-
only and the model with control variables was not statistically significant (p>.05). 
This indicated that familyassociation and recruitment combined were not able to 
distinguish non-arrested Hezbollah members from arrested Hezbollah members. 
On the other hand, the overall model (the model with social learning variables 
and 2 control variables given at Block 2) was not statistically significant (p>.05). 
Therefore, the hypotheses concerning the individual effect of familyassociation 
and recruitment were not tested for significance.  
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Table 13: Logistic Regression Analysis of Social Learning Models 
 DHKP/C Hezbollah 
Variables 
 
Log Odds  
(B) 
 
 
 
SE 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(B) 
 
Log Odds 
(B) 
 
 
 
SE 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(B) 
Block1 
a, d 
      
  Gender -1.380*** .743 .252 NA*** NA NA 
  Age .105*** .062 1.111 .028*** .042 1.029 
  Maritalstatus 
b 
     NA*** NA NA -1.003*** .463 .367 
  Constant -.492*** 1.401 .611 -.242*** .759 .785 
Block2 
c, g 
      
  Gender 
e 
-1.791*** .850 .167 NA*** NA NA 
  Age .187*** .087 1.205 .026*** .043 1.026 
  Maritalstatus NA*** NA NA -1.006*** .478 .366 
  Familyassociation -.768*** .975 .464 .273*** .443 1.314 
  Recruitment  .     
  Recruitment (1) -.154*** .866 .858 -.428*** .498 .652 
  Recruitment (2) 2.764*** 1.163 15.869 -.529*** .540 .589 
  Constant -2.708*** 1.959 .067 .067*** .891 1.070 
Notes: 
a  
DHKP/C Block 1; χ2=6.048**, df=2, R
2
=.139 
b  
Maritalstatus was dropped from DHKP/C models 
c
  DHKP/C Block 2 (n=59); χ2=11.388**, df=3, R
2
=.366, Goodness-of-fit=9.236, df=
 
8 
d  
Hezbollah Block 1; χ2=5.035, df=2, R
2
=.056 
e  
Gender was dropped from Hezbollah models since inadequate sample sizes 
f
  Hezbollah Block 2 (n=117); χ2=2.110, df=3, R
2
=.079, Goodness-of-fit=13.018, df=8 
g
  Familyarrest was not available for Hezbollah datasets 
 
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
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Descriptive Statistics for Research Question Two 
To understand what impacts DHKP/C members‘ involvement in terrorist 
activities differently from Hezbollah members‘ involvement or vice versa, 
DHKP/C and Hezbollah datasets were merged into a single dataset. As seen in 
Table 14, there were N=219 cases in the new dataset. Almost two-thirds of the 
terrorists in the dataset were comprised of Hezbollah members, whereas the 
remaining one-third was comprised of DHKP/C members (66% vs. 34%). A 
majority of the terrorists had a prior arrest history (54%).The distribution of 
education indicated that most terrorists had some high school education (43%). 
On the other hand, the proportion of those who had some university education 
was not impressive (15%). More than one-fifth of the terrorists dropped out of 
school at some point in their educational career (22.4%). Almost half of the 
terrorists were unemployed at the time when they reported their autobiographies 
(47%). The proportion of working full-time was less than one-third (28%). More 
than two-fifths reported that they had a family member associated to a terrorist 
group before (43%). Almost a quarter of terrorists indicated that they had lost 
somebody in a counter-terrorism operation (24%). Most terrorists reported that 
they were first recruited into their respective terrorist organization by their 
relatives (38%). On the other hand, almost one-third of them indicated that they 
were recruited by their friends (31.5%).  
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics of Merged Datasets 
Variables Frequency 
(N) 
Percentage 
(%) 
Organization 
DHKP/C 
Hezbollah 
 
 
75 
144 
 
 
34.2 
65.8 
 
Arrest 
Non-Arrested 
Arrested 
Missing 
 
 
91 
119 
9 
 
 
41.6 
54.3 
4.1 
 
Education 
Primary School 
Middle School 
High School 
University 
Missing 
 
 
44 
31 
95 
33 
16 
 
 
20.1 
14.2 
43.4 
15.1 
7.3 
 
Workstatus 
Unemployed 
Working Part-time 
Working Full-time 
Missing 
 
 
100  
22 
63 
34 
 
 
45.7 
10.0 
28.8 
15.5 
 
Dropout 
Dropout 
Non-dropout 
Missing 
 
 
154 
49 
16 
 
 
70.3 
22.4 
7.3 
 
Loss 
No 
Yes 
Missing 
 
 
156 
53 
10 
 
 
71.2 
24.2 
4.6 
 
Familyassociation 
No 
Yes 
Missing 
 
 
108 
95 
16 
 
 
49.3 
43.4 
7.3 
 
Recruitment 
Friends 
Relatives 
Others 
Missing 
 
 
69 
83 
55 
12 
 
 
31.5 
37.9 
25.1 
5.5 
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Bivariate Statistics for Research Question Two 
Hypotheses 12 through 19 are tested using bivariate statistics. More 
specifically, these hypotheses were tested through crosstab analysis. Statistical 
significance of the associations was tested by Pearson‘s Chi-square test of 
independence. Hypothesis 12 and 17 could not be tested due to the unavailability 
of data concerning the social class and family arrest of Turkish Hezbollah 
members. 
Hypothesis 13 
This hypothesis tested whether there was a difference in education levels 
between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah 
members. As seen in Table 15, of all arrested DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah 
members combined, almost one-fifth (19%) had some university education, about 
a half (48%) had some high school education and one-third (34%) had some 
middle and primary school education. If there was no difference in education 
between these two groups, one would expect that group averages of arrested 
DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members be exactly the same as the 
above figures. However, this was not the case. Accordingly, of the arrested 
DHKP/C members more than one-third (37%) had some university education, 
while of the arrested Turkish Hezbollah members only 3 percent had some 
university education. These proportions were statistically different than the 
overall average for all arrested terrorists of the same educational category, which 
was 19 percent (p<.000). 
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Hypothesis 14 
This hypothesis tested whether there was a difference in work status 
between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah 
members. As seen in Table 15, of all the arrested DHKP/C and Turkish 
Hezbollah terrorists combined, almost two-thirds (64%) were unemployed, 10 
percent were part-time workers, and more than one-fourth (26%) were full-time 
workers. There were considerable differences in unemployment and working full-
time categories between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish 
Hezbollah members. Accordingly, of the arrested DHKP/C members almost four-
fifth (79%) were unemployed while of the arrested Turkish Hezbollah members 
slightly more than half (52%) were unemployed. On the other hand, of the 
arrested DHKP/C members only 10 percent were full-time workers whereas of 
the arrested Turkish Hezbollah members almost two-fifth (39%) were full-time 
workers. The differences were statistically significant (p<.01). 
Hypothesis 15 
This hypothesis tested whether there was a difference in loss (of 
someone) between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish 
Hezbollah members. As seen in Table 15, of all the arrested DHKP/C and 
Turkish Hezbollah slightly more than one-thirds (34.5%) had loss. However, there 
were considerable deviations from this figure across DHKP/C and Turkish 
Hezbollah. Accordingly, of all the arrested DHKP/C terrorists more than half 
(54%) lost someone in a counter-terrorism operations whereas of all the Turkish 
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Hezbollah members slightly more than one-fifth (21%) had such a loss. The 
differences were statistically significant (p<.000). 
Hypothesis 16 
Hypothesis 16 tested whether there was a difference in school dropout 
rates between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah 
members. As seen in Table 15, almost one-third (32%) of all arrested terrorists 
had a school dropout at some points in their educational life. However, there 
were significant deviations from this figure across DHKP/C and Turkish 
Hezbollah. Accordingly, of the arrested DHKP/C members more than half (55%) 
were school dropout whereas of the arrested Turkish Hezbollah members only 
13 percent had such an experience. These figures were significantly different 
than overall average of school dropout for all arrested terrorists (p<.000). 
Hypothesis 18 
Hypothesis 18 tested whether there was a difference in family association 
between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members. As 
seen in Table 15, more than half (56%) of all arrested terrorists had a family 
member who had an association to a terrorist group. This figure was significantly 
different across DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah. Accordingly, almost three-fourth 
of all arrested DHKP/C terrorists (73%) had a family association to a terrorist 
group whereas less than half (44%) of all arrested Turkish Hezbollah members 
had such an association. The differences were statistically significant (p<.01).   
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Hypothesis 19 
This hypothesis tested whether there was a difference in recruitment 
methods between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah 
members. As seen in Table 15, almost one-third of all arrested terrorists (33%) 
were recruited by a friend. There were some deviations from this figure across 
DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah. Accordingly, of the arrested DHKP/C more than 
one-fifth (23%) and of the Turkish Hezbollah almost two-fifth (40%) reported that 
they were recruited by a friend. Almost a half of all arrested terrorists (45%) 
reported that they were recruited by a relative. The deviations from this figure 
across the groups were even bigger. Accordingly, of all arrested DHKP/C 
members three-fifth (60%), while of all arrested Turkish Hezbollah members one-
third (33%) reported that they were recruited by a relative. The differences were 
statistically significant (p<.05).  
Overall, there were significant differences between the groups of arreste 
DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members in terms of their education, 
work status, having a loss of a loved one, school dropout, having a family 
member who is associated with a terrorist organization, and recruitment 
methods. Next chapter addresses the conclusions and discussions of research 
findings.  
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Table 15: Education, Workstatus, Loss, Dropout, Familyassoc, Recruitment by Arrest 
Variables X
2
(df) Arrested DHKP/C 
  N                 % 
Arrested Hezbollah 
  N               % 
Total 
  N               % 
Education 
  Primary 
  Middle 
  High School 
  University 
  Total 
 
24.867(3)***   
4 7.8 
9 17.6 
19 37.3 
19 37.3 
51 100.0 
 
  
16 25.8 
9 14.5 
35 56.5 
2 3.2 
62 100.0 
 
  
20 17.7 
18 15.9 
54 47.8 
21 18.6 
113 100.0 
 
Workstatus 
  Unemployed 
  Part-time 
  Full-time 
  Total 
 
11.365(2)*** 
 
 
  
38 79.2 
5 10.4 
5 10.4 
48 100.0 
 
  
29 51.8 
5 8.9 
22 39.3 
56 100.0 
 
  
67 64.4 
10 9.6 
27 26.0 
104 100.0 
 
Loss 
  No 
  Yes 
  Total 
 
13.504(1)***   
21 45.7 
25 54.3 
46 100.0 
 
  
53 79.1 
14 20.9 
67 100.0 
 
  
74 65.5 
39 34.5 
113 100.0 
 
Dropout 
  No 
  Yes 
  Total 
 
22.736(1)***   
23 45.1 
28 54.9 
51 100.0 
 
  
54 87.1 
8 12.9 
62 100.0 
 
  
77 68.1 
36 31.9 
113 100.0 
 
Familyassoc 
  No 
  Yes 
  Total 
 
8.913(1)***   
12 26.7 
33 73.3 
45 100.0 
 
  
35 55.6 
28 44.4 
63 100.0 
 
  
47 43.5 
61 56.5 
108 100.0 
 
Recruitment 
  Friend 
  Relatives 
  Others 
  Total 
 
8.252(1)*** 
 
  
11 22.9 
29 60.4 
8 16.7 
48 100.0 
 
  
26 39.4 
22 33.3 
18 27.3 
66 100.0 
 
  
37 32.5 
51 44.7 
26 22.8 
114 100.0 
 
Notes: *p<.1**p<.05***p<.01 
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSIONS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is two-fold: First, it explores the factors that may 
have an effect on the probability of arrest for DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah 
members. In other words, it examines whether terrorists‘ arrest probability 
changes in respect to their certain characteristics. Second, it examines the 
similarities and differences in certain characteristics between the groups of 
arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. In Chapter IV, 19 
different hypotheses were tested to indentify bivariate and multivariate 
relationships between certain characteristics of DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah 
terrorists and their involvement levels (arrest). Overall, the results confirmed that 
most of the key characteristics identified significantly predicted the involvement 
levels for DHKP/C terrorists, but not for Turkish Hezbollah terrorists. The results 
also suggested that variations in Turkish Hezbollah terrorists‘ arrest might be 
related to factors that were not in the dataset.  
The following discussion links the research findings to the literature, 
theories, and policies. The findings of this study have some implications for 
theory. This is particularly important considering that terrorism study is yet to 
develop sound and empirically testable theories relevant to the behaviors and 
decision-making processes of individual terrorists. This chapter also identifies 
policy implications of the findings in an attempt to help revise the existing 
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counter-terrorism policies in Turkey. Finally, the findings have some implications 
for future studies.  
Discussions of Findings 
Hypothesis 1  
The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is negatively related to 
terrorists’ social class levels. 
Hypothesis 1 tested whether there was a relationship between terrorists‘ 
involvement in terrorist activities and their social classes of origin. Contrary to the 
stated hypothesis, bivariate analysis of arrest and socialclass indicated that the 
probability of involvement in terrorist activities was not related to terrorists‘ social 
classes. In other words, DHKP/C terrorists‘ involvement in terrorist activities did 
not significantly change by their social class levels. As a result, the null 
hypothesis that there is no relationship between arrest and socialclass can be 
rejected. 
Among the theoretical frameworks used in this study, social class of origin 
is relevant to relative deprivation. The concept of relative deprivation refers to a 
state of discontentment. Accordingly, individuals with discontentment make a 
comparison between the economic situations of their groups and other groups or 
between their current and past economic situations. Based on this assumption, 
one can assume that lower class members who come from the poorer sectors of 
society and have parents with low income and education are more likely to feel 
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relative deprivation than higher class members. However, individuals may not 
always make comparisons based on their respective classes. For instance, a 
person who comes from a lower class family may not feel relatively deprived if he 
is content with his current economic situation. Apparently, the social class of 
family or parents becomes less relevant to relative deprivation if the person is 
given adequate opportunities to achieve his expectations.  
When terrorists' education level is tabulated against their social classes, it 
can clearly be seen that one-third of all DHKP/C members seemed to have an 
opportunity to attend a university regardless of their social class (Appendix M). 
This suggested that social class is not relevant to the involvement in terrorist 
activities. Considering that DHKP/C centers its recruitment effort in the slums of 
big cities (such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana) where lower class people 
are concentrated, it can be assumed that having a lower social class level is 
relevant to one‘s recruitment into a terrorist organization. However, social class 
becomes more irrelevant as one becomes more dedicated to terrorism.  
Hypothesis 2 
The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is positively related to 
terrorists’ education levels.  
Hypothesis 2 tested whether arrest is positively related to education. The 
results showed that the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
arrest and education can be rejected for DHKP/C members, but nor for Turkish 
Hezbollah members. The findings for DHKP/C members indicated that as 
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educational level increased, the probability of involvement in terrorist activities 
also increased. If there is a significant relationship between education and arrest, 
then the question is ―in what way is education relevant to arrest?‖  
As mentioned earlier, non-professional terrorists are assigned to carry out 
certain activities on behalf of a terrorist organization. These activities may not 
require militaristic skills but may require some intellectual capacity. For instance, 
organizing a public meeting and running a student association or a solidarity 
association are activities that demand certain communication skills. Therefore, 
DHKP/C members with higher education may have been purposively selected to 
carry out certain missions in the organization.  
Hypothesis testing for Turkish Hezbollah members, on the other hand, 
showed that arrest was not related to education. This can be attributed to the 
difference in modus operandi between the DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah. As 
aforementioned, the Turkish Hezbollah has no legal extension. Missions in the 
organization may not require discrimination between the militants by their 
intellectual levels. Therefore, education levels may not account for the changes 
in the Turkish Hezbollah members' arrest. 
Hypothesis 3 
The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is positively related to 
terrorists’ probability of being unemployed. 
This hypothesis tested whether arrest was related workstatus. The results 
showed that the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between arrest and 
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workstatus can be rejected for DHKP/C members, but nor for Turkish Hezbollah 
members. Hypothesis testing for DHKP/C indicated that the probability of arrest 
for unemployed DHKP/C members was 31 percent higher than for DHKP/C 
members who were working both on part-time or full-time basis (81% vs. 50% 
and 50%). This can be explained by Toby‘s (1957) concept of ―stake in 
conformity‖. In Toby's view, individuals with few or no stakes in conformity are 
more likely to be drawn into deviance (Toby, 1957)36. Accordingly, compared to 
unemployed DHKP/C members, part-time and full-time working DHKP/C 
members have a stake in conformity because they have a job to lose. Hypothesis 
testing for Turkish Hezbollah members, on the other hand, did not show a 
relationship between arrest and workstatus. Although there was a difference in 
the probabilities of arrest between full-time working and unemployed Hezbollah 
members (43% vs. 58%), these probabilities did not significantly deviate from the 
overall probability of arrest (50%).  
Hypothesis 4 
The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is higher for those who 
have lost a loved one in a counter-terrorism operation than for those who 
have not. 
This hypothesis tested whether losing a loved one in a counter-terrorism 
operation (loss) increases the likelihood of participating in terrorist activities 
                                            
36
 Further details regarding Toby‘s concept of stake in conformity is provided in the section(s) on 
theoretical implications in this chapter. 
179 
 
 
(arrest). The results showed that the null hypothesis of no relationship can be 
rejected for DHKP/C, but not for Turkish Hezbollah members. Hypothesis testing 
for DHKP/C members indicated that terrorists who lost a loved one were 28 
percent more likely to be arrested than terrorists who had no such loss (86% vs. 
58%). The significant difference in the probabilities of arrest can be attributed to 
feelings of frustration and desire for revenge37. Such a rationalization is  also 
consistent with the findings of previous studies (Berko & Erez, 2007). 
Accordingly, terrorists who lost a loved one in a counter-terrorism operation may 
have a desire for revenge and therefore may participate in terrorist activities 
more than other terrorists who have no such loss. On the other hand, there was 
some evidence showing that loss may have an effect on Turkish Hezbollah 
members' arrest. The probability of arrest was 14 percent higher for those who 
had a loss than for those who had no loss (61% vs. 47%). However, these 
probabilities were not significantly different than the overall probability of arrest 
(50%). 
Hypothesis 5 
The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is higher for those who 
have dropped out of school than for those who have not. 
Hypothesis 5 tested whether arrest is related to (school) dropout. The 
results indicated that the null hypothesis that arrest is not related to school 
                                            
37
 Revenge is a reasonable explanation given the findings of Berko and Erez (2007), who found 
that Palestinian women terrorists participate in terrorism to seek revenge for their personal 
losses. 
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dropout can be rejected for DHKP/C members but not for Turkish Hezbollah 
members. The analysis for DHKP/C showed that the probability of arrest for 
dropout terrorists was 24 percent higher than for non-dropout terrorists (85% vs. 
61%). The difference can be attributed to feelings of frustration even though 
there is no finding in the literature showing such a relationship. To determine 
whether dropout is a frustration factor, one must first determine the reason for 
dropout. For DHKP/C members, reasons for dropout vary.  
Some terrorists may have simply failed or had to leave school for 
economic or other reasons. This explanation might be true to some extent, but 
still dropout rate was fairly high that almost one half of all DHKP/C members 
(47%) dropped out of school at some level. According to OECD statistics, school 
dropout rate for high school and university students was 20 percent in 1995 in 
Turkey (OECD, 2006). Accordingly, dropout for DHKP/C members considerably 
deviated from the national average. Therefore, there might be some other 
reasons that may account for the high dropout rate for DHKP/C members. There 
are two more possible reasons. First, some terrorists may have chosen to 
dropout to carry out certain missions given by their leaders. Second, some 
terrorists may have been expelled or suspended from school due to the criminal 
or disciplinary sanctions imposed for participating in illegal activities inside or 
outside schools. Considering that terrorists in the dataset had no full membership 
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as of the date they dropped out, the first possibility was not likely38. Therefore, 
this study assumed that a considerable number of school dropout occurred due 
to the criminal or disciplinary sanctions. In both cases (expulsion or suspension), 
dropout occurs against the student‘s will. In other words, in expulsion or 
suspension, dropout does not reflect the individuals‘ own choice. Therefore, 
dropout can be considered a frustration factor39.  
The analysis for Hezbollah members, on the other hand, indicated that 
arrest is not related to school dropout. The probability of arrest was 8 percent 
higher for dropouts than for non-dropouts (57% vs. 49%). The insignificant result 
can be attributed to Turkish Hezbollah‘s recruitment strategy. Accordingly, high 
schools and universities are not the primary recruitment grounds for Turkish 
Hezbollah. This, in turn, eliminates the possibility of participating in illegal 
activities in schools and, therefore, dropping out of school due to the criminal or 
disciplinary sanctions.  
Hypothesis 6 
The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is higher for those who 
have experienced a family arrest than for those who have not. 
This hypothesis tested whether arrest is related to family arrest. The 
results showed that the null hypothesis that arrest is not related to family arrest 
                                            
38
 Autobiographies are submitted to become a full member. Therefore, samples in the datasets 
were assumed to have no full membership.  
39
 Factor analysis in Chapter III showed that dropout (dropout) is the component of the same 
dimension as family arrest (familyarrest) and loss of a loved one (loss) 
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can be rejected. The analysis for DHKP/C members indicated that the probability 
of arrest for those who had a family arrest were 24 percent higher than for those 
who did not have such an experience (80% vs. 56%).  
The difference in the probability of arrest between these two groups can 
be attributed to feelings of frustration and desire for revenge. Based on the 
findings of previous researches on terrorist characteristics, family arrest can be 
considered a potential predictor of frustration (Berko & Erez, 2007; Florez-Morris, 
2007; Soibelman, 2004; Weinberg, et al., 2003; Wells III & Horowitz, 2007; Yom 
& Saleh, 2004). These studies reported that terrorists seek revenge when they 
are frustrated against personal losses, police use of force, and government 
repression (Table 3). By engaging in terrorist activities, individuals may seek 
revenge for the family arrest.  
If family arrest is a frustration factor, then the question is, ―how does 
frustration lead other family members into recruitment and greater involvement in 
terrorist activities?‖ Family members of an arrested person are emotionally pulled 
into a situation, especially by leftist terrorist organizations including the DHKP/C, 
where they feel that they have to favor the actions of terrorists. For instance, 
arrested terrorists are provided legal attorneys by terrorist organizations. This 
does not only comfort the family financially, but cause them to feel grateful to the 
terrorist organization. In addition, the DHKP/C supports a legal association called 
the Association for Solidarity with the Parents of Arrested and Convicted People 
(TAYAD) to help families of arrested and convicted terrorists. Furthermore, the 
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family members of an arrested terrorist are shown great respect. The mother of 
an arrested terrorist is called ―mother‖ by other terrorists. If the terrorist is dead, 
memorial ceremonies are organized every year by the terrorist organization. 
These are only some of the many tactics employed by the DHKP/C and other 
leftist terrorist organizations to win the hearts and minds of families of arrested 
terrorists. The goal is not only to help families but also to recruit new members.  
Hypothesis 7 
The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is higher for those who 
have a family member (father, mother, brother, and sister) associated with 
a terrorist group than for those who do not. 
This hypothesis tested whether arrest was related to family association 
with a terrorist group. The null hypothesis that these two variables are not related 
can be rejected for DHKP/C members, but not for Hezbollah members. The 
analysis for DHKP/C members indicated that the probability of arrest for those 
who had a family association with a terrorist organization was 28 percent higher 
than for those who had no such association (80% vs. 52%). This finding was 
consistent with the literature. Previous studies reported that most terrorists had 
family member(s) who had an affiliation with a terrorist group (Berko & Erez, 
2007; Moghadam, 2003; Sageman, 2004; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987; Wells III & 
Horowitz, 2007).  
The difference in the probability of arrest between these two groups can 
be attributed to the effect of social learning. A terrorist who grows up in a family 
184 
 
 
environment where the ideology of terrorism is favored is likely to have a greater 
involvement in terrorism than a terrorist who grows up in a traditional law-abiding 
family environment. This explanation is consistent with Sutherland‘s (1947) 
differential association theory of crime. Accordingly, a person becomes criminal 
when he or she is exposed to the excess of definitions favorable to the violation 
of law as opposed to the definitions unfavorable to the law. Individuals learn in 
intimate groups. The most important of these groups are families and friends 
(Sutherland, 1947).  
The analysis for Turkish Hezbollah indicated that the probability of arrest 
for those who had a family association with a terrorist group was 10 percent more 
than for those who had no such association (55% vs. 45%). However, the 
difference was not statistically significant. The result showed that social learning 
does not account for the changes in the probability of arrest.  
Hypothesis 8 
The probability of involvement in terrorist activities is higher for those who 
have been first recruited by a family member, relative, or friend than for 
those who have been recruited by other means. 
This hypothesis tested whether arrest was related to recruitment methods. 
The result showed that the null hypothesis that arrest was not related to 
recruitment methods can be rejected for DHKP/C members, but not for Turkish 
Hezbollah members. The test for DHKP/C members indicated that the probability 
of arrest for DHKP/C members who were recruited by their relatives and family 
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members was 24 percent higher than for DHKP/C members who were recruited 
by friends and 28 percent higher than for those who were recruited in prisons, 
demonstrations, or by reading DHKP/C‘s publications (85% vs.61% and 57%). 
This finding was consistent with Weinberg and Eubank‘s (1987) findings that 
families and relatives are the primary agents for one‘s recruitment into a terrorist 
organization.  
The difference in the probability of arrests between these three groups can 
be attributed to the effect of social learning. As mentioned in the previous 
discussion, a terrorist who lives in a family environment where the terrorist 
ideology is favored may have a greater involvement in terrorist activities than a 
terrorist who lives in a conventional, law-abiding family environment where laws 
and rules are favored. Furthermore, the finding points out the relative importance 
of recruitment by family and relatives over recruitment by friends. This relates 
back to Sageman‘s (2004) argument on the importance of the bottom-up 
recruitment strategy for greater security. Sageman (2004) asserted that some 
terrorist organizations employ a bottom-up recruitment strategy by using reliable 
agents for security reasons. Accordingly, those who were recruited by family 
members and relatives may have given delicate assignments (due to their 
reliability) where they faced a greater risk of arrest.  
For Turkish Hezbollah members, however, recruitment by friends seemed 
to be more effective than recruitment by family members and relatives (52% vs. 
47%). However, these probabilities did not significantly deviate from the overall 
186 
 
 
probability of arrest (50%). The finding for Hezbollah members was consistent 
with Sageman's (2004) finding that friends were the primary agents for 
recruitment in the Salafi Mujahidin. Kinship, on the other hand, has a secondary 
importance when compared to friendship (Sageman, 2004, p. 112).  
Hypothesis 9 
Relative deprivation has a significant effect on the probability of 
involvement in terrorist activities controlling for social class, age, gender, 
and marital status. 
This hypothesis tested whether arrest is related to relative deprivation. 
The results showed that the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
arrest and relative deprivation can be rejected for DHKP/C members. Thus, the 
relative deprivation model significantly distinguished between arrested and non-
arrested DHKP/C members. The individual effect of education showed that 
education increased the likelihood of arrest when the effect of work status was 
controlled (zero). This suggested that the resulting gap may have brought about 
a relative deprivation. Such an explanation is consistent with Gurr's (1970) 
concept of aspirational deprivation. As mentioned earlier, Gurr (1970) stated that 
merely increasing the educational level increases the likelihood of relative 
deprivation if the level of actual achievements remains the same. 
The gap between education and work status can clearly be seen in 
descriptive statistics. When DHKP/C members' education was tabulated against 
their work status it was seen that there was a substantial gap between education 
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and work status (Appendix N). Accordingly, almost all (95.5%) of those who had 
some university education were unemployed. Likewise, almost three-fourths 
(74%) of those who had some high school education were unemployed. On the 
other hand, the (average) national unemployment rate was 29 percent for 
university graduates and 31 percent for high school graduates between 1990 and 
1999 (TUIK, 2008)40. The above figures suggested that an average DHKP/C 
member with some university education was 3 times more likely to be 
unemployed than an average citizen in the same educational category. Similarly, 
an average DHKP/C member with some high school education was 2.5 times 
more likely to be unemployed than an average citizen in the same educational 
category. In short, there was some evidence showing that certain DHKP/C 
terrorists may have experienced relative deprivation due to the large discrepancy 
between their educational levels and work status. 
On the other hand, the test for Turkish Hezbollah members showed that 
the arrest was not related to relative deprivation. Thus, the null hypothesis was 
rejected for Turkish Hezbollah members. Furthermore, education did not bring 
about a significant increase in the probability of arrest when the effect of work 
status was controlled (Table 11). Indeed, descriptive statistics suggested some 
evidence for relative deprivation for Hezbollah members. Accordingly, when work 
status was tabulated against the education level, it was clear that there was no 
                                            
40
 The above years represent a period of time when most autobiographies were submitted 
(Teymur, 2007). Therefore, the above national unemployment rate reflected a 10-year average. 
Furthermore, almost four-fifths (79%) of all DHKP/C members were between the ages of 14 and 
25 as of the date they reported their autobiographies (Table 8). Therefore, national rates reflected 
the unemployment rate for those between the ages of 15 and 24. 
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unemployed person among those who had a university education (Appendix O). 
On the other hand, the unemployment rate for those who had some high school 
education was 57 percent. This was 26 percent higher than the (average) 
national unemployment rate of 31 percent for high school graduates and 
suggested that some Turkish Hezbollah members may have experienced a 
relative deprivation. However, the gap between education and work status, or 
relative deprivation, did not seem to have an impact on the probability of arrest. 
Although the model for DHKP/C members was significant, the results 
should be taken with caution in several respects. First, there was no time order 
between dependent and independent variables. Whether unemployment 
preceded arrest or arrest preceded unemployment was not known. Thus, there 
was no way to establish a time order between cause and effect. Second, the 
model is incomplete in the sense that it might not be including all variables 
relevant to relative deprivation. For instance, it lacked information on the length 
of unemployment. Furthermore, people might feel relative deprivation at a 
different level depending on their own specific conditions41. For instance, an 
unemployed university graduate might still not feel relatively deprived if 
supported by his family. Likewise, relative deprivation might not affect a female 
terrorist as it affects a male terrorist. Third, variables lacked some quality. 
However, Sageman (2004)‘s descriptive analysis of the Salafi Mujahidin 
                                            
41
 Social class, age, gender, and marital status were used as control variables to test whether the 
relationship between arrest versus education and work status still exist controlling for these 
variables.   
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measured relative deprivation based on a comparison between the type of 
education and occupational skills. Such a comparison might be more relevant to 
relative deprivation. However, both Sageman‘s (2004) and this study try to 
construct a psychological process (deprivation) using variables that are collected 
from secondary sources. This can be considered a threat to the validity of its 
construct. On the other hand, given the difficulties in data collection methods, 
terrorism researchers are constrained with the information available in secondary 
sources. This analysis is original in the sense that it attempted to measure Gurr's 
(1970) aspirational deprivation using terrorists' own accounts on their education 
levels and work status.  
Hypothesis 10 
Frustration has a significant effect on the probability of involvement in 
terrorist activities controlling for age, gender, and marital status. 
This hypothesis examined the relationship between arrest and frustration. 
The result showed that the null hypothesis that arrest is not related to frustration 
can be rejected for DHKP/C members. The test for DHKP/C members showed 
that arrest is significantly related to the combined effect of dropout, loss, and 
familyarrest controlling for age and maritalstatus. This was not surprising given 
that almost one half of all DHKP/C members had at least one negative life 
experience in the form of loss of a loved one, school dropout, and family arrest 
(Table 8). This suggested that those who faced such an experience may have 
felt frustration against the authority blaming it for their suffering. According to the 
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model, only dropout significantly predicted arrest when other variables (including 
control variables) were held constant42. The individual effect of loss and 
familyarrest was not significant. Despite their statistical insignificance, the effect 
size for both loss and familyarrest was not small (Table 12). 
Hypothesis testing for Hezbollah showed that there is a significant 
relationship between frustration factors and probability of arrest. Hence, the null 
hypothesis can also be rejected for Turkish Hezbollah members. However, loss 
and dropout combined only explained 5 percent of the changes in the probability 
of arrest, which was very small. This indicated that there was some evidence 
showing that Turkish Hezbollah members were frustrated. Yet, there might be 
some other variables that were not included in the model that may account for 
the rest of the variance in arrest.  
Although there was no bivariate relationship between loss and arrest for 
Turkish Hezbollah members, the individual effect of loss on arrest was significant 
when it was controlled by dropout (along with age and maritalstatus as control 
variables) (Table 10). This can be attributable to what researchers call a 
suppressor effect. This occurs in a multivariate model when a variable increases 
the predictive capacity of another variable (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 
2000). In the frustration model for Turkish Hezbollah, the inclusion of dropout 
                                            
42
 The reason for the insignificant effect for loss and familyarrest can be attributable to the 
sensitivity of the Wald test to the small sample size. As mentioned in Chapter IV, although the 
sample size was acceptable, it was still at the margin to conduct a logistic regression analysis. 
When the sample size is small, the risk of running a large standard error is high. This in turn 
lowers the significance of the effect for some variables depending on their distribution across the 
categories of dependent variable.  
191 
 
 
seemed to increase the predictive capacity of loss. When arrest is tabulated 
against loss controlling for dropout, it was seen that the probability of arrest rose 
to 83 percent for non-dropout Hezbollah members who had a loss (Appendix P). 
For other categories such as non-dropouts who had no loss, dropouts who had 
no loss, and dropouts who had loss, the probability of arrest ranged between 45 
to 60 percent. However, there was neither a prior assumption nor a theoretical 
explanation as to why probability of arrest was high for those non-dropout 
Turkish Hezbollah members who had a loss. If, however, the probability of arrest 
had been high for dropouts who had a loss, this would have been attributable to 
the cumulative effect of frustration. Therefore, the suppression effect here seems 
to be illusionary (Pearl, 2000). In other words, the predictive capacity of loss was 
inflated when it was controlled by dropout in the same model. As a result, the 
significance of the frustration model for Turkish Hezbollah members was suspect. 
As can be seen in the above discussion, the frustration model seems to 
have an adequate fit for the DHKP/C dataset but not for the Turkish Hezbollah 
dataset. Several factors might be responsible for the differences between model 
fits. First, in the Turkish Hezbollah dataset the data regarding the family arrest 
was missing. Second, as seen in descriptive statistics (Table 8), there were 
considerable differences between the DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah in the 
number of terrorists who had some negative life experiences. For instance, 
school dropouts accounted for 47 percent of all DHKP/C members but only 10 
percent of all Turkish Hezbollah members. Those who had a loss in a counter-
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terrorism operation accounted for 40 percent of all DHKP/C members but only 16 
percent of all Turkish Hezbollah members. As a result, the model seemed to 
have a better fit for the arrest of DHKP/C members.  
Although there was a good model fit for DHKP/C members, the results 
should be interpreted with caution in some respects. First, it is difficult to 
establish a causal relationship between frustration factors and arrest. The data 
reflects a cross-section of family arrest, school dropout, loss and arrest. As in the 
relative deprivation model, there was no time order between dependent and 
independent variables. Second, the reason for school dropout was uncertain 
even though the number of terrorists who dropped out of school accounted for 
almost half of all DHKP/C members. Third, this study assumes that frustration 
that instigates aggression and involvement in terrorist activities is a form of 
aggression. However, as Dollard et al. (1939) pointed out, aggression may be 
inhibited and frustration may result in covert aggression. In other words, the 
probability of involvement in terrorist activities may still be low for some terrorists 
although they had some negative life experiences. Finally, all three frustration 
factors lack the quality of showing the degree of frustration. Frustration is 
assumed based merely on the existence of any of these factors. On the other 
hand, as cited earlier, Miller et al. (1941) suggested that ―simply occurrence or 
existence of a frustrating event‖ is a sufficient, if not a necessary, condition for 
aggression. As a result, the model explained some of the variance in arrest for 
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DHKP/C members. If only the sample size was large, the significance of the 
overall model and individual variables would be higher.  
Hypothesis 11 
Social learning has a significant effect on the probability of involvement in 
terrorist activities controlling for age, gender, and marital status. 
This hypothesis tested whether the probability of arrest is related to social 
learning. The result showed that the null hypothesis can be rejected for DHKP/C 
members. The analysis for DHKP/C indicated that the probability of involvement 
in terrorist activities is significantly related to the combined effect of social 
learning factors controlling for age and gender. This was expected given the facts 
that more than half of all DHKP/C members (56%) had a family member 
associated to a terrorist group and that more than two-thirds (69%) were 
recruited either by a friend or relative (Table 8). The significance of the overall 
model showed that social learning is possible for terrorists. Hypothesis testing 
concerning the individual effects of familyassociation and recruitment indicated 
that only recruitment by relatives significantly contributed to the model. On the 
other hand, the individual effects of family association with a terrorist group and 
recruitment by friends did not contribute to the model43. Indeed, the recruitment 
method was a more precise measurement of social learning than family 
                                            
43
However, as mentioned earlier, familyassociation and arrest had a significant bivariate 
relationship. This relationship was probably controlled by recruitment (or by one of the categories 
of recruitment). Hypothesis testing for individual effects showed that much of the variance which 
is attributed to the social learning model is explained by recruitment rather than by 
familyassociation.  
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association with a terrorist group as it (recruitment by relatives) also implies 
family association. Further, when familyassociation was tabulated against 
recruitment, it was seen that of the DHKP/C members who reported that they 
were recruited by their relatives, almost all (94%) had a family association 
(Appendix R). This indicated that inclusion of familyassociation in the social 
learning model was redundant.  
Hypothesis testing for Hezbollah showed that there is no significant 
relationship between social learning factors and probability of arrest. That is, the 
social learning model did not fit well with the behaviors of Hezbollah terrorists. 
Hypothesis tests concerning the individual effects of family association and 
recruitment were not conducted as the overall model was not statistically 
significant.  
Overall, the social learning model, like the relative deprivation and 
frustration models, was able to explain some of the variation in the probability of 
arrest for DHKP/C members but not for Turkish Hezbollah members. This time, 
however, the difference between the model for DHKP/C and the model for 
Turkish Hezbollah cannot be attributable to the inadequate number of terrorists 
who had a family association with a terrorist group and who were recruited either 
by a friend or by a relative. As seen in Table 8, those who had a family 
association with a terrorist group accounted for 37 percent; those who were 
recruited by a friend accounted for 35 percent; and those who were recruited by 
a relative accounted for 34 percent of all Turkish Hezbollah members. As seen 
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by these figures, there was an adequate number of cases in each category. 
However, social learning, like relative deprivation and frustration, fell short in 
explaining the probability of arrest (or level of involvement) for Turkish Hezbollah 
members.  
This was probably due to the differences between the DHKP/C and 
Turkish Hezbollah in their modus operandi. Compared to DHKP/C members, 
Turkish Hezbollah members act more clandestinely. This is because of the 
operational tactics adopted by the Turkish Hezbollah. As mentioned earlier, the 
Turkish Hezbollah has two operational units: military and political (Sevinc, 2008). 
Tactically, these units carry out their operations clandestinely and never engage 
in social activities. Contrary to the Turkish Hezbollah, the DHKP/C has three 
operational units: military, political, and legal. Tactically, military and political units 
carry out their operations clandestinely, while legal units engage in social 
activities.  
These tactical differences between the Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C, in 
turn, determine the level of involvement in terrorist activities for individual 
terrorists. As the Turkish Hezbollah acts more clandestinely, its militants act more 
on a professional basis. In other words, Hezbollah terrorists have little room to 
act independently from their leaders. On the other hand, the DHKP/C does not 
entirely act clandestinely. It has a number of legal units in which members in 
such units act on a non-professional basis. Thus, DHKP/C terrorists, especially 
those acting on a non-professional basis, have larger room to make their own 
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decisions with respect to whether to act in specific situations or not. As a result, 
much of the variance in the probability of involvement in terrorist activities for 
Turkish Hezbollah members can probably be explained by organizational factors 
such as organizational status and task in the organization rather than by 
individual factors such as work and educational status.  
Hypothesis 12 
There was no difference in social class levels between the groups of 
arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
This hypothesis was constructed to test whether there was any difference 
in social class levels between arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah 
members. However, it could not be tested due to the unavailability of data 
concerning the social class of Turkish Hezbollah members.  
Hypothesis 13 
There was no difference in education levels between the groups of 
arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
This hypothesis tested whether there is a difference in education levels 
between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah 
members. The result showed that the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
in education between these two groups can be rejected. As seen in Table 15, 
those who had some university education account for 37 percent of all arrested 
DHKP/C members, but only 3 percent of Turkish Hezbollah members.  
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The difference in educational level between these two groups of arrested 
terrorists can be attributed to the differences in the educational level of cities 
where DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members mostly live. Accordingly, the 
DHKP/C usually operates in urban areas, such as Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir. 
Compared to the general population, people living in these cities have higher 
educational levels. For instance, those who have a high school and/or university 
diploma account for 22 percent of the general population. However, those who 
have the same educational level account for 36 percent of the Ankara , 31 
percent of the Istanbul, and 27 percent of the Izmir populations (TUIK, 2008). On 
the other hand, the Turkish Hezbollah mostly operates in the south-eastern part 
of Turkey, such as Diyarbakir, Van, Mardin, and Batman, where the educational 
levels of people are lower than those of the general Turkish population. Those 
who have a high school and/or university diploma account for 7.6 percent of the 
Diyarbakir, 10 percent of the Van, and 12 percent of both the Mardin and Batman 
populations (TUIK, 2008)44. These figures suggested that the difference in 
education between arrested DHKP/C and arrested Hezbollah members can be 
related to the overall education levels in cities where they mostly operate.  
Hypothesis 14 
There was no difference in work status between the groups of arrested 
DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
                                            
44
 The above educational figures reflect the statistics for 2008. The statistics for the years 
between 1990 and 1999 were not available. 
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Hypothesis 14 tested whether there was a difference in work status 
between arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. The result 
indicated that the null hypothesis that there is no difference between these 
groups can be rejected. As seen in Table 15, the unemployment rate was 27 
percent higher for arrested DHKP/C members than for arrested Turkish 
Hezbollah members (79% vs. 52%). On the other hand, the full-time working rate 
was 29 percent less for arrested DHKPC members than for Turkish Hezbollah 
members (10% vs. 39%).    
The above figures suggested that the difference in unemployment rates in 
cities where these two groups mostly operate may account for the difference in 
unemployment rates of their members. Accordingly, the average unemployment 
rates for those who are between the ages of 14 and 25 was 12 percent in cities 
(Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana) where DHKP/C members mostly live; 
whereas the average unemployment rate for the same age group was 14 percent 
in cities where Turkish Hezbollah members mostly live (Diyarbakir, Mardin, Van, 
and Batman)45. This suggested that city of residency does not account for the 
difference in unemployment rates between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and 
arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
Alternatively, the unemployment rate by educational level may account for 
some of the differences in the unemployment rates between these two groups 
                                            
45
 As seen in the descriptive statistics (Table 8), on average, three-fourths of all DHKP/C (78%) 
and more than two-thirds of all Turkish Hezbollah (71%) members were between the ages of 14 
and 24 at the time when they wrote their autobiographies. Therefore, the unemployment rates of 
cities were measured for this age group. In addition, the above unemployment statistics reflect 
the statistics for the years between 1990 and 1999. 
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because unemployment rates may vary by education levels. Accordingly, in cities 
where Turkish Hezbollah members mostly operate, the average unemployment 
rate was 22 percent for those who have a high school diploma; whereas in cities 
where DHKP/C mostly operates the average unemployment rate was 28 percent 
for the same educational level. These figures indicated that high school 
graduates are more likely to be unemployed in big cities where the DHKP/C 
mostly operates than high school graduates in cities where the Turkish Hezbollah 
mostly operates. Considering that most DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah 
members had a high school diploma, this may account for some of the 
differences in unemployment rates between these two groups. However, the 
difference was not that large as to account for all the difference in the 
unemployment rates between arrested DHKP/C and arrested Hezbollah 
members. On the other hand, the above two explanations are based on the 
assumption that employed terrorists seek job opportunities. However, DHKP/C 
members might be ignorant about their unemployment status. They might care 
more about the tasks given by the organization.  
Hypothesis 15 
Arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members were not 
different when compared in respect to having a loved one killed in a 
counter-terrorism operation. 
This hypothesis tested whether there was a difference between the groups 
of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members in terms of having 
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a loved one killed in a counter-terrorism operation. The results showed that the 
null hypothesis that there is no relationship can be rejected. As seen in Table 15, 
arrested DHKP/C members were 33 percent more likely to have a personal loss 
in a counter-terrorism terrorism operation than arrested Turkish Hezbollah 
members (54% vs. 21%). The difference between these two groups can be 
attributed to the difference in the number of terrorists killed from both sides. 
According to official statistics of the Turkish National Police, between 1994 and 
2006, 186 DHKP/C members were killed as opposed to 22 Turkish Hezbollah 
members (TNP, 2006). These figures suggested that DHKP/C members are 
more likely to have a loved one killed in a counter-terrorism operation than 
Hezbollah members. 
Hypothesis 16 
There was no difference in school dropout rates between the groups of 
arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
This hypothesis tested whether there was a difference in school dropout 
rates between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah 
members. The results showed that the null hypothesis that there was no 
difference in school dropout rates between these two groups can be rejected. As 
seen in Table 15, the probability of school dropout for arrested DHKP/C 
members was 42 percent higher than for arrested Turkish Hezbollah members 
(55% vs. 13%). The difference can be attributable to the difference in recruitment 
strategies between the DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah. As aforementioned, high 
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schools and universities are not the primary recruitment grounds for the Turkish 
Hezbollah. Therefore, Hezbollah members do not carry out any political activities 
in schools. This, in turn, eliminates the probability of dropping out of school due 
to the expulsion or suspension for carrying out illegal political activities.  
Hypothesis 17 
Arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members were not 
different when compared with respect to having an arrested family 
member. 
This hypothesis was constructed to test whether there was a difference in 
family arrest between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish 
Hezbollah members. However, it could not be tested due to the unavailability of 
data concerning the family arrest of Turkish Hezbollah members.  
Hypothesis 18 
Arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members were not 
different when compared with respect to having a family member 
associated with a terrorist group.  
Hypothesis 18 tested whether arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish 
Hezbollah members were different in terms of having a family association to a 
terrorist group. The results showed that the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference can be rejected. As seen in Table 15, of all the arrested DHKP/C 
members almost three-fourths (73%) had a family association, while of all the 
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arrested Turkish Hezbollah members less than a half (44%) had a family 
association with a terrorist group. The result can be attributed to the differential 
effects of social learning. In other words, social learning was not as effective in 
Turkish Hezbollah members‘ involvement in terrorist activities as it was in 
DHKP/C members‘ involvement. While a majority (56%) of DHKP/C members 
had a family association with a terrorist group, less than a majority (37%) of 
Turkish Hezbollah members had such an association (Table 8).  
Hypothesis 19 
There was no difference in recruitment methods between the groups of 
arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. 
This hypothesis tested whether there was a difference in recruitment 
methods between the groups of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish 
Hezbollah members. The result showed that the null hypothesis that there was 
no difference between these two groups can be rejected. As seen in Table 15, a 
majority (60%) of the DHKP/C members was recruited by relatives or families. 
On the other hand, most (39%) of the Turkish Hezbollah members were recruited 
by friends.  
The difference between the DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah in the relative 
importance of recruitment methods can be attributable to the difference in their 
recruitment strategies. As mentioned earlier, the DHKP/C is more active in terms 
of mobilizing the families and relatives of their recruits. The DHKP/C recruits 
families of their members to form a public opinion conducive to their desired 
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actions. For instance, the DHKP/C and other leftist terrorist groups once 
organized a campaign named ―Saturday Mothers‖ to protest against the 
disappearances of their relatives by blaming the security forces for the 
responsibility. During this campaign, ―Saturday Mothers‖ gathered on every 
Saturday at the same place holding the pictures of their missing relatives. The 
purpose was to draw domestic and international attention to their struggle with 
the Turkish government. This is only one of the many examples that show the 
DHKP/C‘s ability to recruit the families and relatives of their members. The 
Turkish Hezbollah, however, has no such recruitment strategies. They do not 
choose to mobilize the families of their members because they do not have such 
concern to form a public opinion on their struggles. Unlike the DHKP/C, the 
Turkish Hezbollah is not involved in social activities. The modus operandi is 
based on illegal activities. As a result, for Turkish Hezbollah members, 
recruitment by family members and relatives is secondary when compared to 
recruitment by friends. 
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Table 16: Summary of Research Findings 
 
Variables 
 
Key Findings 
 
 
Social Class 
 
 No significant difference in arrest between classes 
Education  Arrest increased as education increased for DHKP/C  
 No significant difference for Hezbollah members 
Work status  Arrest was higher for unemployed DHKP/C members 
 No significant difference for Hezbollah members 
School Dropout  Arrest was higher for dropout DHKP/C members 
 No significant difference for Hezbollah members 
Loss of a Loved One  Arrest was higher for DHKP/C member who lost loved 
one  
 No significant difference for Hezbollah members 
Family Arrest  Arrest was higher for DHKP/C member who had family 
arrest  
 No significant difference for Hezbollah members. 
Family Association  Arrest was higher for DHKP/C members who had a 
family association  
 No significant difference for Hezbollah members 
Recruitment Method  Arrest was higher for DHKP/C members who were 
recruited by families and relatives 
 No significant difference for Hezbollah members 
Relative Deprivation  Model fit to DHKP/C data. Relative deprivation 
accounts for 34% of the change in arrest 
 Model did not fit Hezbollah data 
Frustration  Model fit to DHKP/C data. Frustration accounts for 29% 
of the change in arrest 
 The model did not fit Hezbollah data 
Social Learning  Model fit to DHKP/C data. Social learning accounts for 
23% of the change in arrest 
 The model did not fit Hezbollah data. 
Arrested DHKP/C vs. 
Arrested Hezbollah  
 Compared to arrested Hezbollah members, arrested 
DHKP/C members were 
o more educated;  
o had a higher unemployment rate;  
o had a higher dropout rate;  
o had a higher rate of loss;  
o had a higher rate of family association; and  
o recruited by families and relatives as opposed 
to friends and other means 
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Theoretical Implications 
Terrorism studies suffer from lack of theoretical guidance that can help 
identify one‘s path to terrorism. Most of the theories applied to the field were 
adapted from other disciplines such as psychology or political science. This 
section aims to connect the findings of the current research to the theoretical 
explanations for involvement in terrorist activities. The findings support the 
following theories of human behaviors: Relative deprivation, stake in conformity, 
frustration-aggression, and social learning. 
Relative Deprivation 
The results of Hypothesis 2, 3 and 9 (the relative deprivation model for 
DHKP/C members) were consistent with Gurr‘s (1970) aspirational deprivation. 
Accordingly, Gurr (1970) asserted that a person may feel relatively deprived if he 
has no means to attain increasing and intensifying expectations. In Gurr‘s (1970) 
opinion, traditional people‘s mere exposure to education increases their 
expectations. Such an increase in expectations may cause a relative deprivation 
if the level of achievement remains the same. The relative deprivation model for 
DHKP/C members showed that Gurr‘s aspirational deprivation can be tested as 
the difference between education and work (employment) status.  
Stake in Conformity 
The results of Hypothesis 3 for DHKP/C members were consistent with 
Toby‘s stake in conformity theory. The difference in arrest rates of unemployed 
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DHKP/C members versus working-full-time and working part-time DHKP/C 
members implied that some of the DHKP/C members who had a job had a stake 
in conformity and they did not want to jeopardize their stakes by engaging in 
terrorist activities. Toby‘s stake in conformity theory asserts that those who have 
a lot to lose would have a fear of being arrested and therefore are less likely to 
engage in deviance. There are two components of stake in conformity: the 
individual‘s emotional attachment to traditional others and their actual and 
expected investment in the traditional society. If an individual has strong 
emotional ties to traditional others such as families and relatives or invests in 
socially valued objectives such as education and business, they have a lot to 
lose if they engage in crime. Tests for work status versus arrest indicated that 
stake in conformity is also possible for terrorists.  
Frustration-Aggression 
The findings from Hypothesis 4, 5, 6 and 10 were consistent with Dollard‘s 
et al.‘s frustration-aggression hypothesis. The frustration-aggression hypothesis 
may explain why some terrorists have a lesser involvement as opposed to some 
others who have a greater involvement in terrorism. Some terrorists join a 
terrorist organization simply because they are politically discontented from the 
existing regime. Those who are politically discontented may prefer to keep a low 
profile and participate in less risky activities. Having political discontent only may 
be what Berkowitz (1962) calls as simple deprivation rather than frustration. A 
politically deprived person may prefer to overcome his deprivation by joining a 
207 
 
 
terrorist organization. However, he may not be willing to take this further 
especially if he has a stake in conformity such as having a regular job or 
education. In such a situation, the involvement level is expected to be low.  
On the other hand, some terrorists are already ready for terrorist activities 
of all kinds when they are first recruited. Mostly, these terrorists inherit their 
motivations from their family, relatives, and associates. This group of terrorists 
can be categorized under two subgroups: (1) Those who are motivated positively 
by learning a terrorist ideology from their close associates; and (2) Those who 
are motivated negatively by experiencing a frustrating event in their life such as 
school dropout, death or arrest of a family member or a close associate. Those in 
the second group develop frustration against government if they are convinced 
that government has the primary responsibility for their suffering. When such 
individuals are recruited into a terrorist organization, they may prefer to keep a 
high profile and participate in more risky activities.  
Bivariate analysis of arrest versus dropout, loss, and familyarrest for 
DHKP/C members indicated that each of these negative life experiences is a 
potential frustration factor. Likewise, multivariate analysis of the frustration model 
for DHKP/C members showed that the combined effect of dropout, loss, and 
familyarrest accounts for 28 percent of the changes in arrest. The significance of 
the combined effect supported the proposition that frustration develops 
cumulatively (Dollard, 1939).  
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Social Learning 
The finding that DHKP/C members who had a family association had a 
greater involvement in terrorist activities supported Sutherland‘s  (1947) 
differential association theory. Sutherland (1947) asserted that criminal behaviors 
are learned in intimate groups. Accordingly, family and friends are the two 
prominent intimate groups in which a person learns criminal behaviors. The 
multivariate model of social learning for DHKP/C members explained 23 percent 
of the changes in arrest. The analysis showed that the recruitment method, as a 
variable, is a more direct measurement of learning than family association. This 
variable also significantly distinguished between the methods of recruitment. The 
results showed that the DHKP/C uses families and relatives more than friends in 
recruitment and that those who were recruited by families and relatives had a 
greater involvement level when compared to those who were recruited by friends 
and by other means (in prisons or by reading the organization‘s publications). 
This finding was also consistent with what Sageman (2004) defined as the 
bottom-up recruitment approach. In this method of recruitment, terrorists are 
recruited through reliable agents rather than those assigned for recruiting new 
members. On the other hand, recruitment by friends did not distinguish terrorists 
by their involvement level.  
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Policy Implications 
The results of this study have a number of policy implications for policy 
makers, security forces, and terrorism scholars regarding sources of deprivation, 
frustration, and learning for terrorists. Besides, the data also sheds light on some 
demographic characteristics of terrorists regarding their age, gender, marital 
status, education levels, and social class. 
1. Policy makers should consider integrating socially valued goals and 
means and redistribution of opportunities.  
Education is one of the factors that distinguish terrorists in terms of their 
involvement level in terrorist activities. A bivariate analysis of the relationship 
between involvement in terrorism and education, however, helps little to 
understand the origins of the problem. The relative deprivation model, on the 
other hand, suggested that education alone does not suffice to solve economic 
problems, but individuals should be given employment opportunities consistent 
with their education. The national statistics in Turkey showed that schooling ratio 
(ratio of the total number of students in a specific educational category to the 
population of their age group) in higher education alone doubled for the last 
decade (increased from 19% in 1997 to 38% in 2007) (TUIK, 2008). However, 
employment rates for people who had a university degree dropped by 3 percent 
for the same period (from 75.2% in 1997 to 71% in 2007) (TUIK, 2008). These 
figures indicated an increase in the number of unemployed people with a 
university degree. The increasing gap between the education level and 
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employment opportunities suggest that policy makers should focus on policies 
that would increase the employment opportunities for educated people. 
Otherwise, merely providing an education level without providing employment 
opportunities would help to increase economic deprivation.  
2. Decisions regarding the expulsion or suspension of students who are 
charged with participating in illegal activities in or outside the school 
should be based on a court order rather than on administrative discretion. 
School dropout was another factor that distinguished between the 
terrorists in terms of their involvement in terrorist activities. Even though the 
reason was not known, high school dropout rate for DHKP/C members, which 
was well above the national average (47% vs. 20%), suggested that dropouts 
probably may have left the school due to expulsion or suspension for 
participating illegal activities in or outside the school. Prohibiting illegal activities 
is an important policy for school administrations to maintain educational discipline 
and keep students focused on their educational objectives. Further, expulsion or 
suspension of students who are involved in illegal activities can make school 
environment safer, but expelled and suspended students are likely to have 
greater involvement in illegal activities. Therefore, decision-making regarding the 
expulsion or suspension of a student should be based on a court order rather 
than on administrative discretion. Furthermore, individuals who dropped out of 
school at some point in their educational career should be given opportunities to 
complete their education. 
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3. Counter-terrorism officers should be trained in communication skills to 
prevent traumatic implications of arrests that are made in the alleged 
terrorist’s home.  
Another significant finding relates to the arrest of a family member. Arrests 
that are made in the alleged terrorist‘s home may have traumatic implications for 
family members especially for children. Although some socio-demographic 
factors such as family members‘ having a prior association with a terrorist 
organization negatively affect attitudes towards the police, officers‘ 
communication skills help reduce incompliance and establish a positive 
relationship. Police officers should be trained in communicating with people with 
different backgrounds and attitudes and in minimizing violent response and 
excessive use of force in order to prevent collateral damage.  
4. Policies under which personal losses (death) occur should be revised.  
Loss of a loved one is another factor that had an effect on the probability 
of arrest of DHKP/C members Even though there are no statistics showing the 
number of deaths or killed terrorists for specific reasons, it can be assumed that 
most deaths and killing occurred as a result of a police or military operation. In 
the past when technical surveillance capacity of the police was weaker than 
today, raiding terrorist cells was the only way to capture terrorists. Most of the 
time, terrorists would strike back and not surrender. Most of the casualties from 
both security forces and terrorists occurred in such police operations. Today the 
police have more technical capacity to intern terrorists outside their home. Unless 
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there is an urgent circumstance, police should consider arresting terrorists 
outside their cells. This would reduce the number of casualties of both police and 
terrorists. Overall, policies under which personal losses (death) occur should be 
revised.  
Suggestions for Future Studies 
1. Involvement in terrorist activities should be examined qualitatively to 
explore the qualitative values of terrorists. 
One of the contributions of this study to the field of terrorism would be to 
consider involvement in terrorism as a process in a terrorist‘s life. The study of 
terrorism, in general, does not distinguish between the different processes of a 
typical terrorist‘s life. Most studies centered their focus on who becomes a 
terrorist or who joins a terrorist organization. The literature review revealed that 
the process of joining a terrorist organization has long been studied. On the other 
hand, the process of involvement in terrorism has rarely attracted the attention of 
terrorism scholars. However, there are many terrorists who act on what this study 
calls a ―non-professional‖ basis. These terrorists drift in and out of terrorism and 
maintain a regular lifestyle at the same time. This study revealed, at least for 
DHKP/C members, that there are some personal factors other than the 
organizational dynamics that may have an effect on a terrorist‘s decision to 
participate in a terrorist activity in which he or she has some freedom. This study 
extracted potential motivators (personal factors) from the terrorist autobiography 
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and categorized them under different theoretical frameworks based on the 
findings of literature and factor analysis.  
Obviously, the quantitative nature of measurements provides limited 
understanding of the qualitative aspects of the motivations. Terrorism scholars 
should focus on what ways school dropout, family arrest, loss of a loved one and 
other factors increase the likelihood of participating in terrorist activities. In this 
sense, future studies should consider the qualitative analysis of the potential 
motivations of the involvement process. In other words, terrorism scholars should 
focus on understanding the mindset of a typical terrorist rather simply describing 
certain characteristics. This can be achieved through qualitative research 
methods such as field observations. Researchers should observe the culture in 
which individuals are exposed to the definitions that are favorable to terrorism. 
2. Theoretical models can be improved. 
Theoretical models used in this study can be improved. For relative 
deprivation, the categorical nature of work status and education may probably 
have caused a significant information loss. However, future studies can employ 
more reliable measures for education and work status. For instance, researchers 
can compute a relative deprivation score based on education and work status. If 
relative deprivation is the discrepancy between expectation and achievements, 
the difference between the values (scores) of education and work status should 
result in a relative deprivation value (score). Since these two variables are not 
measuring the same concept, mathematical subtraction should base the z-score 
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of each one. For frustration, another score can be computed by taking the 
cumulative scores of frustration measures. Alternatively, when testing a 
frustration model for a given outcome, frustration variables should be entered into 
analysis hierarchically. That way a researcher can measure the relative weight of 
each frustration variable.  
3. Quantitative findings should be interpreted through qualitative findings. 
This study lacks qualitative analysis. However, most of the findings 
warranted qualitative data for further clarification. Future studies should include 
actual statements of terrorists. These statements can be obtained from 
secondary sources such as biographies and autobiographies or primary sources 
such as interviews with terrorists. Qualitative analysis would help the researcher 
understand how relative deprivation, frustration, and social learning processes 
work in practice. Thus, a researcher can use more reliable theoretical models to 
understand how each of these processes develops and at what points alternative 
explanations can be used.  
Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was two-fold. First, this study attempted to 
explore the factors that may have an effect on the probability of arrest. To 
achieve the first objective, 12 different hypotheses were developed. Each 
hypothesis was tested twice once for DHKP/C members and once for Turkish 
Hezbollah members. The first eight hypotheses were tested using crosstab 
analysis with a Pearson chi-square significance test. The results showed that 
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there were statistically significant differences in the probability of arrest for 
DHKP/C members in respect to their education, work status, school dropout 
rates, having a loss of a loved one in a counter-terrorism operation, family arrest 
records, family association with a terrorist organization, and recruitment methods. 
However, there were no statistically significant differences in the probability of 
arrest for Turkish Hezbollah members in respect to any of these of variables. The 
next three hypotheses were designed to test whether the relative deprivation, 
frustration, and social learning concepts significantly predict the probability of 
arrest. These hypotheses were tested using logistic regression analysis. The 
results showed that the relative deprivation, frustration, and social learning model 
significantly predict the probability of arrest for DHKP/C members. On the other 
hand, none of these theoretical models significantly predicts the probability of 
arrest for Turkish Hezbollah members.  
Second, this study also examined the similarities and differences between 
the groups of arrested DHKP/C and arrested Turkish Hezbollah members. To 
achieve this objective, 8 different hypotheses were developed. These hypotheses 
were tested using crosstab analysis with a Pearson chi-square significance test. 
The results showed that there were significant differences between these two 
groups in respect to their education, work status, school dropout rates, having a 
loss of a loved in a counter terrorism operation, having a family association with a 
terrorist group, and recruitment methods. On the other hand, hypotheses 
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regarding differences in social class and family arrest could not be tested due to 
the unavailability of the data for Turkish Hezbollah.  
This research has some implications for theory, policy, and future studies. 
First, the findings supported the relative deprivation, frustration-aggression, and 
social learning theories and indicated that relative deprivation, frustration, and 
social learning can be applicable to the behaviors of individual terrorists.  
Second, the findings suggested that policy makers focus on polices that would 
integrate social goals and means; revise educational policies concerning the 
expulsion and suspension of students at schools, train police officers in 
communication skills, and revise guidelines concerning counter-terrorism 
operations. Finally, the findings suggested that future research use qualitative 
research methods to understand the qualitative aspects of terrorists‘ motivations. 
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Appendix A 
Correlations 
  Education Dropout Loss Familyassoc Familyarrest Recruitment Workstat 
Education Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .300** -.112 -.093 .035 .240 -.181 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .009 .362 .454 .792 .050 .137 
N 74 74 68 67 59 67 69 
Dropout Pearson 
Correlation 
.300
** 1 .317** .058 .059 .272 -.107 
Sig. (2-tailed) .009  .009 .641 .655 .026 .380 
N 74 74 68 67 59 67 69 
Loss Pearson 
Correlation 
-.112 .317** 1 .329** .360** .210 -.098 
Sig. (2-tailed) .362 .009  .010 .008 .101 .439 
N 68 68 68 61 54 62 64 
Familyassoc Pearson 
Correlation 
-.093 .058 .329** 1 .821** .240 -.159 
Sig. (2-tailed) .454 .641 .010  .000 .063 .218 
N 67 67 61 67 54 61 62 
Familyarrest Pearson 
Correlation 
.035 .059 .360** .821** 1 .333 -.180 
Sig. (2-tailed) .792 .655 .008 .000  .015 .189 
N 59 59 54 54 59 53 55 
Recruitment Pearson 
Correlation 
.240 .272 .210 .240 .333 1 .050 
Sig. (2-tailed) .050 .026 .101 .063 .015  .697 
N 67 67 62 61 53 68 63 
Workstat Pearson 
Correlation 
-.181 -.107 -.098 -.159 -.180 .050 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .137 .380 .439 .218 .189 .697  
N 69 69 64 62 55 63 70 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix B 
 
Familyarrest * Familyassoc Crosstabulation 
   Familyassoc 
Total    No Yes 
Familyarrest No Count 18 5 23 
% within Familyarrest 78.3% 21.7% 100.0% 
Yes Count 0 31 31 
% within Familyarrest .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 18 36 54 
% within Familyarrest 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Outlier Statistics
a 
  Case Number Statistic 
Mahal. Distance 1 60 18.061 
2 73 16.846 
3 75 14.920 
4 58 13.300 
5 57 11.335 
6 74 10.408 
7 59 10.362 
8 38 9.815 
9 31 9.755 
10 13 8.901 
a. Dependent Variable: Arrest 
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Appendix D 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .495 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 34.926 
df 15 
Sig. .000 
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Appendix E 
Correlations 
  Education Dropout Loss Familyassoc Recruitment Workstat 
Education Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .237** .019 .103 -.036 -.022 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .007 .836 .254 .693 .825 
N 129 129 127 124 125 101 
Dropout Pearson 
Correlation 
.237
** 1 .231** .024 -.028 -.044 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007  .009 .788 .753 .663 
N 129 129 127 124 125 101 
Loss Pearson 
Correlation 
.019 .231** 1 -.066 -.065 .063 
Sig. (2-tailed) .836 .009  .448 .450 .505 
N 127 127 141 133 137 114 
Familyassoc Pearson 
Correlation 
.103 .024 -.066 1 -.068 -.084 
Sig. (2-tailed) .254 .788 .448  .436 .388 
N 124 124 133 136 132 109 
Recruitment Pearson 
Correlation 
-.036 -.028 -.065 -.068 1 .069 
Sig. (2-tailed) .693 .753 .450 .436  .474 
N 125 125 137 132 139 111 
Workstat Pearson 
Correlation 
-.022 -.044 .063 -.084 .069 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .825 .663 .505 .388 .474  
N 101 101 114 109 111 115 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix F 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .496 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 13.590 
df 15 
Sig. .557 
 
 
Appendix G 
Univariate Statistics 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Missing No. of Extremesb 
 Count Percent Low High 
Arrest 72 .72 .451 3 4.0 0 0 
Gender 75 .67 .475 0 .0 0 0 
Age 75 23.43 5.875 0 .0 0 6 
Education 74 2.85 1.016 1 1.3 0 0 
Maritalstatus 75 .11 .311 0 .0 . . 
Socialclass 65 2.80 1.492 10 13.3 0 0 
Dropout 74 .47 .503 1 1.3 0 0 
Familyarrest 59 .58 .498 16 21.3 0 0 
Loss 68 .44 .500 7 9.3 0 0 
Familyassoc 67 .63 .487 8 10.7 0 0 
        
a. . indicates that the inter-quartile range (IQR) is zero. 
b. Number of cases outside the range (Q1 - 1.5*IQR, Q3 + 1.5*IQR). 
 
 
Appendix H 
EM Means
a 
Arrest Gender Age Education Maritalstatus Socialclass Dropout Familyarrest Loss Familyassoc 
.72 .68 23.58 2.83 .10 2.73 .48 .55 .44 .64 
a. Little's MCAR test: Chi-Square = 92.618, DF = 95, Sig. = .550 
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Appendix I 
Separate Variance t Tests
a 
  Arrest Socialclass Familyarrest Loss Familyassoc 
Socialclass 
t .6 . .4 -1.1 .3 
df 8.3 . 9.0 8.8 7.2 
P(2-tail) .582 . .672 .311 .778 
# Present 64 65 51 60 60 
# Missing 8 0 8 8 7 
Mean(Present) .73 2.80 .59 .42 .63 
Mean(Missing) .63 . .50 .63 .57 
Familyarrest 
t -.6 -.5 . .7 1.3 
df 20.9 19.8 . 20.5 17.2 
P(2-tail) .547 .592 . .487 .211 
# Present 58 51 59 54 54 
# Missing 14 14 0 14 13 
Mean(Present) .71 2.75 .58 .46 .67 
Mean(Missing) .79 3.00 . .36 .46 
Loss 
t -1.0 .6 1.9 . -.2 
df 8.0 4.5 4.9 . 5.9 
P(2-tail) .359 .601 .109 . .849 
# Present 65 60 54 68 61 
# Missing 7 5 5 0 6 
Mean(Present) .71 2.83 .61 .44 .62 
Mean(Missing) .86 2.40 .20 . .67 
Familyassoc 
t -1.2 -.3 -.1 -.7 . 
df 10.2 4.8 4.6 7.3 . 
P(2-tail) .240 .757 .923 .514 . 
# Present 64 60 54 61 67 
# Missing 8 5 5 7 0 
Mean(Present) .70 2.78 .57 .43 .63 
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Mean(Missing) .87 3.00 .60 .57 . 
For each quantitative variable, pairs of groups are formed by indicator variables (present, missing). 
a. Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed. 
 
 
Appendix J 
Univariate Statistics 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Missing No. of Extremesb 
 Count Percent Low High 
Arrest 138 .49 .502 6 4.2 0 0 
Gender 144 1.01 .083 0 .0 . . 
Age 132 19.08 5.154 12 8.3 0 3 
Maritalstatus 140 .30 .460 4 2.8 0 0 
Education 129 2.42 .966 15 10.4 0 0 
Dropout 129 .11 .312 15 10.4 . . 
Loss 141 .16 .371 3 2.1 . . 
Familyassoc 136 .39 .489 8 5.6 0 0 
a. . indicates that the inter-quartile range (IQR) is zero. 
b. Number of cases outside the range (Q1 - 1.5*IQR, Q3 + 1.5*IQR). 
 
 
Appendix K 
EM Means
a 
Arrest Gender Age Marital_rec Educ_rec Dropout Loss 
Familyasso
c 
.48 1.01 19.05 .30 2.41 .11 .16 .39 
a. Little's MCAR test: Chi-Square = 93.165, DF = 82, Sig. = .188 
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Appendix L 
Separate Variance t Tests
a 
  Arrest Age Educ_rec Dropout Familyassoc 
Age 
t 1.6 . .0 .0 .9 
df 12.1 . 9.1 9.1 12.0 
P(2-tail) .143 . .938 .981 .405 
# Present 127 132 120 120 125 
# Missing 11 0 9 9 11 
Mean(Present) .50 19.08 2.42 .11 .40 
Mean(Missing) .27 . 2.44 .11 .27 
Education 
t 1.0 -3.2 . . .4 
df 16.1 11.9 . . 13.2 
P(2-tail) .324 .007 . . .684 
# Present 124 120 129 129 124 
# Missing 14 12 0 0 12 
Mean(Present) .50 18.45 2.42 .11 .40 
Mean(Missing) .36 25.33 . . .33 
Dropout 
t 1.0 -3.2 . . .4 
df 16.1 11.9 . . 13.2 
P(2-tail) .324 .007 . . .684 
# Present 124 120 129 129 124 
# Missing 14 12 0 0 12 
Mean(Present) .50 18.45 2.42 .11 .40 
Mean(Missing) .36 25.33 . . .33 
Familyassoc 
t -.4 -.4 .6 4.0 . 
df 6.6 6.6 4.4 123.0 . 
P(2-tail) .676 .721 .583 .000 . 
# Present 131 125 124 124 136 
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# Missing 7 7 5 5 0 
Mean(Present) .48 19.03 2.43 .11 .39 
Mean(Missing) .57 19.86 2.20 .00 . 
For each quantitative variable, pairs of groups are formed by indicator variables (present, missing). 
a. Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed. 
 
Appendix M 
Education * Socialclass Crosstabulation 
   Socialclass 
Total 
   
Under 
Class 
Working 
Poor 
Working 
class 
Lower 
Middle 
Class 
Upper 
Middle 
Class 
Education Primary 
School 
Count 3 1 1 3 1 9 
% within 
Educ_rec 
33.3% 11.1% 11.1% 33.3% 11.1% 100.0% 
Middle 
School 
Count 3 2 2 3 1 11 
% within 
Educ_rec 
27.3% 18.2% 18.2% 27.3% 9.1% 100.0% 
High School Count 8 2 2 10 3 25 
% within 
Educ_rec 
32.0% 8.0% 8.0% 40.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
University Count 7 2 5 2 4 20 
% within 
Educ_rec 
35.0% 10.0% 25.0% 10.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 21 7 10 18 9 65 
% within 
Educ_rec 
32.3% 10.8% 15.4% 27.7% 13.8% 100.0% 
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Appendix N 
Education * workstatus Crosstabulation 
   workstatus1 
Total 
   
Unemployed 
Working Part-
time 
Working Full-
time 
Education Primary School Count 8 1 1 10 
% within Education 80.0% 10.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Middle School Count 13 0 1 14 
% within Education 92.9% .0% 7.1% 100.0% 
High School Count 17 3 3 23 
% within Education 73.9% 13.0% 13.0% 100.0% 
University Count 21 0 1 22 
% within Education 95.5% .0% 4.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 59 4 6 69 
% within Education 85.5% 5.8% 8.7% 100.0% 
 
  
237 
 
 
Appendix O 
Education * workstat Crosstabulation 
   workstat 
Total 
   
Unemployed 
Working Part-
time Working-Fulltime 
Education Primary School Count 11 3 12 26 
% within Education 42.3% 11.5% 46.2% 100.0% 
Middle School Count 7 0 7 14 
% within Education 50.0% .0% 50.0% 100.0% 
High School Count 32 4 20 56 
% within Education 57.1% 7.1% 35.7% 100.0% 
University Count 0 1 4 5 
% within Education .0% 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 50 8 43 101 
% within Education 49.5% 7.9% 42.6% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX P 
Loss * Arrest * Dropout Crosstabulation 
Dropout 
Arrest 
Total No Yes 
0 Loss No Count 53 44 97 
% within Loss 54.6% 45.4% 100.0% 
Yes Count 2 10 12 
% within Loss 16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 55 54 109 
% within Loss 50.5% 49.5% 100.0% 
1 Loss No Count 4 5 9 
% within Loss 44.4% 55.6% 100.0% 
Yes Count 2 3 5 
% within Loss 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 6 8 14 
% within Loss 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 
 
APPENDIX R 
Recruitment * Familyassoc Crosstabulation 
   Familyassoc 
Total    Yes 2 
Recruitment Relative Count 12 4 16 
% within Recruitment 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Friend Count 2 29 31 
% within Recruitment 6.5% 93.5% 100.0% 
Others Count 8 6 14 
% within Recruitment 57.1% 42.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 22 39 61 
% within Recruitment 36.1% 63.9% 100.0% 
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